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Rapid development of information technology leads to the current networked and
social economy, where social interactions become increasingly prevalent and inﬂu-
ential in the consumer market. Through various popular social media, consumers
can easily access any information about particular products or services, where rec-
ommendations, opinions, and choices of others signiﬁcantly inﬂuence their purchase
decisions. The inﬂuence of social interactions brings not only opportunities for ﬁrms
to survive and succeed, but also challenges in operations management in the ﬁercely
competitive market.
Under social interactions, ﬁrms should be equipped with ﬁtting operational ca-
pabilities to achieve proﬁtability, market share expansion, product and brand recog-
nition as well as customer loyalty enhancement. From the practical point of view,
how operational decisions should be adapted to the changes of consumer purchase
behaviors is a critical challenge for managers to tackle in order to better leverage the
inﬂuence of social interactions. From the academic perspective,the impact of social
interactions on operational decisions and its managerial implications is worth inves-
tigation. Therefore, in this dissertation, we focus on operational decisions including
capacity, price and quality under social interactions.
We ﬁrst investigate capacity/service rate and price decisions in a ﬁxed size
consumer market under competition with two homogeneous ﬁrms. Although social
interactions can always beneﬁt a monopolistic ﬁrm, under competition, ﬁrms can
beneﬁt from social interactions depending on market size and social interaction in-
tensity. We demonstrate that a small market or a higher social interaction intensity
will lead to a higher service rate or a lower price which reduces ﬁrm proﬁt; while con-
sumers may always beneﬁt from social interactions with positive expected surplus.
If the market size is large or the social interaction intensity is low, ﬁrms may still
get beneﬁt from social interactions, where price and service rate can be determined
to extract all consumer expected surplus.
Next, we focus on how managers can better leverage social interactions in oper-
ations to increase proﬁtability, by focusing on the price and capacity decisions of a
monopolistic ﬁrm in a market with repeated interactions. The main result indicates
that under social interactions, strategic pricing or capacity policies always induce a
monotonic arrival rate path, which converges to a unique steady state. A lower price
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or a higher capacity decision is desired to build up a larger customer base which
will induce more potential consumers under social interactions. If price and capacity
are simultaneously determined, a lower proﬁt margin may be expected to increase
the customer base. Strategic policies can always achieve a larger proﬁt after initial
periods when a larger market base has been established due to social interactions.
We then investigate the impact of social interactions on resource investment
decisions on service quality, termed as service eﬀort decisions for a proﬁt maximiz-
ing ﬁrm. Under social interactions, particularly the word-of-mouth communication,
heterogeneous consumers are backward-looking and adaptive in purchase decision-
making. Service eﬀort decisions impact both post-purchase experiences pre-purchase
expectations which aﬀect consumer satisfaction. It is found that optimal service ef-
fort policies always induce monotonic overall experience paths which converge to a
unique steady state level. Social interactions always lead to a higher steady state
service eﬀort level, especially due to the negative social interaction eﬀect. Under
satisfaction-dependent social interactions, a constant service eﬀort policy may be
optimal to oﬀer consistent quality of service, especially when consumers have high
initial expectations.
This dissertation adopts multiple research methodologies to build analytical
models to investigate operational decisions under social interactions, including game
theoretical analysis, queueing theory, and dynamic programming techniques. Based
on the analytical results, the contribution of this dissertation lies in oﬀering fresh
insights and better understanding on the impact of social interactions in operational
decisions and performance, and opening new avenues for future research in operations
management under social interactions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Background
Rapid development of information technology and wide availability of internet con-
nection have lead to the current networked and social economy. In the consumer
market, due to various vastly emerging and increasingly popular social media, such
as social networking sites, instant messengers and on-line virtual communities, con-
sumption styles and customer purchase behavior have been inﬂuenced and changed
signiﬁcantly. Nowadays, consumers are inﬂuenced more and more by others through
social interactions when making consumption decisions, since they can easily ac-
cess any information about goods or services they intend to buy. A recent survey
by McKinsey Global Institute reveals that, 80% of the current 1.5 billion social net-
working users interact with social networks regularly, while 1/3 of consumer spending
could be inﬂuenced by social shopping (Chiu et al., 2012b). The increasing inﬂuence
of social interactions in consumer decision making is not only prevailing in mature
markets but also growing in emerging economies, like China, where 66% of Chinese
consumers rely on recommendations from friends and family (Chiu et al., 2012a).
It has been observed for several decades in various disciplines that due to social
interactions, decisions made by individuals are inﬂuenced by their observations, per-
ceptions, or anticipations of decisions made by others (Cialdini, 2001; Lopez-Pintado
and Watts, 2008). Pioneered by Becker (1974), the impact of social interactions on
individual social and economic behaviors, such as investment in education, crime in a
neighborhood (Glaeser et al., 1996), drug abuse, political opinion formation, etc. in a
society (Brock and Durlauf (2001), Lopez-Pintado and Watts (2008)), as well as con-
sumption choices, diﬀusion of products and innovations, etc. in consumer markets,
has been studied for several decades. Scheinkman (2004) deﬁnes social interactions
as the “particular forms of externalities, in which the actions of a reference group act
on an individual’s preferences.” Due to social interactions, “the utility or payoﬀ an
individual receives from a given action depends directly on the choices of others in
that individual’s reference group” (Brock and Durlauf, 2001), and individual actions
may aﬀect the constraints, expectations, and/orpreferences of others (Manski, 2000).
Many factors or underlying forces that drive individuals to be susceptible to so-
cial inﬂuences from interactions with others when making social and economic choices
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have been identiﬁed and analyzed. Summarized by Lopez-Pintado and Watts (2008),
individuals may desire to be recognized within certain social groups (Festinger et al.,
1950), to be diﬀerentiated from others (Simmel, 1957), to avoid anticipated sanc-
tions due to peer pressure by conforming to group behavior (Kandel and Lazear,
1992), or as a socially conditioned response to authority (Milgram, 1969); following
the choices of others may serve as a means of reducing the complexity of decision-
making processes (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Due to information asymmetry when
making choices, individuals may herd as a way of inferring otherwise inaccessible
information (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992,
1998; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002). For some products or services, such as the
telecommunication service, due to network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985,
1994), the utility of the product or service to an individual is positively related to
the network size which drives consumers to purchase the same brand.
Social interactions among individuals result in the interdependence between
individual decision-makers, which in turn aﬀect the collective behavior of the corre-
sponding population dramatically in an aggregate level. Theoretical and empirical
studies have documented various social and economic phenomena due to the inﬂu-
ence of social interactions on individual decision-making, such as the sudden change
of a neighborhood from integrated to segregated (Schelling, 1971), the popularity
of books, songs and movies from nowhere to become a hit (Salganik et al., 2006),
and the markets locked in to inferior technology (Arthur and Lane, 1993), the herd-
ing behavior in the ﬁnancial market (Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Bikhchandani and
Sharma, 2001) and online market (Onnela and Reed-Tsochas, 2010).
The inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer purchase decisions is also preva-
lent, which has been widely investigated. Due to social interactions, consumers are
inﬂuenced substantially by the reference group eﬀect (Bearden and Etzel, 1982), ob-
servational learning (OL) (Cai et al., 2009), word-of-mouth communication (WOM),
etc. in purchase decision-making. Three reference group eﬀects have been identiﬁed,
namely informational, utilitarian, and value-expressive inﬂuence, where a reference
group is “a person or group of people that signiﬁcantly inﬂuences an individual’s be-
havior ” (Park and Lessig, 1977). Informational inﬂuence is due to uncertainty about
the product or service, such as the quality. Utilitarian inﬂuence refers to the attempts
to comply with the wishes of others to achieve rewards or avoid punishments. Value-
expressive inﬂuence is characterized by the need for psychological association with a
person or group and is reﬂected in the acceptance of positions expressed by others.
As a particular way of social interactions, WOM is “the primary factor behind 20%
to 50% of all purchase decisions” and the inﬂuence is “greatest when customers are
buying a product for the ﬁrst time or when products are relatively expensive” (Bughin
et al., 2010).
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Two categories of models that incorporate social interactions in consumer choices,
namely the “heuristic” models and “utility” models (Lopez-Pintado and Watts, 2008),
have been developed. Heuristic models include the diﬀusion models of innovations
and collective actions, such as those developed in Anderson and May (1991), Glaeser
et al. (1996), Granovetter (1978), and Watts (2002). In those models, individuals
adopt simple rules as a function of previous decisions of other actors. In market-
ing research, the Bass model of diﬀusion (Bass, 1969) belongs to the category of
heuristic models. Relying on utility functions to describe individual preferences,
utility models incorporate social inﬂuences directly based on assumptions about the
psychological or economic details of the human decision-making process. Herding
models (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992, 1998) due to incomplete infor-
mation and consumer observational learning behaviors are typical examples. The
anti-coordination games (Bramoullé, 2007), and coordination games (Ellison, 1993;
Kandori et al., 1993; Morris, 2000; Young, 1998) are other typical examples of utility
models.
The prevailing social media facilitates social interactions among consumers sub-
stantially and ampliﬁes and accelerates the inﬂuence in consumer purchase behaviors
to a great extent. Social interactions bring not only opportunities for ﬁrms to expand
market share, achieve stable growth and increase proﬁtability, but also challenges
operations management to better serve increasingly demanding consumers. Taking
WOM as an example, “   word-of-mouth is no longer an act of intimate, one-on-
one communication. Today, it also operates on a one-to-many basis    . Some
customers even create web sites or blogs to praise or punish brands” (Bughin et al.,
2010). However, “few have a deep understanding of exactly how social media interacts
with consumers” (Divol et al., 2012), although companies are investing substantial
resources into social media. Therefore, better understanding of the inﬂuence of social
interactions in consumer purchase decisions is critical in operations. From a man-
agerial perspective, how operational decisions are impacted under social interactions
is of practical signiﬁcance to improve decision-making and ﬁrm performance.
The inﬂuence of social interactions can be analyzed along consumer decision-
making processes. Typically, consumers make purchase decisions through four pri-
mary phases: initial consideration, active evaluation and comparison, selection and
purchase, and post-purchase experience (Court et al., 2009). In the initial consider-
ation stage, a substantial proportion of potential brands may be considered through
social interactions. In the evaluation and comparison stage, consumers now rely
more on information through social interactions to make purchase decisions, such as
online product reviews and recommendations from others. During transaction pro-
cesses, how products or services are delivered during service encounters inﬂuences
consumer purchasing experiences substantially. After purchasing, consumer satisfac-
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tion and loyalty will be determined. They become more and more active in sharing
experiences which will inﬂuence potential consumer purchase decisions. Therefore,
social interactions become critical in the cycle of the consumer decision process.
Although social interactions become signiﬁcant in consumer purchase decisions,
there is a lack of research on how operational decisions and ﬁrm performance would
be impacted under social interactions. Previous research either focuses on the un-
derlying factors that drive the inﬂuence of social interactions in individual decision
making or studies the dynamics of the collective behavior under social interactions.
Very few studies focus on the impact of social interactions on ﬁrm performance
from an operational perspective. Motivated by academic needs and practical utili-
ties, in this dissertation, we focus on how managers can better improve operational
decision-making to enhance ﬁrm performance and customer satisfaction under so-
cial interactions. Speciﬁcally, under the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer
purchase decisions, the following three topics are investigated:
1. The impact of social interactions on the price and capacity decisions in a
competitive market (Chapter 2);
2. The impact of social interactions on the price and capacity decisions in the
long-term operations (Chapter 3);
3. The impact of social interactions on the service eﬀort decision in product/service
delivery (Chapter 4).
The operational decisions investigated are capacity/service rate, price as well as
service quality. Critical to the success of any proﬁt-making company, we investigate
how social interactions would impact operational decisions in terms of capacity,
price, and quality in proﬁt optimization, market expansion and consumer satisfaction
enhancement.
1.2 Dissertation Structure
Drawing on extensive studies on social interactions, operations management, and
consumer behavioral theories, the above three research topics are investigated through
analytical models. Fig.1.2.1 illustrates the framework of this dissertation.
In Chapter 2, the impact of social interactions on the price and capacity de-
cisions in a competitive market is investigated, where two homogeneous ﬁrms com-
pete for market share with a ﬁxed market size. The model is a static model, where
consumers have rational expectations when making purchase decisions (or strategic
queue-joining decisions), and operational decisions are derived based on the rational
expectation framework (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Through analyzing the impact
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Fig. 1.2.1: Dissertation structure.
this chapter contributes to the research in operations management, particularly, the
competition in a service system from a game theoretical perspective. The impact of
social interactions on the price and capacity decisions in the long-term operations is
investigated in Chapter 3, where a monopolist ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt through price
and capacity decisions in the consumer market with repeated interactions. The ﬁrms
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are operated as M/M/1 queueing systems to capture
congestion due to capacity constraint. Social interactions are captured by the phe-
nomenon that consumers perceive a higher value of a product or service when more
consumers make the same choice (Chapter 2) or the existing market share or cus-
tomer base (Chapter 3). Consumer choices under social interactions are developed
based on heuristic models, where a social utility term is incorporated in consumer
purchase decisions. By investigating both positive and negative externalities due to
social interactions in a service system, Chapter 3 contributes to the study in op-
erations management, particularly how operational decisions should be adapted in
the new economy. The impact of social interactions on the service eﬀort decision
is studied in Chapter 4, where a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm needs to decide how much
resource should be invested (service eﬀort) to provide a certain quality of service in
product delivery or service encounters. Service eﬀort decisions impact both experi-
ences and expectations, which determine consumer satisfaction. Social interactions,
particularly the word-of-mouth communication, inﬂuence consumer purchase deci-
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sions. The contribution of this chapter lies in oﬀering new insights on the impact of
social interactions on service operations management.
Each topic captures the three main interactions among consumers in purchase
decision-making, namely the constraint, expectation and preference (Manski, 2000).
In particular, the models in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 capture the interactions on
constraint and preference among consumers, where social interactions bring both
positive consumption externalities and congestion eﬀect; the model in chapter 4 fo-
cuses on the interactions among preferences and expectations, where potential con-
sumer expectations are inﬂuenced by existing consumers. In this dissertation, social
interactions play a role along all consumer decision processes. Speciﬁcally, Chapter
2 and Chapter 3 focus on how consumers make initial considerations of potential
options, active evaluations of each choice and purchase decision; Chapter 4 focuses
on how pre-purchase expectations and post-purchase experiences impact consumer
purchase decisions. Among these three topics, the impact of social interactions on
operational decisions of price, capacity and quality is investigated and managerial
insights are oﬀered based on analytical results. Conclusions, limitations, and future
research directions are provided in Chapter 5.
2. SERVICE COMPETITION UNDER SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
2.1 Abstract
Consumer purchase decisions are highly inﬂuenced by the choices of others through
social interactions, where they perceive a higher value of a product or service when
more consumers make the same choice. Social interactions lead to more intense
competition in the consumer market and bring both opportunities and challenges
in operations management. Under social interactions, how operational decisions
such as capacity and price are made is critical for ﬁrms to expand market share
and increase proﬁtability in the ﬁercely competitive market. In this chapter, we
investigate the price and capacity decisions under social interactions in a ﬁxed size
consumer market between two competing homogeneous ﬁrms which are operated
as two M/M/1 queueing systems. The capacity of each ﬁrm is determined by the
service rate, which is costly to expand. The market size is captured by the total
potential arrival rate. Consumers are strategic in queue-joining decisions.
The result indicates that social interactions can always beneﬁt a monopolist ﬁrm
where a higher price is charged and a smaller capacity is determined. However, under
competition, the impact of social interactions on equilibrium operational decisions
depends on the market size and the social interaction intensity. A small market
size or a higher social interaction intensity will lead to a higher service rate or a
lower price which reduces ﬁrm proﬁt; while consumers may always beneﬁt from
social interactions with positive expected surplus. If the market is large or the
social interaction intensity is low, ﬁrms can still beneﬁt from social interactions,
where appropriate price and service rate can be determined to extract all consumer
expected surplus in service competition. Taking social interactions and the interplay
with competition into consideration, managers can better improve ﬁrm performance
through operational decision-making.
2.2 Introduction
The rapid economic growth leads to increasingly intense competition among ﬁrms for
both product deliveries and service oﬀerings. Competition among ﬁrms for market
share comes from both the supply side and the demand side. From the supply side,
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various similar and substitutable products or services are now supplied by many
competing ﬁrms in the consumer market. Consumers have many alternatives when
making consumption choices. Due to technological advances, product diﬀerences
and service distinctions become increasingly small and even negligible, which drive
ﬁrms to rely more on properly managed operations to survive and succeed in the
ﬁercely competitive market. How to make and implement appropriate operational
strategies such as price and capacity decisions becomes critical for ﬁrms to expand
market share and increase proﬁtability.
On the demand side, due to social interactions, competition among ﬁrms in the
consumer market becomes even more intense, since consumer preferences and pur-
chase behaviors have evolved and changed substantially. A typical phenomenon due
to social interactions is that consumers become more inclined to purchase the prod-
ucts and services with a large sales and customer base, such as those bestsellers, star
products and popular services; they are more likely to herd into longer queues where
more consumers are waiting in the same line to be served (Veeraraghavan and Debo,
2009a). Social interactions become increasingly inﬂuential due to rapid development
of information technology, since consumers can easily access any information about
goods or services through various social medias, such as social networking sites, in-
stant messengers, and on-line virtual communities. Thus, social interactions become
more and more signiﬁcant in consumer purchase decisions, which bring opportunities
for ﬁrms to boost demand and achieve rapid growth.
The inﬂuential role of social interactions in consumer purchase decisions has
been realized by managers, and various strategies in marketing and operations have
been applied to utilize the inﬂuence to enhance ﬁrm performance, sometimes even
unethically. To attract more demand through a large sales quantity as a bestseller,
authors may secretly purchase their own books1 in order to enter into the bestseller
list. Firms may adopt sales inﬂation to show the popularity of their products, even
for big companies, such as BMW2. Some companies may strategically create short-
ages by withholding available inventories, maintaining certain waiting lists or queues
to signal popularity of their products or services in order to stimulate demand3. For
many real examples about ﬁrm practices to stimulate demand through waiting-list
eﬀect, see Sapra et al. (2010). In the current digital era, due to information overload,
consumers become increasingly skeptical about traditional company-driven advertis-
ing and marketing while increasingly prefer to make purchase decisions based on
others’ recommendations, reviews, and choices through social interactions (Bughin
et al., 2010).
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also results in challenges in operations. On the one hand, due to resource scarcity,
more demand attracted through social interactions may increase the congestion of a
service system. The increased congestion may drive customers away, leading to po-
tential revenue loss, where consumers may never come back for dining4, healthcare
service5, etc. To reduce congestion requires more capacity investment. However,
capacity is always costly to expand, which restricts operational ﬂexibility. On the
other hand, since consumers become more reliant on social interactions when making
purchase decisions, products or services from some dominant companies may become
extremely popular and widely adopted, which leads their competitors which provide
substitutable products or similar services to suﬀer from insuﬃcient demand and a
small market. A typical example is observed in Becker (1991), where social inter-
actions drive consumers to join a long queue outside a popular seafood restaurant,
while the nearby competing restaurant still has many empty seats, although similar
service is oﬀered and price is almost identical. Thus, social interactions may intensify
competition among ﬁrms. How operational decisions would be impacted by social
interactions becomes signiﬁcant in ﬁrm operations management in the competitive
market.
Therefore, competition and social interactions as well as their interplay call for
appropriate operational strategies for ﬁrms to survive and succeed in the increasingly
competitive market. Envisioning the inﬂuence of social interactions, the objective
of the current study is to investigate: (1) how should ﬁrms make operational deci-
sions in terms of capacity and price; (2) what will be the equilibrium capacity and
price decisions in service competition; (3) can ﬁrms achieve more proﬁt from social
interactions in competition; (4) can consumers beneﬁt from social interactions with
more utility or surplus from purchase decision-making. To answer these questions,
we consider operations of two competing ﬁrms which provide substitutable products
or services in capacity and price decisions in a market of a ﬁxed size. For ease of
exposition, we assume substitutable services are oﬀered by proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms.
Service is a broad term in this chapter, which may refer to actual services oﬀered by
service providers, or the products supplied by make-to-order ﬁrms, etc. The ﬁrm is
operated as a queueing system, and the capacity is modeled as the service rate. The
market size is captured by the total potential arrival rate. Firms can expand the
market by serving more consumers through capacity investment and price reduction.
Capacities are costly which constrain the operational strategy in both capacity and
price decision-making.
In the consumer market, social interactions inﬂuence consumer purchase deci-
sions. Speciﬁcally, consumers may perceive the value of a service more if a greater
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/dining/09reservations.html?pagewanted=all
5 http://www.asianewsnet.net/news-34738.html
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number of other customers make the same choice. Our results indicate that social
interactions can always beneﬁt a monopolist ﬁrm, where a larger market can be cov-
ered and a higher price can be charged, while a smaller capacity can be adopted.
Under competition with two homogeneous ﬁrms, we focus on the symmetric equilib-
rium service rate and price decisions. Based on the equilibrium operational decisions,
our result indicates that, social interactions and competition as well as their inter-
play may drive ﬁrms to build a high capacity, charge a low price, leading to a small
proﬁt, especially in a small market with more intense social interactions. However, if
social interactions are less intense, or the market size is large, ﬁrms can still beneﬁt
from social interactions by charging a high price and building a small capacity under
competition.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.3, we brieﬂy review
several related studies about competition in service systems. Section 2.4 investigates
the optimal service rate and price decisions for a monopolist. Consumer queue-
joining behavior facing two competing ﬁrms is discussed in Section 2.5. We focus on
service rate competition in Section 2.6. Price competition is studied in Section 2.7. In
Section 2.8, we investigate the competition on service rate and price simultaneously
under a ﬁxed proﬁt margin policy. Section 2.9 concludes this chapter with summary
and managerial insights.
2.3 Related Studies
There are two streams of literature related to this study, namely the inﬂuence of social
interactions in consumer purchase decisions, and the competition in service systems
based on queueing framework. For excellent reviews about the research progress with
the terminologies as well as the modeling issues on social interactions from various
disciplines, see Manski (2000) and Hartmann et al. (2008). The inﬂuence of social
interactions studied in this chapter includes the reference group eﬀect, observational
learning, word-of-mouth communication or network externality, etc. As the ﬁrst
stream has been generally reviewed in Chapter 1, we mainly focus on the second
stream in this section.
Capacity and price decisions in a service system in operations research have
been studied for several decades (Stidham, 2002; Ata and Shneorson, 2006). The
model developed in this chapter is also related to the equilibrium analysis of queue-
ing systems with strategic consumers as in Hassin and Haviv (2003), pioneered by
Naor (1969), and the competition in queueing systems. Due to strategic behaviors,
consumers face the choices of whether or not to join a queue, or which of several
queues to join. Bell and Stidham (1983) study consumer queue-joining decisions with
unobservable queue length in a ﬁxed consumer market. They compare the optimal
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arrival rate allocations under the social optimum situation and the case with self-
interest consumers. Hassin and Haviv (2003) provide an excellent literature review in
strategic consumer queue-joining behavior. Several studies investigate the capacity
decision of a supplier by taking the equilibrium queue-joining decision of consumers
who are not strategic, such as the allocation of jobs by one buyer to minimize the
expected waiting time in Cachon and Zhang (2006, 2007).
Plenty of studies focus on the optimal service rate and price decisions in queue-
ing systems. On the competition in service rate, Kalai et al. (1992) study a model
with two competing exponential servers and Poisson arrivals assuming an increasing
and convex cost of service rate per time unit. In the model, competition in service
rate is considered as a means for capturing a larger market share in order to maxi-
mize long-run expected proﬁt per time unit. Deneckere and Peck (1995) incorporate
the competition among consumers into a two-stage game where several ﬁrms simul-
taneously determine prices and capacities under a stochastic demand setting. In the
model, consumers randomly choose a ﬁrm to visit and the probability of being served
depends on the capacity and other consumer adoption strategies. It is shown that
there exists at most one pure strategy equilibrium. So (2000) studies the problem
where many service ﬁrms compete for market share on price and service time to
maximize the proﬁt using delivery time guarantees. The results indicate that when
ﬁrms are identical, the equilibrium price and time guarantee decisions are similar
to the optimal solution as a monopolist. However, heterogeneous ﬁrms will exploit
their distinctive ﬁrm characteristics to diﬀerentiate their services, such as the high
capacity ﬁrms provide better time guarantees, while ﬁrms with lower operating costs
oﬀer lower prices. The diﬀerentiation becomes more acute as demands become more
time-sensitive.
Queue length may impact consumer queue-joining decisions. Christ and Avi-
Itzhak (2002) study a model with two exponential servers competing for Poisson
arrivals on service rate, where potential consumers make joining decisions based on
the queue length. The consumer utility in our settings is based on the full price
model, which is also used in Chen and Wan (2003; 2005). They consider the price
and capacity competition of two make-to-order ﬁrms modeled as two M/M/1 queues
in a ﬁxed size consumer market. Their results demonstrate that there may exist
no equilibrium, a unique equilibrium, or multiple equilibria in terms of price or
service rate decisions. However, the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer
purchase decisions is not considered in their model. Allon and Federgruen (2007)
analyze a general market with competing service facilities on price and waiting time
standard. In the model, service facilities can select their choice on price and waiting
time standard simultaneously or one after the other. Each facility is modeled as
an M/M/1 queue system. Allon and Federgruen (2008) generalize the model into
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Tab. 2.1: Key variables and notations.
Variables Notations Variables Notations
Total potential arrival rate  Intrinsic service value v
Service price p Social value V s()
Capacity/Service rate  Waiting cost per unit time w
Social interaction intensity  Parameter of service cost 
G/GI/s systems, and consider the ﬁrms compete on price, waiting time standard, and
simultaneous price and waiting time standard. They characterize how the capacity
cost and decision sequence impacts the equilibrium decisions.
From the above literature, we can see previous studies mainly consider the
capacity and price decisions from the supplier’s perspective. Although some studies
take the congestion eﬀect into consumer queue-joining decisions, few studies have
considered the impact of social interactions explicitly on operational decisions. There
is a lack of studies considering the positive externality from social interactions and
negative externality from congestion simultaneously. By focusing on operational
decisions both in a monopoly setting and duopoly competition from ﬁrm perspective,
our study ﬁlls the gap in literature on how operational decisions would be impacted
under both positive and negative eﬀect of social interactions.
2.4 Monopoly Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions
A proﬁt maximizing monopolist ﬁrm oﬀers a service to the consumer market of a ﬁxed
size , where consumer purchase decisions are inﬂuenced by others’ choices through
social interactions. Speciﬁcally, due to social interactions, the perceived value of the
service to a potential consumer depends on the number of the consumers who are
making the same choice. The ﬁrm is operated through a queueing system, where
the capacity measured by the service rate  and the price p need to be decided.
Capacity is costly for the ﬁrm to expand in order to provide a fast service. A queue
always exists due to random arrivals of the demand and random service times. In
many service oﬀerings and product deliveries, consumers may not always observe
the queues or waiting lines before making purchase decisions. Therefore, we assume
the queue is unobservable, which is a typical assumption used in the literature.
Consumers need to decide whether to join the queue to purchase the service. We
assume once the purchase decision is made, consumers will join the queue without
reneging. Therefore, in the following section, purchase decision and queue-joining
decision are used interchangeably. Key notations used in this chapter are listed in
Table 2.1.
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2.4.1 Consumer Purchase Decision
Due to the inﬂuence of social interactions, from consumer perspective, the perceived
value V of the service depends on the intrinsic value v of the service and the social
value vs(), which depends on the eﬀective arrival rate to the ﬁrm. For tractability,
we assume an additive form of the perceived value as V = v+vs() and a linear form
of the social value vs() = ( b), where b  0 represents the base demand. Our
model of social interactions is based on the deﬁnition given by Brock and Durlauf
(2001), where social interactions refer to “the utility or payoﬀ an individual receives
from a given action depends directly on the choices of others in that individual’s
reference group.” In this chapter, we assume b = 0 without loss of generality. The
parameter  is deﬁned as the social interaction intensity, which may depend on
ﬁrm characteristics or customer purchase behaviors. In this chapter, we assume 
is exogenous given. If  > 0, the inﬂuence of social interactions is positive, i.e.,
more arrivals will increase consumer perceived value of the service, maybe due to
the bandwagon eﬀect, positive consumption externality or the network externality
nature of the service, etc; if  < 0, the inﬂuence of social interactions is negative,
i.e., more arrivals will decrease consumer perceived value of the service, due to the
snob eﬀect or negative consumption externality, etc; if  = 0, we have the traditional
case where social interactions do not play a role in consumer purchase decisions. In
this chapter, we mainly focus on the positive inﬂuence of social interactions under
 > 0 on consumer purchase behavior. The result can be easily generalized to the
situation with a negative social interaction intensity.
We assume the ﬁrm is operated as an M/M/1 queue for tractability (the model
can be extended to more general queueing settings). Therefore, demand for the
service arrives according to a Poisson process and the service time is exponentially
distributed. Although the M/M/1 model may not capture all aspects of the system
behavior, it captures many of the congestion-related phenomenon (Ata and Shne-
orson, 2006). Moreover, using this model, we are able to explicitly characterize the
equilibrium decisions under social interactions. Therefore, the expected waiting cost
given the service rate  and the actual arrival rate  (in queue and service) is
CW (; ) =
8<: w  ; 0   < +1;      :
Consumer purchase decision depends on the expected surplus and reservation
surplus. Speciﬁcally, if the expected surplus is no less than the reservation value,
consumers will join the queue to procure the service; otherwise, they will balk. Since
the queue is unobservable, based on the full price model, consumer expected surplus
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is deﬁned as
S(E ; ; p) = v + E   p  CW (E ; )
where E is the anticipated arrival rate.
We assume consumers are homogeneous in terms of waiting cost per unit time,
and normalize their reservation surplus to be 0 (the model can be generalized to the
situation with heterogeneous customers with diﬀerent waiting cost per unit time).
Since the queue is unobservable, upon arrival, each consumer makes the joining de-
cision depending on the perceived value of the service, the expected waiting cost
based on their anticipated arrival rate, and the price, before the actual arrival rate
is known. We assume consumers are strategic in queue-joining decisions in the sense
that, if the expected surplus is positive, they will join the queue; if the expected sur-
plus is negative, they will not join the queue; in equilibrium, the anticipated arrival
rate and the eﬀective arrival rate are coincident E = , as in the fulﬁlled expec-
tation (or rational expectation) framework. For individual consumers, we focus on
the symmetric equilibrium queue-joining strategy as in Hassin and Haviv (2003) and
Anand et al. (2011). Speciﬁcally, letting e(; p) denote the equilibrium probability
that an individual consumer would join the queue given the service rate  and price
p, we have the following scenarios:
 If S(; ; p) = v +    CW (; )   p > 0, i.e., the expected surplus is non-
negative even if a potential customer anticipates all the other consumers join
the queue; therefore, all consumers will join the queue in equilibrium, i.e.,
e(; p) = 1;
 If max2[0;] S(; ; p) < 0, i.e., the expected surplus is negative for any  2
[0;]; therefore, no consumers will join the queue in equilibrium, i.e., e(; p) =
0;
 If 9 2 [0;]; S(; ; p) = v +    CW (; )   p = 0, i.e., each consumer
plays a mixed strategy in equilibrium, in the sense that each consumer will
join the queue with probability e(; p) =  2 [0; 1].
In the third case, there may exist two points (1) and (2) in the range [0;], such
that S(; ; p) = 0, since the expected surplus function is concave in . We always
refer to the larger one as the equilibrium arrival rate in this chapter. Therefore, for
the monopolist, given the service rate  and price p, the eﬀective arrival rate (; p)
is given as the following result:
(; p) =
8>>><>>>:
; S(; ; p) > 0
 2 [0;]; S(; ; p) = 0
0; max2[0;] S(; ; p) < 0
:
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In the following section, we use the superscript m to denote the optimal service
rate and price decisions for the monopolist. Although the above consumer pur-
chase behavior is developed based on unobservable queues, the model can be also
interpreted as the equilibrium result with observable queues.
2.4.2 Monopoly Optimal Price and Service Rate
Since consumer expected surplus is increasing in  and decreasing in p, the monop-
olist can increase the service rate  or lower the price p to serve more consumers per
unit time. However, service rate is not free to increase. Following existing studies,
the service rate cost is assumed to be C() =  which captures the marginal cost
for each served customer and  measures the capacity sensitivity in service cost.
Therefore, the expected proﬁt of the monopolist with the service rate  and price p
is given as (; p) = (p  ) if the arrival rate is . Under social interactions, the




(; p) = max
;p
(p  ) (2.4.1)
s:t: v +   p  CW (; )  0
 2 [0;]; 0   < 
We assume the following condition holds in this chapter, v  2pw. This
assumption indicates that even if there are no social interactions, consumers will
join the queue if the price is charged as low as the service rate cost (p = ), i.e.,








2 ], which indicates the
monopolist can always achieve positive proﬁt under appropriate operational deci-
sions, since the operational space for the service rate is non-empty.
The optimal decisions for the monopolist are given as the following result:












;  < 
;   
All omitted proofs in this chapter are listed in Appendix 6.1. Therefore, social
interactions play an important role in operations. From the above result we can
see, if social interactions are intense, such that   , it is always optimal for the
monopolist to cover the whole market. The reason can be explained by the following
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pricing policy p =  + , where for each consumer, the facility charges a ﬁxed
premium (or the proﬁt margin)   0 and   v + (   )   2pw. Suppose
we increase the service rate by   0 at the cost of , if the arrival rate also
increases by , the expected waiting cost keeps the same. Since the social value will
increase by , the price can be increased by  to keep consumer expected surplus
as zero. However, the increased price is larger than the increased service rate cost,
i.e.,   , which is beneﬁcial to the monopolist. Therefore, the monopolist will
always cover the whole market for any ﬁxed premium. However, if  < , it is not
always optimal to cover the whole market. Whether it is optimal to cover the whole
market depends on the service value, the service rate cost, and the waiting cost per
unit time. While if  is approaching , it may be always optimal for the monopolist
to cover the whole market. The above result is also applicable to the case  < 0, the
negative inﬂuence of social interactions. We can see when  < 0, the monopolist has
to charge a lower price and covers a smaller market, compared with the situation
without social interactions where  = 0. The above result also implies, under the




w which is independent of the social interaction intensity, while the
average queue length m
q

w depends on social interactions if the market is not fully
covered, i.e., the average queue length is increasing in the social interaction intensity.
2.4.3 Managerial Implication
Compared with the result where social interactions are absent, i.e.,  = 0, if the
market is fully covered, the service rates will be the same; however, the price charged
under social interactions can be higher, which brings a larger proﬁt. The reason is
due to social interactions, consumer perceived value of the service becomes larger if
more consumers are adopting the same service, which drive them to pay more. Under
the same market coverage, although the service rates are the same under  > 0 and
 = 0, the price is always higher under  > 0. Without social interactions, the
monopolist may only partially cover the market, while under social interactions, the
monopolist can always cover a larger market or even the whole market.
The operational decisions under  = 0 also capture the situation where man-
agers ignore the inﬂuence of social interactions. Therefore, if managers ignore social
interactions when making operational decisions, a potential proﬁt will be lost due
to a lower price or a smaller market coverage. In the following section, we com-
pare the potential proﬁt loss when managers ignore social interactions. We assume
the potential market size  is large enough, such that the market will be partially
covered without social interactions. Suppose the monopolist sets the price and the
service rate without considering social interactions, i.e., po = v pw; o = v2 and
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2 . The actual arrival rate denoted as 
a under social interactions can be
solved from the following equation:
v +   w
o      p






w + v)2   162w
4
;
and the actual arrival rate is a = min (;) :
Based on the assumption v > 2
p
w, one of the solutions of  is always negative,
while the other one is in (0; v2 ). Therefore, the eﬀective arrival rate 
a is always
larger than the result without social interactions, i.e., o < a. Deﬁne N (o; po)
as the optimal proﬁt without social interactions, (o; po; a) as the actual proﬁt




is the increased proﬁt ratio due to social interactions




lost proﬁt ratio due to ignoring social interactions. Fig.2.4.1 describes the increased
proﬁt ratio and the lost proﬁt ratio under the parameters v = 10;  = 1; w =
1;  = 6, where the optimal price and service rate without social interactions are
po = 9; o = 5 and o = 4.
From the ﬁgure, we can see, the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer pur-
chase decisions always beneﬁts the monopolist, even if operational decisions are made
without considering this inﬂuence. The increased proﬁt ratio is always increasing
in social interaction intensity. However, compared with the case where social inter-
actions are considered, the lost proﬁt ratio is also increasing in social interaction
intensity but more signiﬁcant if social interaction intensity is large. Therefore, we
can see ﬁrms will lose substantial proﬁt if ignoring social interactions in operational
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decision-making. While considering the inﬂuence in consumer purchase decision, the
monopolist will obtain more proﬁt.
2.5 Service Competition Under Social Interactions
From the above section, we can see for a monopolist, the inﬂuence of social interac-
tions in consumer purchase decisions always beneﬁts the ﬁrm, where a larger market
can be covered and a higher price can be charged. If there are many competing
suppliers which oﬀer similar or substitutable services, consumers have many alter-
natives when making purchase decisions. Whether social interactions can beneﬁt
ﬁrms under competition needs further investigation. We focus on the competition
between two ﬁrms which provide perfectly substitutable services in the market with
a ﬁxed potential size . The models can be generalized to the case with multiple
competing ﬁrms.
The two ﬁrms may be symmetric (or homogeneous) if the service rate cost and
social interaction intensity in both ﬁrms are the same respectively, asymmetric (or
heterogeneous) otherwise. They are competing for market shares through capacity
and price decisions. We use the subscript i to denote the parameters and decisions
for ﬁrm i. We focus on the equilibrium operational decisions, deﬁned in the following
section. The sequence of the events is as follows: the two ﬁrms simultaneously make
the price and the service rate decisions; customers make queue-joining decisions after
observing the price and service rate from each ﬁrm.
Since queues of both ﬁrms are unobservable before joining the system, arriving
consumers need to decide which queue to join to purchase the service or balk without
entering any queue. We also assume consumers are homogeneous with the same
waiting cost per unit time as w from either ﬁrm. (It is possible that customers may
be subject to diﬀerent waiting costs from diﬀerent ﬁrms.) Consumer queue-joining
decisions depend on the expected surplus from either service provider. Denote the
expected surplus from ﬁrm i as S(Ei ; i; pi) = v+
E
i  CW (Ei ; i)  pi; i = 1; 2,
where an arriving consumer expects Ei consumers would join the same queue. We
consider all consumers adopt the same mixed queue-joining strategy denoted as
i  0; i = 0; 1; 2, and
P
i = 1, where 0 denotes the probability of balking;
1 denotes the probability of joining the queue of the ﬁrst ﬁrm; 2 denotes the
probability of joining the queue of the second ﬁrm. In the equilibrium of consumer
queue-joining decisions, the expected arrival rate and the eﬀective arrival rate are
consistent as Ei = i = i.
We assume consumers always try to maximize the expected surplus when making
queue-joining decisions. In terms of the market coverage, given the service rate i
and the price pi of each ﬁrm, we have the following situations:
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1. The market is fully covered, and each ﬁrm covers a strictly positive market,
i.e., i > 0; 1 + 2 = ; i = 1; 2;
2. The market is fully covered by one ﬁrm, i.e., i = 0 and j = , i 6= j;
3. The market is partially covered, i.e., i  0; 1 + 2 < ; i = 1; 2.
For the ﬁrst case, consumer expected surplus from either ﬁrm satisﬁes S(1; 1; p1) =
S(2; 2; p2)  max (S(; 1; p1); S(; 2; p2); 0). For the second case, the expected
surplus from joining the queue of ﬁrm j is the largest among all possible mixed
queue-joining decisions. For the third case, the expected surplus from either ﬁrm is
the same as the reservation value, i.e., S(1; 1; p1) = S(2; 2; p2) = 0.
The eﬀective arrival rate to each ﬁrm depends on the service rate and the price
decisions, denoted as i = G(i; j ; pi; pj). The proﬁt function of ﬁrm i with service
rate i and price pi, given the other ﬁrm chooses j and pj is denoted as
(i; pi; j ; pj) = (pi   i)i = (pi   i)G(i; j ; pi; pj)
and the objective of ﬁrm i is to maximize the expected proﬁt. We consider the
optimal service rate and price of each ﬁrm in the Nash equilibrium under service
competition, denoted as ei and p
e
i respectively. In Nash equilibrium, consumer
queue-joining strategy is the best response of ﬁrms’ operational decisions, i.e., given
the service rate and the price of each ﬁrm, consumers try to maximize their expected
surplus through queue-joining decisions; for each ﬁrm, the operational decisions (ser-
vice rate, price or both) are the best response of the competitor’s decisions and the
consumer queue-joining decisions.
Speciﬁcally, the following deﬁnes the Nash equilibrium in operations: given the
other ﬁrm j chooses j = ej and pj = p
e
i , the proﬁt for ﬁrm i with operational
decisions i 6= ei and pi 6= pei is always suboptimal, as
8i 6= ei ; pi 6= pei ; (ei ; pei ; ej ; pej)  (i; pi; ej ; pej):
Based on the monopoly optimal decisions, we can immediately get the following
result in terms of the equilibrium market coverage in service competition:
Lemma 2.1. The following result in terms of the market coverage holds:
 If at least one ﬁrm has a large social interaction intensity, such that i  i,
the market will be fully covered for any potential market size  and consumer
expected surplus is non-negative.
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 If the social interaction intensity for each ﬁrms is small, such that i < i,
i = 1; 2,





2(2 2) , the market will be fully covered and con-
sumer expected surplus is non-negative;





2(2 2) , the market is partially covered, and each









iw, and covers i = v 2
p
iw
2(i i) ; consumer expected
surplus is 0 from either ﬁrm.
The proof of the above result is straightforward, which is omitted here. There-
fore, if the social interaction intensity is large enough at one of the two ﬁrms or both
ﬁrms, the market will be fully covered. The result is intuitive. Suppose the market
is not fully covered in equilibrium as 1 + 2 < . Then consumer expected surplus
must be zero from either ﬁrm. However, since i  i, the optimal decision for ﬁrm
i is to cover the market as large as possible based on the monopoly result. Therefore,
the partial market coverage can not be an equilibrium. If the social interaction inten-
sity is small at both ﬁrms, the market coverage depends on the potential market size
. If the potential market size is smaller than the total monopoly optimal market
sizes of the two ﬁrms, the market will also be fully covered; while if the potential
market size is large enough, the market will be partially covered.
Given each ﬁrm’s price and service rate decisions, when the social interaction
intensity is large enough, all customers may join the same queue and leave the other
queue empty. The following result provides a possible situation for one ﬁrm to cover
the whole market:
Lemma 2.2. If i >  and i  w(i )2 , then the market will be fully covered by
one ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, if v + i   wi    pi  max(S(; j ; pj); 0), the market is
fully covered by ﬁrm i; while if S(; j ; pj)  max(v + i  wi    pi; 0), then the
market is fully covered by ﬁrm j.
Therefore, under social interactions, one ﬁrm may cover the whole market while
leaving its competitor with empty demand, especially when the social interactions
are intense. As discussed in Chen and Wan (2003; 2005), there may exist no equilib-
rium or multiple equilibria in price competition and service rate competition for two
symmetric ﬁrms based on the full price model even if  = 0. In the following sections,
we also focus on the competition between two symmetric ﬁrms. Since there are two
operational decisions, there may exist multiple combinations of the service rate and
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price decisions in equilibrium. To reduce analytical complexity, in the following sec-
tion, we mainly focus on the competition in one-dimensional decisions. Speciﬁcally,
we will investigate the service rate competition with ﬁxed price constraint, the price
competition with ﬁxed service rate constraint, and the simultaneous service rate and
price competition under ﬁxed proﬁt margin policy. In each scenario, we ﬁrst consider
the optimal monopoly decision, and then investigate the equilibrium operational de-
cision under competition. As discussed in Brock and Durlauf (2001), when social
interactions act as strategic complementarity among agents, multiple equilibria may
occur in absence of any coordination mechanisms. Therefore, in the following sec-
tions, appropriate assumptions will be stated if necessary in each scenario to exclude
multiple equilibria and symmetric equilibrium is primarily investigated.
2.6 Service Rate Competition Under Social Interactions
In this section, we consider the two ﬁrms compete on the service rate where the
price is assumed to be ﬁxed. The service speed can be considered as one aspect
of the service quality. The ﬁxed service price may be due to regulations. The two
ﬁrms may be operated by the same company where service rate will be individually
determined as the situation in Anand et al. (2011).
2.6.1 Optimal Monopoly Service Rate
Given the ﬁxed price p, the monopoly proﬁt optimization problem is formulated as
max (p  ) (2.6.1)
s:t: v +   p  CW (; )  0;  2 [0;]
For the monopolist, in equilibrium, consumer expected surplus must be zero
under the optimal service rate decision. Therefore, given the arrival rate, the service
rate satisﬁes
8 2 [0;];  = + w
v   p+ 
which indicates if w
(v p+)2  1,  is decreasing in  2 [0;]; while if w(v p)2  1, 
is increasing in  2 [0;]. It is possible that if w
(v p+)2  1 and w(v p)2  1,  is
ﬁrst decreasing in  2 [0; c], and then increasing in (c;], where w
(v p+c)2 = 1.
In this section, we assume w
(v p)2  1, so that  is always increasing in  2 [0;],
i.e., given , there always exists a unique  < . We also assume p   wv p  0, so
that a positive market size will be covered under the optimal service rate decision,
since if  = 0, then  = wv p , the proﬁt margin is always non-negative as p   0.
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The monopoly proﬁt optimization problem is reduced as
max
2[0;]




v   p+ 


with the ﬁrst and second order derivatives with respect to  as
@(; p)
@
= p  2  w(v   p)





1  w(v   p)
(v +   p)3

where we can see the second order derivative is decreasing in .
Based on the assumption w
(v p)2  1, 8 2 [0;]; @
2(;p)
@2
 0 indicates (; p)
is concave in . Therefore, we have the following result in terms of the optimal
monopoly service rate with the ﬁxed price constraint:
Lemma 2.3. Given the ﬁxed price p, the optimal service rate is m = m+ wv p+m ,




= p  2?   w(v   p)
(v + ?   p)2 = 0:
Therefore, given the market size  and the ﬁxed price p, we can see the social
interaction intensity  plays an important role in the service rate decision for the
monopolist. The ﬁrm can cover the whole market or partially cover the market
depending on the social interaction intensity , the waiting cost per unit time w, the
net value of the service v   p, and the total potential market size , as well as the
marginal cost of service rate . For example, given all the other parameters ﬁxed, if





2 [(v + ?   p)3   w(v   p)] > 0
Therefore, when  is large enough, ?  , the monopolist may cover the whole
market. Speciﬁcally, if   p2   w2(v p) , the monopolist will cover the whole market
for any   0.
Given a ﬁxed total market size , Fig.2.6.1-2.6.2 illustrate the impact of price
level given ﬁxed social interaction intensity, and the impact of social interaction
intensity given ﬁxed price level on the optimal service rate decision in the monopoly
setting. The following parameters are used in the numerical example, v = 10; w =
1;  = 1;  = 4.
Given the ﬁxed social interaction intensity, when the price level increases, both
service rate and arrival rate increase. While given the ﬁxed price level, if the social
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Fig. 2.6.1: The impact of the price p on the optimal service rate and arrival rate under the
social interaction intensity  = 0:8.
































Fig. 2.6.2: The impact of the social interaction intensity  on the optimal service rate and
arrival rate under the price p = 8.
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interaction intensity increases, the arrival rate will increase, while the service rate
will decrease. Therefore, the monopolist will get more proﬁt if social interaction
intensity become large, since a smaller service rate will be determined, while a larger
market will be covered.
2.6.2 Duopoly Service Rate Competition
Based on the monopoly result, we can see for the ﬁxed price level p, if the monopoly
optimal arrival rate is small, such that m  2 , service competition does not impact
service rate decisions, since each ﬁrm will be operated as a monopolist. The condition
for the situation where competition does not impact service rate decisions is
p    w(v   p)
(v + 2   p)2
 0
where the left hand side (LHS) is decreasing in  based on the assumption w
(v p)2  1.
Therefore, if the total potential market size is large enough, such that   c, where
c satisﬁes the above equation, each ﬁrm will be operated as a monopolist. The
conclusion can be easily generalized to the competition with n  2 symmetric ﬁrms,
where if   nc2 , each ﬁrm will be operated as a monopolist.
However, if  < c, as a monopolist, each ﬁrm wants to cover a larger market
than 2 or even the whole market. Therefore, competition impacts their service rate
decisions, which is the focus of the following section.
We ﬁrst have the result that the market will be fully covered in equilibrium:
Lemma 2.4. Under the above condition, the market will be fully covered in equilib-
rium, i.e., 1 + 2 = .
Proof. Suppose under the above condition, the market is not fully covered in equi-
librium, i.e., at least one of the ﬁrms covers a small market which is less than 2 .
Thus, there exists a portion of customers balking from either queue, which indicates
customer expected surplus must be 0. Therefore, the ﬁrm whose market share is
less than 2 can always increase its proﬁt by covering an additional market which
increases its proﬁt. Therefore, in equilibrium, the market must be fully covered.
Based on the above result, there are three possible results for the full market
coverage situation, namely one ﬁrm covers the whole market and leaves the other
ﬁrm empty, i.e., i =  and j = 0; or the two ﬁrms split the whole market with
strictly positive market share, i.e., 0 < i <  and i + j = . Speciﬁcally, if the
total market is small enough, such that p  2  w(v p)
(v+ p)2  0, then one ﬁrm may
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cover the whole market; while if p   2   w(v p)
(v+ p)2 < 0, then the two ﬁrms split
the market and each one will cover a strictly positive market.
Similar to the monopoly setting, the service rate is bounded as  2 [ wv p ; p ]
to insure a non-negative arrival rate and proﬁt. Since we consider the competition
between two symmetric ﬁrms, we mainly focus on the symmetric equilibrium where
both ﬁrms make the same service rate decision and cover the same size of market.
In the symmetric equilibrium, to exclude the case where one ﬁrm covers the whole
market, we assume 8 2 [ wv p ; p ]; and > ; S(; ; p)  S(2 ; ; p), i.e., ( p  
)( p   2 )  w, which indicates, even if both ﬁrms adopt the maximum service rate
p
 , the expected surplus from joining the same queue is always smaller when one half
of the consumers join each queue. Therefore, consumers will not join the same queue
in any symmetric equilibrium for e 2 [ wv p ; p ], and each ﬁrm will cover a strictly
positive market. To exclude multiple equilibria, we assume consumers always join




In the symmetric equilibrium, each ﬁrm sets the service rate at i = e and
covers ei =

2 . Clearly, 
e  2 + wv p+
2
. We investigate the condition under which




can be a symmetric
equilibrium in service competition under social interactions. It turns out that the
total market size plays an important role in equilibrium service rate decision.
We have the following result in terms of the equilibrium service rate if the total
market size is intermediate:






 p)2 > 0, in the symmetric equilibrium, each
ﬁrm covers one half of the market 2 , and the symmetric equilibrium service rate is












v   p+ 2
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(v   p+ 2 )2





8 2 [0; p

  e]; (p  e   )00()  20()  0
where  satisﬁes F (; ) = 2
 
e +    2   
  
e   2 + 
   2w + w = 0, 0()
and 00() are the ﬁrst and second order conditions for  in terms of , then the




is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Based on the assumption w
(v p)2  1, it can be proved that the LHS of the
above condition is increasing in . Therefore, there exists a critical c1, such that
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 p)2 ) > 0. Therefore, 
c1 < c, which indicates if the total potential
market size  is in the range (c1;c), there exists a symmetric equilibrium, where




and covers one half of the market.
In the symmetric equilibrium, consumer expected surplus from either ﬁrm is zero,
i.e., consumers can not get any beneﬁt from social interactions even if there are
several competing ﬁrms providing similar services.
If the total market size is small, we have the following result in terms of the
service rate decision in the symmetric equilibrium:






 p)2  0, in the symmetric equilibrium, each












If the following condition holds,
8 2 [0; p

  e]; (p  e   )00()  20()  0
where  satisﬁes F (; ) = 2
 
e +    2   
  
e   2 + 
   2w + w = 0, 0()
and 00() are the ﬁrst and second order conditions for  in terms of , then the
symmetric equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium.




 p , we have the condition
3


























 p)2  0, i.e.,   c1, the symmetric equilibrium
service rate satisﬁes e  2 + wv+
2
 p , which indicates consumers may get positive
expected surplus when the total potential market size is small. Therefore, we have
the following result:
Corollary 2.1. If  > c1, consumer expected surplus in the symmetric equilibrium
is 0; if   c1, consumers can get positive expected surplus.
The above result is not diﬃcult to understand. If the total potential market
size is small, each ﬁrm wants to cover the market as much as possible. Therefore,
both ﬁrms will decide a higher service rate which leads to a strictly positive expected
surplus for consumers. If the total potential market becomes large, to cover one half
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Tab. 2.2: The impact of market size on the equilibrium service rate and consumer expected
surplus under social interactions.
Market size Equilibrium service rate Consumer expected surplus
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e; p) = 0
  c m = m + wv p+m S(2 ; m; p) = 0























Fig. 2.6.3: The impact of the market size  on the service rate and the arrival rate in the
symmetric equilibrium.
of the market, the service rate is already large even if consumer expected surplus
is zero. Therefore, neither ﬁrm has motivation to increase the service rates. Thus,
consumer expected surplus is zero in equilibrium.
Table 2.2 summarizes the impact of market size under social interactions on the
equilibrium service rate and consumer expected surplus.
Fig.2.6.3 illustrates the impact of  on the equilibrium service rate. The pa-
rameters used in the numerical study are v = 10; w = 9;  = 1;  = 0:2; p = 5.
From the ﬁgure, we can see when the total market size is small, each ﬁrm will
determine a higher service rate, and consumers will get positive surplus in equilib-
rium. While when the total market size becomes large, consumer surplus will be
reduced to their reservation level as in the monopoly case. Market size captures
the competition intensity. A smaller market size leads to more intense competition
among ﬁrms with substitutable services. Therefore, consumers can always get pos-
itive surplus in the market with more intense competition. The result may explain
the situation in some service industries. For example, due to the small market, the
competition in the telecommunication industry in Singapore is very intense, and in-
ternet service providers have to oﬀer high speed services for their customers; while
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Fig. 2.6.4: The impact of the social interaction intensity  on the service rate and arrival
rate in the symmetric equilibrium.
due to a huge market in China, the internet connection speed oﬀered by all service
providers is much lower than that in Singapore.






 p)2 is decreasing in , we conclude that given
all the other parameters, for a ﬁxed market size , if  becomes large, consumers
will beneﬁt from social interactions, i.e., the expected surplus will be positive due
to the increased service rate. Therefore, the inﬂuence of social interactions drives
competing ﬁrms to decide a higher service rate, which reduces their expected proﬁt
while beneﬁting consumers. Fig.2.6.4 illustrates the impact of  on the equilibrium
service rate. The following parameters are used v = 10; w = 9;  = 1;  = 4; p = 5.
2.7 Price competition under social interactions
In this section, we consider the two ﬁrms compete on the price decision while the
service rate is assumed to be ﬁxed. Since service rate can be considered as one aspect
of service quality, the ﬁxed service rate can be considered as the quality requirement
regulated by authorities or industry standards, or the situation where the two ﬁrms
are operated by one company with the same infrastructure.
2.7.1 Optimal Monopoly Price Under Social Interactions
In equilibrium, for a monopolist ﬁrm, consumer expected surplus must be zero under
the optimal price decision. Therefore, the eﬀective arrival rate satisﬁes
v +   CW (; )  p = 0;  2 [0;]
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where the optimal price will be p = v +   w  if the eﬀective arrival rate is .
In the following section, to reduce the complexity of the analysis, we assume
 > . The situation with    can be analyzed similarly. Therefore, if the social
interaction intensity is large enough, such that   w
( )2 , p is always increasing
in  2 [0;]; while if the social interaction intensity is small enough, such that 
w
2
, p is always decreasing in  2 [0;]; while if the social interaction intensity is
intermediate, such that w
2
<  < w
( )2 , p is ﬁrst decreasing in  2 [0; c], and
then increasing in (c;], where  = w
( c)2 . In the following section, we focus on
the case where   w
2
is small, so that the eﬀective arrival rate will decrease if the
price increases.
The proﬁt optimization problem of the monopolist is reformulated as
max
2[0;]
(; ) = max
2[0;]
(v +   CW (; )  ) (2.7.1)
and the optimal monopoly price decision is determined by the following result:
Lemma 2.5. Given the service rate  > , the optimal price will be pm = v+m 
w
 m , where 
m = min(?;) is the optimal arrival rate, and ? satisﬁes the ﬁrst
order condition @(;)@ = v + 2    w( )2 = 0.









(  )3 < 0
based on the assumption   w
2
. Therefore, the optimal arrival rate will be m =
min(?;), where ? satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
@(; )
@
= v + 2    w
(  )2 = 0
Clearly, ? is increasing in  from the ﬁrst order condition. Therefore, we can
see, given the service rate , the optimal price and the optimal arrival rate depend
on the social interaction intensity. If the social interaction intensity is large enough,
the monopolist may cover the whole market by setting the corresponding price level.
While if the social interaction intensity is small, such that ? < , the monopolist
may only partially cover the market.
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Fig. 2.7.1: The impact of the price p on the optimal service rate and arrival rate under the
social interaction intensity  = 0:2.
Given a ﬁxed total market size , Fig.2.7.1-2.7.2 illustrate the impact of service
rate given ﬁxed social interaction intensity, and the impact of social interaction
intensity given ﬁxed service rate on the optimal price decision in the monopoly
setting. The following parameters are used in the numerical example, v = 10; w =
4;  = 1.
Therefore, if the service rate or social interaction intensity increases, more mar-
ket will be covered, and the price will also increase in the monopolist setting. In
other words, given the ﬁxed service rate, social interactions can help ﬁrms to charge
a higher price and cover a large market, thus lead to more proﬁt.
2.7.2 Price Competition Under Social Interactions
From the optimal price decision for the monopolist, we can see if
v +     w
(  2 )2
 0
the optimal monopoly arrival rate is m  2 . Therefore, service competition does
not impact the price decision and each service provider will be operated as a mo-
nopolist with the optimal price charged at pm = v + m   w m . The LHS of the








<    w
2
 0
based on the assumption. Therefore, if  is large enough, such that   c, where




= 0, each ﬁrm will be operated as
a monopolist.
In the following section, we focus on the case  < c, where the monopoly
2. Service Competition Under Social Interactions 31


















Fig. 2.7.2: The impact of the social interaction intensity  on the optimal service rate and
arrival rate under the service rate  = 3.
optimal arrival rate is m > 2 . Therefore, the competition impacts ﬁrm pricing
decisions. Similar to the previous section, the market will be fully covered, and the
ﬁrm with a larger price will cover a smaller market, as shown in the following result:
Lemma 2.6. If  < c, the market will be fully covered. If p1  p2, the eﬀective
arrival rate satisﬁes 1  2  2 and 1 + 2 = .
Proof. It is straightforward that the market will be fully covered. Since   w
2
,
given any price p, the surplus S(; p) = v +    CW (; )   p is decreasing in
 2 [0;]. Suppose 1 < 2 if p1 < p2. We have S(2; p2) < S(1; p2)  S(1; p1)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the decreasing property of S(; p) with respect
to , and the second inequality follows since S(; p) is increasing in p for ﬁxed .
Therefore, 1 < 2 can not be equilibrium.
Therefore, under the ﬁxed service rate constraint, a smaller price will always
attract a larger eﬀective arrival rate if the social interaction intensity is small. We
consider the symmetric equilibrium, where each ﬁrm sets the price at pi = pe and
covers i = 2 . Clearly, in the symmetric equilibrium, p
e  v + 2   w 
2
since
consumer expected surplus can not be negative. In the following section, we investi-
gate whether pe = v + 2   w 
2
can be an equilibrium under service competition.
Similar to the result in service rate competition, market size plays an important role
in equilibrium price decisions. If the total potential market size is intermediate, we
have the following result:
Proposition 2.4. Under the assumption   w
2
, if the market size is in the range
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pe = v + 2   w 
2















8 2 [0; pe   ]; (pe     2)00()  40()  0
where  satisﬁes F (; ) = (2+)
 
(  2 )2   2
 2w = 0, 0() and 00() are the
ﬁrst and second order conditions for  in terms of , then the symmetric equilibrium
price pe is the unique Nash equilibrium.
If the total market size is small enough, we have the following result:
Proposition 2.5. Under the assumption   w
2
, if the market size satisﬁes  
c1, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in terms of the price competition, where
each ﬁrm covers one half of the market by setting the price at
pe = +
4w
(2  )2   
and consumer expected surplus is strictly non-negative. If the following condition
holds,
8 2 [0; pe   ]; (pe     2)00()  40()  0
where  satisﬁes F (; ) = (2 + )
 
(  2 )2   2
   2w = 0, 0() and 00() are
the ﬁrst and second order conditions for  in terms of , then the equilibrium price
pe is the unique Nash equilibrium.
From + 4w
(2 )2   = v+2   w 
2








= 0. Therefore, if   c1,  + 4w
(2 )2     v + 2   w 
2
.
The reason is as follows. If the total potential market size is small enough, the
competition is more intense. Each ﬁrm wants to cover as much of the market as
possible. Therefore, both ﬁrms will charge a lower price which leads to a strictly
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Fig. 2.7.3: The impact of the market size  on the service rate and arrival rate in the
symmetric equilibrium.
positive expected surplus for consumers. If the total potential market becomes large,
competition becomes less intense. Each ﬁrm can charge a higher price to reduce con-
sumer expected surplus to zero and covers one half of the market. Neither ﬁrm has
motivation to lower their prices. Thus, consumer expected surplus is zero in equilib-
rium. The result may also explain the situation in some service industries. Taking
the telecommunication industry as an example, the market size is so small such that
the competition intensity becomes extremely strong, and the service providers have
to charge a lower price to their customers, which is a sharp contrast to the price
charged by China telecommunication ﬁrms, since there is a huge market in China.
Fig.2.7.3 illustrates the impact of  on the equilibrium service rate. The follow-
ing parameters are used in the numerical study, v = 10; w = 9;  = 1;  = 0:2;  =
4.







is increasing in , we conclude that given
all the other parameters are ﬁxed, if  becomes large, consumers will beneﬁt from
social interactions, i.e., the expected surplus will be positive, since the equilibrium
price will become smaller. The larger the social interaction intensity is, the smaller
the price will be. Therefore, the inﬂuence of social interaction drives competing
ﬁrms to charge a lower price, which reduces their expected proﬁt while beneﬁting
consumers. The equilibrium price under a small market also indicates, each ﬁrm
will not charge the minimum price while still getting strictly a positive proﬁt in
equilibrium, since 4w
(2 )2 > . However, compared with the case without social
interactions ( = 0), social interactions always lead to a smaller price which reduces
ﬁrm proﬁt under a small market   c1. Therefore, under a small market with
more intense competition, social interactions may harm ﬁrms in terms of proﬁt, since
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Tab. 2.3: The impact of market size on the equilibrium price and consumer expected surplus
under social interactions.
Market size Equilibrium price Consumer expected surplus
  c1 pe = + 4w
(2 )2    S(2 ; ; pe)  0
c1 <  < c pe = v + 2   w 
2
S(2 ; ; p
e) = 0
  c pm = v + m   w m S(2 ; ; pm) = 0






















Fig. 2.7.4: The impact of the social interaction intensity  on the service rate and arrival
rate in the symmetric equilibrium.
a lower price has to be charged.
Table 2.3 summarizes the impact of market size under social interactions on the
equilibrium price and consumer expected surplus.
Fig.2.7.4 illustrates the impact of  on the equilibrium price decision. The
following parameters are used in the numerical study v = 10; w = 9;  = 1;  =
4; p = 5.
2.8 Service Rate and Price Competition
Since there are two operational decisions, to fully characterize the equilibrium deci-
sions is not easy. In this section, we consider the service rate and price competition
simultaneously under the condition that each ﬁrm adopts the ﬁxed proﬁt margin
policy. The proﬁt margin is deﬁned as  = p   , i.e., the net proﬁt from each
served consumer. In some service industries, the marginal proﬁt may be strictly
regulated by public policies or industry standards. Through the ﬁxed proﬁt margin
constraint, the two-dimensional decision problem is reduced as a one-dimensional
decision problem, either the service rate or the price. In the following section, we
focus on the service rate decision in the competition. Since the proﬁt margin is ﬁxed,
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we assume given the eﬀective arrival rate, each service provider will set the service
rate and the corresponding price to maximize consumer expected surplus.
2.8.1 Monopoly Service Rate and Price with Fixed Proﬁt Margin
For a monopolist with the proﬁt margin , given the service rate  > 0, the price
will be p =  +. In equilibrium, consumer expected surplus denoted as S(; )
must be non-negative as
S(; ) = v +   CW (; )     0;  2 [0;]
The monopolist maximizes the proﬁt () =  on  2 [0;] by choosing the
corresponding service rate . We assume v     0 and (v   )2   4w  0, so
that the available range of the service rate is non-empty.
Since the proﬁt margin is ﬁxed, the monopolist wants to cover the market as
much as possible. However, it may not be possible for the monopolist to cover the
whole market. If the ﬁrm covers the whole market, the service rate would be larger,
and the price will be larger, which reduces consumer expected surplus. Therefore,
given the arrival rate  2 [0;], we ﬁrst calculate the maximum surplus that the
monopolist can provide to the consumers as
SM () = max

S(; ) = v + (  )  2
p
w  
where  = +
q
w
 . The curve S
M () = S(; +
q
w
 );  2 [0;] is the maximum
expected surplus if the eﬀective arrival rate is . We have the following result in
terms of the monopoly optimal service rate under the ﬁxed proﬁt margin policy:
Lemma 2.7. Given the ﬁxed proﬁt margin , the monopoly optimal service rate is
given in the following cases:
 If   , the optimal service rate will be in the range
m 2 [v + (+ )  
p
(v + (  ) )2   4w
2
;
v + (+ ) +p(v + (  ) )2   4w
2
]
and the monopolist covers the whole market, i.e., m = ;
 If  < , we have the following cases:
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– If v + (   )   2pw     0, the optimal service rate will be the
same as in the above range and the monopolist covers the whole market
m = ;
– If v+( ) 2pw  < 0, the optimal service rate will be m = m+q
w





The above result indicates, if the social interaction intensity is large, such that
  , the monopolist can always cover the whole market by setting appropriate
service rate and price for any ﬁxed proﬁt margin level. Since    and the proﬁt
margin is ﬁxed, suppose the arrival rate increases from  to  + . The service
rate can be increased from  + , meanwhile consumer expected surplus increases,
since the congestion cost keeps the same. Therefore, the market will always be fully
covered for any ﬁxed proﬁt margin. However, if the social interaction intensity is
small, the ﬁrm may not cover the whole market. The above result also conﬁrms the
optimal price and capacity decisions for the monopolist ﬁrm in the previous section.
The optimal proﬁt margin  can be derived which is omitted here.
2.8.2 Service Rate and Price Competition Under Social Interactions
From the above result, we can see if  <  and the total potential market size  is
large enough, such that
v   2pw  




each ﬁrm’s optimal decision is to partially cover the market, which is smaller than one
half of the market, under the ﬁxed proﬁt margin   0. Therefore, the competition
does not impact the service rate and price decisions.
While if   , the service rate decision will be impacted by the competition
between the two ﬁrms, since each ﬁrm’s optimal decision is to cover the whole market
under the ﬁxed premium   0. If  <  and the total potential market  is small,
such that
  v   2
p
w  
    ;
each ﬁrm’s optimal decision is still to cover the whole market under the ﬁxed proﬁt
margin   0. The competition between the two ﬁrms will impact the service rate
decision.
We ﬁrst consider the case    in the following section. Similar to previous
sections, the market will be fully covered in equilibrium. Since the premium is ﬁxed,
each ﬁrm will try to cover the market as much as possible. We have the following
result:
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Lemma 2.8. If   , there exists a Nash equilibrium in terms of service rate
decision, where each ﬁrm sets e =  +
q
w
 . In the Nash equilibrium, the eﬀective
arrival rate will be (; 0) or (0;), i.e., only one ﬁrm covers the whole market.
The above result indicates, if the social interaction intensity is strong, such
that   , each ﬁrm will set the service rate to maximize consumer expected
surplus at the level such that all consumers will join the same queue. However,
all the consumers will only join one queue in equilibrium. Therefore, a large social
interaction intensity will always beneﬁt consumers. From a long-run perspective,
if each period starts anew, each ﬁrm will cover 2 on average, i.e., consumers may
select the service provider alternatively.
We consider the case where  <  and   2v 2
p
w 
  , where each ﬁrm can
cover more than one half of the market as a monopolist, i.e., S(2 ) > 0. Since  < ,
if all consumers join the same queue, the maximum surplus S(; +
q
w
 ) is the
smallest. We ﬁrst have the following result:
Lemma 2.9. S(; )  S( pw ; )  S( pw ;  pw +qw ).
Proof. The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that given , consumer expected
surplus is maximized at  =   pw due to the concavity of S(; ) in terms of
. The second inequality follows from the fact that given , consumer surplus is
maximized at  = +
q
w
 due to the concavity of S(; ) in terms of .
The above result indicates, given  and , the maximum consumer expected
surplus is S(; +
q
w
 ), i.e., 8 2 [0;], SM () = S(; +
q
w
 ), in the sense that
S() crosses the maximum point of S(; ) for ﬁxed . For example, we can compare









































We focus on the symmetric equilibrium, where each ﬁrm sets the service rate
at  = e and covers one half of the market, i.e., e = 2 . In the following section,
we investigate whether the service rate e = 2 +
q
w
 can be the equilibrium. It is
straightforward that, consumer expected surplus will be maximized at e given one
half of the consumers join the same queue.








) > v + (  )  2
p
w  
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Fig. 2.8.1: The impact of the deviation from the equilibrium service rate.




sumer expected surplus is larger than the maximum surplus from the other queue
if all the consumers join there. Graphically, in the range  2 (2 ;], the consumer
expected surplus curve S(   ; 2 +
q
w
 ) is always above the maximum surplus
curve S() for  2 [0;]. Based on the above assumption, we have the following
result:
Proposition 2.6. If  <  and   2v 2
p
w 
  , there exists a unique equilibrium









 ) > v + (  
)  2pw  .
Therefore, we can see if the surplus curve S(   ; 2 +
q
w
 ) is above the




is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, where consumer surplus is maximized and
exactly half of the market will be covered by each ﬁrm. If the above condition is not
satisﬁed, we may have multiple equilibria as discussed in Brock and Durlauf (2001).
Fig.2.8.1 illustrates the impact of the deviation in service rate decision from
the equilibrium level on the eﬀective arrival rate, given the other ﬁrm chooses the
equilibrium service rate. The parameters used in the example are v = 10; w =
9;  = 0:5;  = 1;  = 2;  = 1. Therefore, from the ﬁgure, we can see if the other
ﬁrm chooses the equilibrium service rate, a larger or smaller service rate will result
in a lower arrival rate, which indicates deviation from the equilibrium service rate is
always suboptimal.
Fig.2.8.2 illustrates the equilibrium service rate and consumer expected surplus
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Fig. 2.8.2: The equilibrium service rate e and consumer expected surplus under the ﬁxed
proﬁt margin policy.
under the ﬁxed proﬁt margin policy with the parameters v = 10; w = 9;  = 0:5;  =
1; = 2; = 1.
2.9 Conclusion
The inﬂuence of social interactions is signiﬁcant in consumer purchase decision-
making, which, as an additional driving force, leads to more intense competition
in the consumer market and severe challenges in operations management. How
operational decisions should be adapted and implemented under social interactions
in the competitive market becomes critical for ﬁrms to survive and succeed.
The inﬂuence of social interactions, which can be a double-edged sword, brings
both opportunities and challenges in operations. Social interactions may help ﬁrms
attract more demand to achieve market expansion and revenue growth, since con-
sumers become more inclined to purchase products and services which are also pre-
ferred by others. However, increased demand through social interactions may lead
to a more congested service system due to capacity constraint which is costly to
expand. Congestion increases consumer waiting cost, which may cause potential
revenue loss. Thus, social interactions create both positive and negative externali-
ties in consumer purchase decisions. Since consumers are more likely to make the
same purchase decision as others do, competition among ﬁrms for market share may
become even more intense under social interactions. Thus, competition and social
interactions as well as their interplay demand for appropriate operational strategies
to improve ﬁrm performance.
In this chapter, we consider service competition in terms of price and capacity
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decisions between two homogeneous ﬁrms in a ﬁxed size consumer market under
social interactions. By focusing on the symmetric equilibrium, we investigate the
impact of social interactions on the equilibrium capacity and price decisions. The
result suggests that in the monopoly market, social interactions can always beneﬁt
the ﬁrm, where a large market can be covered while a smaller capacity is adopted and
a higher price is charged. More inﬂuential social interactions may help the monopolist
cover the whole market. If managers ignore social interactions in decision-making,
a substantial potential market and revenue will be lost due to ineﬃcient price and
capacity decisions.
However, in competition, social interactions may not always beneﬁt ﬁrms, es-
pecially when the social interaction intensity is large and the market size is small.
Under a small market, due to competition, ﬁrms have to invest in large capacities or
charge low prices, while social interactions compel ﬁrms to build even more capacities
or charge even lower prices. Therefore, social interactions under a small market may
always drive ﬁrms to sacriﬁce more proﬁt in competition. If the social interaction
intensity becomes larger, ﬁrms need to build more capacities and charge lower prices
which will lead to less proﬁt in competition. Consumers may always beneﬁt from
more intense social interactions with positive surplus from consumption; therefore,
the presence of social interactions may harm ﬁrms while beneﬁting consumers in a
small competitive market. However, under a large market, if the social interaction
intensity is small, each ﬁrm can still beneﬁt from social interactions, where the price
and the service rate can be determined at the level where consumer expected surplus
is reduced as low as their reservations.
Therefore, if managers ignore the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer
purchase decisions in the competitive market, they may over-price the products or
services, build insuﬃcient capacities when the market size is small; they may under-
price their products or services, over-invest in capacities when the market size is large.
Therefore, ignoring social interactions, potential proﬁt will be lost in the consumer
market with ﬁerce competition. As discussed, market size captures the competition
intensity. Our result indicates that social interactions may drive ﬁrms to charge
a lower price, build a larger capacity to provide a more responsive service, since
competition intensity may be aggravated due to changes in consumer preferences
and purchase behaviors. Be aware of social interactions and their interplay with
competition will help managers better improve their operational decisions and ﬁrm
performance.
The model in this chapter suﬀers from several limitations. We use M/M/1
queue to model the operations of the service provider for analytical tractability.
As discussed in this chapter, although an M/M/1 queue captures the congestion
phenomenon for many service systems, the Poisson arrival rate assumption can not
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capture the impact of variability of the arrival rate to the system performance.
Therefore, one potential extension of the current model is to study the impact of
social interactions based on the G/M/1 queueing system. In this chapter, we mainly
focus on the impact of positive social interaction eﬀect on the operational decisions.
The model can be generalized to the case with negative social interactions, and some
key results can be derived. For example, in service competition, compared with the
case where social interactions are absent, under a small market, the negative social
interaction eﬀect may oﬀset the impact of competition, where ﬁrms can charge a
higher price or build a lower capacity; while under a large market, each ﬁrm may
suﬀer from the negative social interaction eﬀect, where a lower price or a higher
capacity would be optimal. In this chapter, we consider a linear form of social
value for analytical tractability. Some non-linear features of social interactions may
be lost due to a linear form. A more realistic functional form may be a convex-
concave function, where the inﬂuence of social interactions depends on the number
of consumers. However, the close form solution in terms of equilibrium price and
capacity decisions may not be easy to derive. We also assume the social interaction
intensity is a constant, which is exogenously given. In reality, social interactions
may also depend on operational decisions, such as price. For example, services with
a lower price may help attract more potential consumers. The optimal price and
service rate decisions under price-dependent social interaction intensity is listed in
the Appendix 6.1.
3. DYNAMIC CAPACITY AND PRICE DECISIONS UNDER SOCIAL
INTERACTIONS
3.1 Abstract
Under social interactions, consumers perceive a higher value of a product or service
with more existing adopters. Social interactions help ﬁrms attract more potential
demand, and also lead to more congestion, which bring challenges in operations.
To investigate how social interactions impact operations in proﬁt optimization and
market expansion, we focus on price and capacity decisions of a monopolist ﬁrm in
a market with repeated interactions. Due to capacity constraint, managers need to
balance the social interaction eﬀect and congestion eﬀect through price and capacity
decisions. The ﬁrm is operated as an M/M/1 queueing system, and the capacity of
the ﬁrm is determined by the service rate. Consumers are rational in queue-joining
decisions. Both strategic and myopic policies in terms of price and capacity are
investigated and compared under several dynamic settings.
Under several dynamic settings, the results indicate that price and service rate
decisions lead to monotonic arrival rate paths, which converge to a unique steady
state. Strategic policies always achieve a larger market. Under strategic policies, a
lower price or a higher capacity should be adopted to build up a larger customer base
which helps attract more potential consumers through social interactions. If price
and capacity are simultaneously determined, a lower proﬁt margin may be desired
to increase the customer base in the strategic policy although both higher prices and
capacities are adopted than those in the myopic policy. Proﬁt margins in strategic
policies may always be smaller than those in myopic policies, especially when social
interactions are less intense. However, strategic policies can always achieve a larger
proﬁt after initial periods when a larger market base has been established. Under
social interactions, managers should tradeoﬀ short term proﬁt loss for long term
beneﬁt in operational decision-making. Ignoring such long term implications of their
operational decisions, managers may charge inappropriately high prices, build insuf-
ﬁcient capacities, or grab too high proﬁt margins. Be aware of social interactions;
operational decisions such as price and capacity can be better determined to improve
ﬁrm performance.
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3.2 Introduction
In order to enter into the bestseller list, two authors secretly purchased 50,000 copies
of their book The Discipline of Market Leaders from various stores whose sales were
monitored to select books for the New York Times bestseller list1. Despite mediocre
reviews, that book entered into the bestseller list and subsequently sold well enough
to continue as a bestseller without further demand intervention (Bikhchandani et al.,
1998). Recently, in order to boost sales performance of their ﬂagship-brand cars in
the US, BMW AG adopted sales inﬂation by counting many demo models in a sales
announcement2. Many similar cases have been reported that demand intervention
and sales inﬂation are often intentionally or secretly adopted by companies in order
to promote their products into bestseller lists or top in sales rankings. The fact that
companies take such tactics, even unethically, highlights the reality of the inﬂuence
of social interactions.
Due to social interactions, consumers are inclined to purchase those products
or services with large existing sales, or followed by long queues. Herding in long
queues is a typical phenomenon under the inﬂuence of social interactions, which
drives consumers to join a long queue for a popular restaurant (Becker, 1991), wait
for many hours in order to see a general practitioner3, etc. The signiﬁcant inﬂuence
of social interactions brings opportunities for companies to increase proﬁtability and
expand market share. However, social interactions also raise challenges in operations,
such as price and capacity decisions. On the one hand, social interactions help
attract more potential demand which helps ﬁrms increase sales and achieve fast
growth. On the other hand, increased demand may create congestion leading to an
intolerable waiting experience for consumers due to insuﬃcient capacities which are
usually costly for ﬁrms to expand. Capacity constraint often reduces ﬂexibility in
operations and restricts ﬁrm capabilities in product and service delivery, often leading
to congestion, which may be aggravated due to excess demand induced by social
interactions. Congestion due to insuﬃcient capacities leads to potential revenue
loss, since consumers may never come back again for dining4, healthcare services5,
or even grocery shopping6. Therefore, better understanding of the impact of social
interactions on operational decisions is required for managers to improve operational
decision-making to achieve proﬁtability and maintain stable growth.
Under social interactions, poorly managed operations, such as an inappropriate
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revenue loss. It has been reported that due to huge demand and insuﬃcient supply
due to poor capacity planning and supply chain management, consumers have had
to wait several weeks for the new smart phone Nexus 47, and substantial potential
revenue may have been lost. Therefore, under social interactions, how management
practices and operational decisions should be adapted and implemented becomes
critical for ﬁrms to achieve sustainable growth and proﬁtability.
To investigate the impact of social interactions on operational decisions, we con-
sider the long-term capacity and price decisions for a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm provid-
ing frequently purchased product or service in the consumer market. For exposition
simplicity, we assume a service is oﬀered. Service is a broad term in this chapter,
which may refer to speciﬁc services oﬀered by service providers, or the products sup-
plied by make-to-order ﬁrms, etc. We adopt social interaction eﬀect to characterize
the phenomenon that potential consumers are more inclined to purchase the ser-
vice when more existing consumers are present. The ﬁrm is operated as a queueing
system to capture the congestion eﬀect due to capacity constraint. Under several
dynamic settings, both strategic and myopic policies in terms of price, capacity, and
joint price and capacity are investigated and compared. Based on the optimal pricing
and capacity strategies derived, this study aims to oﬀer some possible explanations
or reasons for several interesting phenomena observed in practice, such as (1) why
ﬁrms with popular products or services do not leverage on the popularity to raise
prices; (2) why some ﬁrms can charge higher prices or proﬁt margins than their
competitors even if similar or the same service is oﬀered; (3) why some ﬁrms suﬀer
from signiﬁcant loss of market share after changing their prices; (4) why some ﬁrms
charge seemingly unreasonably low prices or build seemingly excessive capacities.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we brieﬂy review several
studies which focus on the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer purchase
decisions. We discuss the settings of the model in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses
the dynamic model with constant service rate and price. Section 3.6 investigates the
capacity/service rate decisions, where the price is ﬁxed. Section 3.7 focuses on the
dynamic pricing model with ﬁxed service rate. In Section 3.8, we investigate the
joint capacity and price decisions under social interactions. Section 3.9 concludes
this chapter with summary and managerial insights.
3.3 Related Studies
The inﬂuence of social interactions in individual decision-making has been investi-
gated extensively, see the brief review in Chapter 1. Similar to Chapter 2, in this
chapter, the inﬂuence of social interactions studied can be due to the reference group
7 http://www.ibtimes.com/nexus-4-sold-out-again-us-google-ceo-says-supply-shortages-are-
priority-nexus-team-1042598#
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eﬀect, OL, WOM communication or network externality. There are extensive studies
on the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer purchase decisions including both
empirical investigations and theoretical models.
Empirical investigations focus on identifying and measuring the inﬂuence of so-
cial interactions. Using a natural experiment, Kraut et al. (1998) ﬁnd that due to
social interactions, employees will adopt a particular video system with more exist-
ing users for both utility and normative reasons. Similarly, Manchanda et al. (2008)
and Angst et al. (2010) ﬁnd signiﬁcant inﬂuence of social interactions on adoption
of new products in the pharmaceutical industry and the diﬀusion of electronic med-
ical records in U.S. hospitals. The inﬂuence of social interactions not only increases
household participation in the stock-market (Hong et al., 2004), but also drives em-
ployees to choose the same healthcare plans (Sorensen, 2006). People’s satisfaction
judgments can also be modiﬁed due to social interactions (Bohlmann et al., 2006).
Hartmann (2010) estimates the inﬂuence of social interactions on an individual’s
utility based on the purchase decisions within several golf players. The ﬁndings in-
dicate around 35% of the median consumer value is attributable to the inﬂuence of
social interactions with their peers. In the study of Moretti (2011), 32% of sales for
a typical movie with positive surprise is attributed to social interactions, based on
the box-oﬃce data for all movies released between 1982 and 2000, where consumers
consider sales data as an indicator of quality.
Consumer purchase decision has been inﬂuenced substantially through various
online social interactions in recent years. As consumers become overloaded with
information, they become increasingly skeptical about traditional company-driven
advertising and marketing while increasingly prefer information from social inter-
actions, such as product reviews (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Chen et al., 2011),
recommendations through WOM, and OL through previous sales information. Sur-
veyed by Mckinsey Quarterly, 64% of respondents said that WOM inﬂuenced their
purchase decisions (Atsmon et al., 2011). WOM has become one critical factor that
inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s market share, which can be increased by 10% or reduced by 20%
due to the pass-on rates for key positive and negative messages over a two-year period
(Bughin et al., 2010). WOM can even help newly established ﬁrms to survive and
succeed in the competitive market. The exponential acceleration in market share
of Google was mostly due to WOM for the ﬁrst few years of its existence (Moretti,
2011). Through OL, previous sales performance, such as the number of downloads of
a particular software, the number of bids of an auction, can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence po-
tential consumer choices (Hanson and Putler, 1996; Onnela and Reed-Tsochas, 2009;
Simonsohn and Ariely, 2008). Through a natural experiment, Cai et al. (2009) ﬁnd
that when customers are given ranking information of the ﬁve most popular dishes,
the demand for those dishes increases by 13 to 20 percent due to OL. In online trans-
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actions, the popularity information can shape consumer choices substantially, such
as the wedding service vendor selection (Tucker and Zhang, 2011), and the lending
decisions to ﬁnance potential borrowers (Zhang and Liu, 2012), where lenders always
draw quality information from observing others’ choices.
As discussed in Chapter 1, theoretical studies on social interactions are related
to modeling the driving forces and the consequences of the inﬂuence of social inter-
actions, such as the herding phenomenon. Models and approaches that explicitly
model agents’ payoﬀs as a function of other agents’ choices or states have appeared
(Hartmann et al., 2008). In the operations management area, Veeraraghavan and
Debo (2009a,b; 2010) investigate the herding behavior in queue choices when the
service quality or service value is unobservable. In these studies, a long queue may
be a signal of service quality in consumer decision processes (Debo et al., 2012).
The current study is also related to dynamics of a social-economic system and
the marketing strategies under the inﬂuence of social interactions. To explain the
phenomenon that the popular restaurant with a long queue does not increase its
price, Becker (1991) develops a theoretical model where individual demand depends
not only on the price but also on the demand of others due to social interactions.
Brock and Durlauf (2001) investigate the rational expectations equilibria in the dis-
crete choice model where an individual’s utility depends on one’s own choice (the
private utility) and others’ choices (the social utility). In the framework of Lopez-
Pintado and Watts (2008) on modeling binary decisions with social interactions, a
one-dimensional “inﬂuence-response function” in terms of the (weighted) number of
others choosing each of the alternatives is developed. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995)
and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) investigate the dynamics and equilibrium of
an economic system where individuals get information and make decisions through
WOM learning. Several studies focus on marketing strategies envisioning the in-
ﬂuence of social interactions in order to increase proﬁtability, such as the pricing
strategy with network externalities (Xie and Sirbu, 1995; Bensaid and Lesne, 1996;
Cabral et al., 1999; Jing et al., 2011), the optimal entry timing decision into a
new market (Joshi et al., 2009), product design (Aral and Walker, 2011) and the
strategy of providing online customer review (Chen and Xie, 2008). Sapra et al.
(2010) consider the inventory replenishment decision when the shortages as a signal
of popularity may induce more demand of a product.
Although the inﬂuence of social interactions is well recognized, few studies have
focused on the link between operations and the inﬂuence of social interactions, es-
pecially when operations are subject to capacity constraint. In this chapter, we
investigate the capacity and price decision under social interactions, with a focus
on how operational decisions should be made to balance the tradeoﬀ between social
interaction eﬀect and congestion externality in proﬁt optimization is the main focus.
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Tab. 3.1: Key variables and notations.
Variables Notations Variables Notations
Capacity/Service rate  Discount factor 
Price p Social interaction intensity 
Arrival rate  Waiting cost per unit time w
Social value vs() Consumer expected surplus S
Total potential market size  Consumer reservation surplus Sr
Cost per capacity per customer  Intrinsic service value v
3.4 Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions
This section describes the capacity and price decision model under social interactions.
A monopoly service provider oﬀers frequently purchased service to the consumer
market where consumer purchase decisions are inﬂuenced by social interactions. The
objective of the monopolist is to maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt through
capacity/service rate  and service price p. The monopolist is operated through a
queueing system. Due to capacity constraint and random arrivals as well as random
service time, queues will be formed. Consumers need to decide whether to join
the queue to purchase the service or balk. In the following section, we use the
purchase decision and the queue-joining decision interchangeably. We assume the
queue length is unobservable to consumers before joining the queue. Consumers are
strategic in queue-joining decision as in Hassin and Haviv (2003) which is modeled
in the following section. Although we assume the queue is unobservable, the model
is also applicable to the situation where the system is in equilibrium in each period
and we focus on the equilibrium dynamics of the service system. Key notations used
in this chapter are listed in Table 3.1.
3.4.1 Consumer Queue-joining Decision
Due to the inﬂuence of social interactions, from consumer perspective, the perceived
value V of the service depends on its intrinsic value v and the social value vs(h),
where h is the sales volume of the service or the existing customer base. For sim-
plicity, we assume an additive form of the perceived value as V = v + vs(h). The
model speciﬁcation follows the deﬁnition of social interactions used in Brock and
Durlauf (2001) as “the utility or payoﬀ an individual receives from a given action
depends directly on the choices of others in that individual’s reference group”. We
realize that for observable queues, customer purchase decision may be inﬂuenced by
the queue length, which has been empirically documented in Lu et al. (2012) and
Kremer and Debo (2012). In this chapter, we use past arrival rates to measure the
existing customer base, based on the assumption that the queue is unobservable.
Given the service rate  and the price p, an individual consumer’s purchase
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decision depends on the expected surplus denoted as S(h; ; ; p) and the reservation
surplus Sr before making the queue-joining decision. Speciﬁcally, if the expected
surplus is no less than the reservation surplus, an arriving consumer will join the
queue to procure the service. The expected surplus is deﬁned as S(h; ; ; p) =
v+ vs(h) CW (; )  p, where CW (; ) is the waiting cost due to congestion in
the queue. Since the queue is unobservable, we assume consumers adopt the expected
waiting time (in queue and service) to estimate their waiting cost, and the resulting
arrival rate  is denoted as the equilibrium arrival rate. We assume the monopolist is
operated as an M/M/1 queue for tractability (the model can be extended to general
queueing models). Therefore, demand arrives according to a Poisson process and
the service time is exponentially distributed. Although the M/M/1 model may not
capture all aspects of the system behavior, it captures many of the congestion-related
phenomenon (Ata and Shneorson, 2006). Moreover, using this model, we are able
to explicitly characterize the operational policy and the structural properties of the
system dynamics. Therefore, consumer expected waiting cost is calculated as
CW (; ) =
8<: w  ; 0   < +1;     
where w is the waiting cost per unit time for all customers, and  is the total
potential market size (or arrival rate).
We assume consumers are homogeneous in terms of the reservation surplus Sr.
Since the queue is unobservable, upon arrival, each consumer makes the joining
decision based on the perceived value of the service, the expected waiting cost and
the price. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium queue-joining strategy since all
consumers are homogeneous as in Hassin and Haviv (2003) and Anand et al. (2011).
Letting e(; p; h) denote the equilibrium probability that an individual would join
the queue given the service rate  and price p as well as the existing customer base
h, we have the following scenarios:
 If S(h;; ; p) = v + vs(h)   CW (; )   p > Sr, i.e., the expected sur-
plus is larger than the reservation for an individual consumer even if all the
other consumers join the queue; therefore, all consumers will join the queue in
equilibrium, i.e., e(; p; h) = 1;
 If S(h; 0; ; p) = v+ vs(h) CW (0; )  p < Sr, i.e., the expected surplus is
smaller than the reservation for an individual consumer even if no consumers
join the queue; therefore, no consumers will join the queue in equilibrium, i.e.,
e(; p; 
h) = 0;
 If 9 2 [0;]; S(h; ; ; p) = v + vs(h)   CW (; )   p = Sr, i.e., each
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individual consumer plays a mixed strategy in equilibrium, in the sense that
each consumer will join the queue with probability e(; p; h) =  2 [0; 1].
Therefore, the equilibrium arrival rate denoted as e(h; ; p) is given as the following
result:
e(h; ; p) =
8>>><>>>:
; S(h;; ; p) > Sr
 2 [0;]; S(h; ; ; p) = Sr
0; S(h; 0; ; p) < Sr
:
Given consumer queue-joining strategy, optimal operational decisions will drive
consumer expected surplus to the reservation level, if the expected surplus is larger
than the reservation; the monopolist can always make additional proﬁt by increasing
the price or decreasing the service rate to reduce consumer expected surplus to the
reservation level meanwhile keeping the same demand.
3.4.2 Capacity and Price Decisions
We consider a monopolist service provider which oﬀers frequently purchased service
in an inﬁnite-horizon with periods t = 1; 2;    ;1 in the consumer market with
potential demand size t. If the service is not frequently consumed, we interpret t
as the market size of new consumers who enter the market in period t. Given the
price of the service pt, the monopolist wants to cover the market as much as possible
in each period. However, due to capacity constraint of the service rate t, the
market that can be covered by the monopolist is restricted due to congestion. The
monopolist can increase its service rate in order to serve more consumers (or cover a
larger market) at the marginal cost  per unit of service rate denoted as C(t) = t,
such as training of employees, facility improvement, hiring more employees and so
on. In this chapter, we assume the monopolist can not simply increase the service
speed meanwhile keeping the intrinsic service value unchanged. For example, in
consumer-intensive service industry studied by Anand et al. (2011), such as the
consulting service, simply increasing the service speed may decrease the service value.
Therefore, in each period, the monopolist needs to make the price and service rate
decisions.
The total potential market size t may be inﬂuenced by the price, the service
rate or the existing customer base, which may be dynamically changed in each period.
We model the service setting with a queueing regime with unobservable queues.
Therefore, t is the total potential arrival rate, and the eﬀective arrival rate is t 
[0;t] in period t after the price pt and service rate t are determined. We assume
the ﬁrm is operated with a risk neutral manager whose objective is to maximize the
long-run discounted proﬁt with discount factor  2 (0; 1). We refer to the equilibrium
3. Dynamic Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions 50
arrival rate as the state in each period; while the steady state refers to the convergence
of the equilibrium arrival rate in the dynamics of the service operations model.
Based on the above consumer purchase decision, in each period t, due to social
interactions, given t and pt, consumer expected surplus is given as
S(ht 1; t; t; pt) = v + v(t 1)  CW (t; t)  pt; t  1
where ht 1 = (h0 ; h1 ;    ; ht 1) denotes the eﬀective arrival rates during previous
periods. Therefore, we assume consumer perceived value of the service in period t
before joining the queue is inﬂuenced by the arrival rates in previous periods which
serve as the existing customer base. We assume the social value of the service due
to the inﬂuence of social interactions as v(ht 1) = ht 1, where   0 is denoted as
the social interaction intensity. The magnitude of  has been measured by various
empirical studies. For example, in Hartmann (2010), 35% of the median consumer
value is attributable to the inﬂuence of social interactions. Although several empir-
ical studies do not directly measure the impact of existing customer base or sales
volume on the valuation of potential customers, they have measured the eﬀect of OL
or WOM on the sales volume. For example, in the dining choice experiment (Cai
et al., 2009), the sales quantity can be increased by 13 percent to 20 percent; in
the online vouchers sales in Groupon.com, a 10% increase in past sales is associated
with 1.4 more vouchers in the next hour (Li and Wu, 2012); displaying popularity
information of the online wedding service can bring 30.53 more clicks (Tucker and
Zhang, 2011).
Since in each period, the optimal service rate and the price will reduce consumer
expected surplus to be equal to the reservation level, the equilibrium arrival rate in
period t satisﬁes
S(ht 1; t; t; pt) = v + 
h
t 1   CW (t; t)  pt = Srt ; t 2 [0;t]; t  1
where Srt is consumer reservation surplus in period t. We normalize the reservation
surplus as Sr = 0 in each period in the following sections, and the potential arrival
rate t is large enough which does not impact the operational decisions. In period
t+ 1, the equilibrium arrival rate t in period t will be the eﬀective arrival rate ht .
Therefore, in the following section, we omit the superscript and denote the state
transition function (or the arrival rate dynamics) as t = F (t 1; t; pt).
The proﬁt of the monopolist in period t is given as
(t; pt; t 1) = (pt   t)F (t 1; t; pt) (3.4.1)
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and the long-run discounted proﬁt with the initial arrival rate 0 and the discount




t(t+1; pt+1; t); s:t: t = F (t 1; t; pt); t  1 (3.4.2)
The objective of the monopolist is to maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt
through service rate and price decisions as
V (0) = sup
t;pt
(0) (3.4.3)
where the value function V () is the unique bounded solution to the following Bell-
man equation (Stokey et al., 1989):
V () = sup
;p
(; p; ) + V (F (; ; p)) (3.4.4)
since the single period proﬁt (; p; ) is bounded.
There are two decision variables in each period, in the following section, we ﬁrst
consider three special dynamical models, namely the model with constant price and
service rate and the model with constant price or constant service rate. We then
consider the general model, where the service rate and the price are simultaneously
determined in each period.
3.5 Service Operations with Constant Price and Capacity
In this section, we consider a special strategy adopted by the monopolist, the constant
price and service rate policy, where the service rate and the price are pre-determined
as t =  and pt = p  . These ﬁxed operational decisions capture the situation
where ﬁrms announce the price and service rate before entering into the market
and stick to their policies in operations. Therefore, for each served consumer, the
monopolist receives a constant proﬁt margin p  indicating the monopolist adopts
a constant price premium (or proﬁt marginal) policy. We assume the following
condition holds in this section:
Assumption on constant price and service rate: v   p  w > 0.
The above assumption indicates even if there is no existing customer base, i.e.,
t = 0, consumers still have incentives to adopt the service in period t + 1, i.e.,
the equilibrium arrival rate in each period is always positive (we may not need this
assumption, if the initial arrival rate is positive).
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The arrival rate dynamic is through the following state transition equation:
v + t 1   p  w
  t = 0) t =  
w
v + t 1   p; t < 
Therefore, the arrival rate in period t is increasing in the arrival rate in the previous
period (the existing consumer base). The arrival rate path ft; t  1g starting with
the initial arrival rate 0 can be computed sequentially given the service rate and
price. If there exists a steady state arrival rate, denoted as c, we can solve c as
the solution to the following quadratic equation:  =    wv+ p . It is easy to see
that there exists a unique solution denoted as c(; p), where
c = c(; p) =
  v + p+p(+ v   p)2   4w
2
2 (0; )
based on the above assumption. It can be shown that c(; p) is increasing in , i.e.,
the larger social interaction intensity, the larger steady state arrival rate. Thus, a
large social interaction intensity will help the service provider to cover a large market
eventually.
We have the following result in terms of the existence of the steady state arrival
rate and the monotonicity of the arrival rate paths:
Lemma 3.1. Under the constant price and service rate policy, there exists a unique
steady state arrival rate c and the arrival rate paths ft; t  1g converge to c
monotonically.
Proof. Since t is increasing in t 1, and bounded above by , there exists a unique
steady state c in (0; ). If 0  c, the sequence converges to c decreasingly, while
if 0 < c, the sequence converges to c increasingly.
Remark 3.1. The arrival rate is bounded in t 2  = [min(0; c);max(0; c)]. The
steady state arrival rate is decreasing and concave in p, while increasing and concave
in , thus denoted as c(; p). It is also supermodular, since the cross derivative
denoted as p can be checked to be positive.
Given the constant service rate  and price p, the single period proﬁt is reformu-





which is increasing in the state t 1. Based on the above result, if 0  c, the proﬁt
function will decrease monotonically, i.e., (t 1; t)  (t; t+1); while if 0 < c,
the proﬁt function will increase monotonically, i.e., (t 1; t) < (t; t+1). For
the ﬁxed (; p) policy, given the initial arrival rate  = 0, the long-run discounted
3. Dynamic Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions 53


















Fig. 3.5.1: The steady state arrival rate with respect to the social interaction intensity  2
[0; 2] under the constant service rate and price policy.
proﬁt is denoted as
W (; p; 0) =
1X
t=0
t(p  )t+1; t+1 =

  w
v   p+ t

(3.5.1)
which is bounded, since the single period proﬁt is bounded.
Fig.3.5.1-3.5.3 describe the steady state arrival rate with respect to , two arrival
rate paths and two proﬁt paths with  = 0:4 and  = 0:6 under the parameters
v = 10;  = 1; w = 1 and  = 5; p = 9.
The optimal constant service rate and price policy denoted as (?; p?) is to
maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt W (; p; 0), as
V (0) = max
;p
W (; p; 0) (3.5.2)
Although given  and p, the proﬁt in each period is monotonic, due to the
nonlinear state transition function; to solve the optimal constant service rate and
price is not straightforward. In the following section, we focus on two special poli-
cies, namely, the policy that maximizes the steady state proﬁt and the policy that
maximizes the ﬁrst period proﬁt. We focus on the optimal constant service rate and
price from the above two special policies. We deﬁne
max
;p




(; p; ) (3.5.3)
and we denote the optimal decisions as (; p()). The above deﬁnition implies the
3. Dynamic Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions 54















Fig. 3.5.2: Two arrival rate paths under the constant service rate and price policy.




















Fig. 3.5.3: Two proﬁt paths under the constant service rate and price policy.
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monopolist sequentially solves the service rate  and price p. Since the proﬁt function
(; p; ) is concave in p and  respectively and supermodular in (; p), there exists
a unique pair of (; p()) for ﬁxed .
The proﬁt in the ﬁrst period is
1(; p; 0) = (p  )1 = (p  )

  w
v + 0   p

(3.5.4)




which maximizes 1(; p; 0). The










The proﬁt in the steady state is
c(; p; c) = (p  )
 


















































as W I(0) and W II(0) respectively,





as the optimal long-run discounted proﬁt
based on the two constant policies. Therefore, given the two feasible policies, we
have the following results:
Proposition 3.1. Given the initial arrival rate 0 and the two feasible policies
(I ; p(I)) and (II ; p(II)), the following cases hold:
 if 0  min, W (0)  
c(II ;p(II))
1  ;
 if 0  max, W (0)  1(
I ;p(I))
1  ;








Given the constant service rate and price policy, the impact of social interactions
on the dynamics of the service system depends on the comparison between the steady
state arrival rate and the initial arrival rate. Based on the previous result, given the
initial arrival rate 0, a large social interaction intensity  will induce a large c,
which indicates the proﬁt path under either policy may increase; while a small social
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Fig. 3.5.4: Proﬁt paths and arrival rate paths under the two constant service rate and price
policies.
interaction intensity  will lead to a small steady state arrival rate, which indicates
the proﬁt path will decrease; while a medium social interaction intensity  may
lead to a decreasing proﬁt path under (I ; p(I)), with an increasing proﬁt path
under (II ; p(II)). Therefore, if the social interaction intensity is large, it will be
optimal for the monopolist to adopt the policy (II ; p(II)); while for a small social
interaction intensity, the policy (I ; p(I)) may be optimal.
Based on the parameters v = 10;  = 1; w = 4;  = 0:3, the optimal service
rate and price that maximize the steady state proﬁt are II = 6:2856; pII = 9:2857.
Fig.3.5.4-3.5.6 depict the proﬁt paths under the two policies with the initial arrival
rates 0 = 2, 0 = 5 and 0 = 4 in correspondence with the above three cases. The
optimal service rate and price which maximize the ﬁrst period proﬁt with 0 = 4
are I = 5:6001; pI = 9:2001, and I = 5:3000; pI = 8:6001 with 0 = 2, while
I = 5:5954; pI = 9:2851 with 0 = 5.
3.6 Dynamic Capacity Management Under Social Interactions
3.6.1 Model Settings
In this section, we consider the dynamic capacity management under the inﬂuence
of social interactions, where the price is ﬁxed as a constant due to regulations or
other factors, such as the price promise of the service provider. While we assume
the service rate can be adjusted by the monopolist in each period, the monopolist
decides the optimal service rate in order to maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt.
Since the price is ﬁxed, we assume the following condition holds in this section:
Assumption under the constant price constraint: Ap   w  0, where A =
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Fig. 3.5.5: Proﬁt paths and arrival rate paths under the two constant service rate and price
policies.
























Fig. 3.5.6: Proﬁt paths and arrival rate paths under the two constant service rate and price
policies.
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v   p > 0 is the net value of the service from the consumer perspective.
The assumption indicates under the ﬁxed price p, if the monopolist sets the
service rate at the maximum value p , consumers have incentive to join the queue
to purchase the service even if the existing customer base is zero (hence no social
interaction eﬀect), since we have Ap  w  0) v   p  wp

= A  wp  0.
Since in equilibrium consumer reservation surplus is zero in each period, we have
the following state transition function in period t:
v + t 1   p  CW (t; t) = 0) t = t   w
v + t 1   p = t  
w
A+ t 1








, and the equilibrium
arrival rate is in the interval 0  t < t. Given the service rate, the proﬁt in each
period t+ 1 is formulated as






For the ﬁxed price p, the proﬁt is deﬁnitely bounded, since it is concave in t+1.
For an initial arrival rate 0, the monopolist determines the service rate t in each
period to maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt as





t(t+1; t); s:t: t+1 = t+1   w
A+ t
; t  0 (3.6.2)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The above value function is the unique
bounded solution to the following Bellman equation:
V () = sup
2







In the above formulation, the state transition mechanism is a nonlinear function,
which may cause diﬃculty in determining the property of the optimal service rate
policy. Based on the assumption that the potential arrival rate in each period is
large enough, and consumer equilibrium surplus is zero, we have
t+1 = t+1 +
w
A+ t
which is decreasing in t. The above equation indicates that monopolist can de-
termine the arrival rate (or the market coverage) in each period by setting the
corresponding service rate. Therefore, we can change the decision variable from
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the service rate to the selection of the equilibrium arrival rate in each period. We









t+1 = (t; t+1) (3.6.4)
Obviously, the set of feasible t+1, denoted as ^t+1 =
h
0; p   wA+t
i
is bounded.
Therefore, we reformulate the above problem as the following form:





where the value function is the unique solution to the following Bellman equation
V () = sup
^2^
(; ^) + V (^): (3.6.6)
Therefore, we have changed the original problem where the decision variable is
the service rate in each period as an alternative problem where the decision variable
is the equilibrium arrival rate in each period. In the following section, we will use the
reformulated problem to investigate the optimal decisions in the dynamic model. The
single period proﬁt function (; ^) is increasing and concave in the state variable
 by checking the ﬁrst and second order derivatives with respect to . Therefore,
the value function V () is increasing in , indicating a large initial market is always
beneﬁcial to the monopolist.
Because the action set ^ is compact and all functions are continuous, there
exists an optimal stationary arrival rate policy that solves the above problem. We
deﬁne the optimal arrival rate policy as ^?() = argmax^ (; ^) + V (^). The
arrival rate path f^?t ; t  1g starting with the initial arrival rate 0 is computed
sequentially as ^?t = ^?(^?t 1). The sequence f^?t g of the optimal decision is also the
optimal state path f?t ; t  1g, and the corresponding service rate path f?t ; t  1g





The monopolist that ignores the impact of the social interactions on the equilibrium
arrival rate in the future period will try to maximize its proﬁt in each period by
selecting the corresponding arrival rate through the service rate decision. We deﬁne
the policy that maximizes each single period proﬁt as the myopic policy, since it
ignores the impact of the current period decision in the future period, while we
deﬁne the optimal policy as the strategic policy. In the following section, we use
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superscript M to denote the decisions and results for the myopic policy. It is easy to
check that the single period proﬁt function (; ^) is supermodular in (; ^), based
on the cross-derivative as ^ =
w
(A+)2
> 0. Therefore, we have the following
result:
Lemma 3.2. The single period proﬁt maximizing arrival rate ~() = argmax(; ^)
is increasing in ; while the corresponding service rate ~() is decreasing in . More-
over, the optimal single period proﬁt (; ^) is also increasing in .
For the myopic policy, the monopolist selects the arrival rate by setting the
corresponding service rate which is only optimal in the current period. The decision
under the myopic policy is equivalent to setting the discount factor  = 0, in the
sense that the monopolist only focuses on the current period proﬁt and does not
care about the future proﬁt. We deﬁne the arrival rate path of the myopic policy
as fMt ; t  1g and the corresponding service rate path as fMt ; t  1g. Therefore,
the evolutions of the arrival rate and the corresponding service rate in the myopic













Since the arrival rate space is bounded and based on the monotonic property
of the arrival rate dynamics, there exists a unique steady state arrival rate in the
myopic policy, denoted as M 2 (0; ), which can be solved from the equation
 = p2   w2(A+) as
M =
 (2A   p) +p(2A + p)2   82w
4




Therefore, we have the monotonicity of the arrival rate path and service rate
path in the myopic policy as the following result:
Lemma 3.3. For any initial market size 0, the service rate paths fMt g and the
arrival rate paths fMt g monotonically converge to the unique steady state M and
M respectively in opposite directions in the myopic policy.
Proof. If Mt 1 > M , we have Mt = ~(Mt 1) > ~(M ) = M and Mt   Mt 1 =
p
2   w2(A+Mt 1)   
M
t 1 < 0 indicating M < Mt < Mt 1, i.e., the arrival rate paths
fMt g converge to M in a decreasing order. We have Mt+1 = ~(Mt ) > ~(Mt 1) = Mt
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due to the decreasing property of Mt . Therefore, the service rate paths fMt g
converge to M in an increasing order. The case for Mt 1 < M can be similarly
proved.
The above result indicates, if the initial market size is large enough, such that
0 > 
M , in the myopic policy, the service rate path will increase gradually, while
the arrival rates will decrease monotonically. However, when the initial market size
is small, such that 0 < M , the service rate path will decrease gradually, while the
arrival rates will increase monotonically. Therefore, for a large initial market size,
the myopic policy will always increase the service rate gradually; while for a small
initial market size, the myopic policy will decrease the service rate gradually.
Since the myopic policy ignores the impact of the arrival rate in the current
period on the future demand, we anticipate that the myopic policy selects a smaller
arrival rate compared with the strategic policy. Indeed, we have the following result:
Proposition 3.2. In the myopic policy, the arrival rate is always less than that in the
strategic policy, i.e., ~()  ^?(), and the service rate also satisﬁes ~()  ^?(),
where ^?() is the corresponding service rate in the strategic policy. Moreover, for
any initial arrival rate 0, the arrival rate in the myopic policy is always less than
that in the strategic policy, i.e., Mt  ?t .








(; ^) = ~()
We also have ^?() = ^?() + wA+  ~() + wA+ = ~(). We use induction to
prove the rest. For any initial arrival rate 0, we have ?1 = ^?(0)  ~(0) = M1 .
Suppose ?t  Mt . We have ?t+1 = ^?(?t )  ~(?t )  ~(Mt ) = Mt+1 based on the
increasing property of ~(). Therefore, ?t  Mt for any t  1.
Therefore, in the myopic policy, the arrival rate path is always less than the
optimal arrival rate path in the strategic policy for the same initial arrival rate 0.
The arrival rates in the myopic policy obviously lower consumer perceived value of
the service in the future period, and thus erode the future proﬁt due to a smaller
eﬀective arrival rate. By selecting a higher arrival rate through a larger service rate
decision, the strategic policy trades oﬀ the current period proﬁt for future period
beneﬁt under the inﬂuence of social interactions. In order to utilize the inﬂuence
of social interactions for the long term operations provides an alternative reason to
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explain why some companies adopt seemingly suboptimal operational decisions in
the short term situation, such as a higher service delivery speed (as one aspect of
service quality) or a higher capacity.
3.6.3 Strategic Policy
Since there exists a unique steady state under the myopic policy for both the arrival
rate and the service rate, we investigate whether the steady state in the strate-
gic policy exists or not. Suppose there exists a steady state arrival rate ?? and
correspondingly the service rate is ??. If the monopolist sets the service rate
at ?? when the existing arrival rate is ??, the eﬀective arrival rate will be the
same as ?? = ??   wA+?? in the current period. Therefore, if the monopolist
has an initial market size ??, the optimal arrival rate chosen each period will be
?? = argmax^2^
n
(??; ^) + V (^)
o
, and the long-run discounted proﬁt is calcu-
lated as V (??) =
P1
t=0 
t(??; ??) = (
??;??)
1  .
In the following section, we ﬁrst prove the existence and the uniqueness of the
steady state in the strategic policy and then characterize the solution of the steady
state arrival rate and service rate. We ﬁrst have the monotonicity of the optimal
arrival rate path in the strategic policy:
Lemma 3.4. The optimal arrival rate ^?() in the strategic policy is increasing in
. Moreover, the optimal arrival rate path f?t ; t  1g is monotonic.
The monotonicity of the strategic policy can be seen from the following exam-
ple. Given the initial arrival rate 00 > 0. Deﬁne the optimal arrival rate path






sider a feasible arrival rate path for 00, such that f00; 01; ?2;    g where 01 > ?1
and (0; ?1) = (00; 01). Such a 01 must exist, since (; ^) is increasing in the
state variable , and if ^  ^?(), (; ^) is decreasing in ^, we have (0; ?1) <
(00; ?1) > (00; 01). Therefore, we have (01; ?2) > (?1; ?2) and





t+1) > V (0)
which indicates that starting with a larger initial market size 00, the monopolist can
select a larger arrival rate in period 1 and then selects the arrival rate path in the
following periods as the optimal one for the smaller initial market, and the proﬁt is
always larger. We continue this reasoning by selecting a larger arrival rate in period
2, 3, ... , and eventually we get the optimal arrival rate path for the larger initial
market. Therefore, the optimal arrival rate ^?() is always increasing in .
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Although the optimal arrival rate path is monotonic, the corresponding service
rate path may not be monotonic, since ?t+1 is increasing in ?t+1 while decreasing in
t. On the one hand, in order to cover a larger arrival rate, the service rate ?t+1 will
become larger; on the other hand, a large existing customer base t will motivate
the ﬁrm to oﬀer a slower service rate, since the service rate is costly. The impacts
of these two forces depend on the parameters ;w;A.
Based on the above monotonicity of the optimal arrival rate, we have the fol-
lowing result in terms of the existence and the uniqueness of the steady state in the
strategic policy:
Proposition 3.3. There exists a unique steady state service rate ?? and arrival
rate ?? in the strategic policy. All arrival rate paths converge to the steady state ??
monotonically.
Proof. Since the arrival rate is bounded and the optimal arrival rate path is mono-
tonic, we conclude the optimal arrival rate path will converge to a unique steady
state ??. The corresponding service rate will converge to the unique steady state
??. Since the arrival rate path is monotonic, all arrival rate paths converge to the
steady state ?? monotonically.
Therefore, starting with a larger initial market, the monopolist will systemati-
cally lower the arrival rate, which eventually converges to the unique steady state.
While starting with a smaller initial market, the optimal arrival rate will increase
gradually and eventually converge to the steady state. Although a large customer
base or market size will be preferred by companies, due to capacity constraint, ﬁrms
have to reduce the demand since capacity is costly. This may explain why some
companies with popular products or services have to maintain certain waiting lists
and keep a long queue.
We characterize the steady state arrival rate and the service rate in the strategic
policy, as shown in the following result:
Theorem 3.1. In the strategic policy, the steady state arrival rate ?? is the unique
solution in (0; p ) to the cubic function (p 2)(A+)2 w(A+)+w = 0.
The steady state service rate is ?? = ?? + wA+?? . The steady state 
?? in the
strategic policy is increasing in  and  respectively. Moreover, ?? is larger than the
steady state in the myopic policy M , i.e., ??  M .
Therefore, the steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy can be easily solved
from a cubic function. If the magnitude of the social interaction intensity is larger,
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the steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy will also be larger. Thus, starting
from the same initial arrival rate 0, if 1  2, we have the corresponding relation
?t (1)  ?t (2), i.e., for any point in time, the arrival rate path with a larger
social interaction intensity will be always larger than that with a smaller social
interaction intensity, if the monopolist adopts the strategic policy. We also know
that the optimal arrival rate in the strategic policy is larger than that in the myopic
policy. Therefore, a large social interaction intensity also indicates the monopolist
should trade oﬀ more current period proﬁt to increase future period demand and
proﬁt. Similarly, if the discount factor is bigger, the steady state in the strategic
policy will also be larger, indicating that starting from the same initial arrival rate
0, if 1  2, we have the corresponding relation ?t (1)  ?t (2). Therefore, the
strategic policy will trade oﬀ more current proﬁt for the long term beneﬁt in the
future period, if the monopolist cares about more future proﬁt. The above result
also provides guidance for a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm in capacity decision-making. For
example, managers can invest in the capacity at the steady state level ??, so that
eventually the arrival rate will converge to the steady state, no matter how large the
initial market is. If the arrival rate can converge to the steady state very fast, it
would be an appropriate capacity strategy. Intuitively, a higher price level will lead
to a smaller steady state arrival rate, which can be seen from the dynamics of the
system.
Based on the M/M/1 queue, the queue length is calculated as L =   =

1  ,
where  =  is the utilization. From the above result, we can easily see that due to
a larger arrival rate, the queue length and the expected waiting time in steady state
under the strategic policy are also larger than those under the myopic police. The
steady state utilization in the strategic policy is also larger than that in the myopic
policy.
Fig.3.6.1-3.6.4 depict the value function, the arrival rate path and the service
rate path, as well as the arrival rate decision in the strategic policy and the myopic
policy, with the parameters v = 10; p = 9;  = 1; w = 1;  = 0:8;  = 0:9.
From the comparison in the ﬁgures, we can see, the arrival rate path and the
service rate path in the strategic policy are always above those in the myopic policy.
For the same customer base, the arrival rate decision in the strategic policy is always
larger than that in the myopic policy. In the above result, the service rate paths
in the two policies are also monotonically converging to the corresponding unique
steady state.
Although the steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy is always larger
than that in the myopic policy, the steady state service rate in the strategic policy
may not be necessarily larger. We have the following result in terms of the steady
state service rate comparison:
3. Dynamic Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions 65
















Fig. 3.6.1: Value function in the dynamic service rate management model with respect to
the initial arrival rate.






















Fig. 3.6.2: Arrival rate paths in the dynamic service rate management model under the
myopic policy and the strategic policy.
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Fig. 3.6.3: Service rate paths in the dynamic service rate management model under the
myopic policy and the strategic policy

























Fig. 3.6.4: Arrival rate dynamics in the dynamic service rate management model under the
myopic policy and the strategic policy.
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?? < M .
Proof. In both policies, the steady state service rate is  = + wA+ with the ﬁrst
order derivative as @@ = 1  w(A+)2 which is increasing. Thus, if (A+M )2  w,
@
@ = 1   w(A+)2  0, indicating ?? > M , since ??  M . Otherwise,  is
convex in , with the minimizer at  = A 
p
w
 . Thus the rest of the above result
follows.
Therefore, from the above result, we can see if the steady state arrival rate is
small, the service rate in the strategic policy may be smaller than that in the myopic
policy. The reason is that since the strategic policy has built up a large customer
base, even if the steady state service rate is smaller, the steady state arrival rate
is still larger than that in the myopic policy. This result may explain why some
companies can cover a larger market than their competitors, but the service delivery
speed or service quality may not be superior.
In order to bound the steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy, we con-
sider the optimal arrival rate under the constant price policy in the static single
period model denoted as ?, where the equilibrium arrival rate satisﬁes v+  p 










and the corresponding optimal proﬁt is deﬁned as (?; ?). Denote the steady state
proﬁt in the myopic policy and the strategic policy as (M ; M ) and (??; ??)
respectively. We have the following result:
Proposition 3.4. The steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy is bounded
in [M ; ?], i.e., M  ??  ?. Moreover, the proﬁt function is bounded in
[(M ; M ); (??; ??)], i.e., (M ; M )  (??; ??)  (?; ?).
Therefore, from the above result, we can see under the ﬁxed price constraint,
compared with the optimal arrival rate and proﬁt in the static single period model,
the steady state results in the strategic policy are smaller. In the dynamic model,
consumer purchase decisions depend on the arrival rate as the existing customer base
in the previous period, and there exists delay in the social interaction eﬀect. However,
in the static single period model, this delay eﬀect does not exist. Therefore, the
feasible arrival rate space for the monopolist to make decisions is larger, indicating
an even higher proﬁt. The above result also provides another way for the monopolist
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Tab. 3.2: Comparison between strategic policy and myopic policy.
Steady state arrival rate Steady state service rate Steady state proﬁt
?? > M ?? >< M ?? > M

























Fig. 3.6.5: Steady state arrival rate with respect to the social interaction intensity  2 [0; 1]
under three diﬀerent policies.
to estimate the steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy, i.e., how much of the
market should be covered in the long-run. The monopolist can set the steady state
service rate based on the myopic policy and the static single period model, which
may be an appropriate service rate decision, especially when the discount factor is
not known, for example s = s+ wA+s , where 
s = ?+(1  )M and  2 [0; 1]
can measure the magnitude of the discount factor. If the monopolist cares more
about the current proﬁt, a small  can be chosen; otherwise, a large  should be
preferred.
Table 3.2 summarizes the comparison between strategic policy and myopic policy
in terms of the steady state arrival rate, service rate and proﬁt.
Fig.3.6.5 shows the steady state arrival rate with respect to , with the param-
eters v = 10; p = 9;  = 1; w = 1;  = 0:8; Fig.3.6.6 shows the steady state arrival
rate with respect to , with the parameters v = 10; p = 9;  = 1; w = 1;  = 0:8,
where the other two steady state arrival rates are independent of .
3.7 Dynamic Pricing Strategy Under Social Interactions
3.7.1 Model Settings
In this section, we consider the dynamic pricing strategy under the constant service
rate constraint. Service rate can be considered as one aspect of service quality in
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Fig. 3.6.6: Steady state arrival rate with respect to the discount factor  2 [0; 1] under three
diﬀerent policies.
some service industries, for example, the consumer-intensive service. Therefore, the
constant service rate can be considered as the ﬁxed or standard service quality due
to regulations or other factors, such as the quality promise of the service provider.
While we assume the price can be changed in each period, the monopolist decides
the optimal price in order to maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt. We make the
following assumption in this section:
Assumption under constant service rate policy: B > w, where B = v  > 0
is the net value of the service from the perspective of the service provider.
The assumption indicates, under the ﬁxed service rate , if the price p is charged
as low as the service rate cost, consumers have incentives to join the queue to pur-
chase the service even if there is no social interaction eﬀect (there are no consumers
purchasing the service in previous periods), since B > w ) v     w > 0.
In each period, the equilibrium arrival rate will drive consumer surplus to be
zero. Therefore, we have the state transition in terms of the equilibrium arrival rate
in period t as
v + t 1   pt   CW (t; ) = 0) t =   w
v + t 1   pt
where the price pt is bounded in set pt 2 Pt =
h
; v + t 1   w
i
, and the arrival
rate is also bounded as 0  t < .
Given the price decision, the proﬁt in each period is
(t 1; pt) = (pt   )t = (pt   )

  w
v + t 1   pt

(3.7.1)
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which is increasing in t 1, since the derivative with respect to t 1 is
(pt )w
(v+t 1 pt)2 >
0. For the ﬁxed service rate , the proﬁt is deﬁnitely bounded, since it is concave
in pt in a bounded set. For an initial arrival rate 0, the monopolist determines the
price in each period to maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt as




t 1(t 1; pt); s:t: t =   w
v + t 1   pt ; t  1 (3.7.2)
The proﬁt function in each period is concave and bounded, so the value function
is the unique bounded solution to the following Bellman equation:
V () = sup
p2P
W (p; ); where W (p; ) = (; p) + V

  w
v +   p

(3.7.3)
Since the single period proﬁt function (; p) is increasing in , the value func-
tion V () is increasing in , indicating a large initial market share is always beneﬁcial
to the monopolist.
Similar to the dynamic service rate model with constant price, the state tran-
sition function is nonlinear in the decision variable p, which may not be easy to
derive the property of the policy function. Therefore, we also reformulate the above
problem by changing the decision variable as the equilibrium arrival rate, based on
the assumption that in each period, the potential market is large enough for the mo-
nopolist to cover. Therefore, the monopolist can determine the equilibrium arrival
rate in each period by setting the corresponding price. The price is determined by
the selected arrival rate in period t as:
pt = v + t 1   w
  t
where the action space of t, denoted as ^t which is bounded and compact, can be
solved from the following inequality
pt = v + t 1   w





and the single period proﬁt function is reformulated as
(t 1; pt) =

B + t 1   w
  t

t = (t 1; t) (3.7.4)
where (t 1; t) is concave in t and bounded.
Starting at the initial arrival rate 0, the optimal value function is reformulated
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as





which is the unique bounded solution of the following Bellman equation:
V () = sup
^2^
W (; ^); where W (; ^) = (; ^) + V (^) (3.7.6)
The single period proﬁt function (; ^) is increasing in , indicating the value
function V () is increasing in . Therefore, we see the reformulated dynamic pro-
gramming problem in the pricing strategy is similar to the dynamic service rate
problem with the constant price constraint. The diﬀerence lies that the state tran-
sition mechanisms are diﬀerent in the two models.
Because the action set ^ is compact and all functions are continuous, there
exists an optimal stationary arrival rate policy that solves the above problem. We
deﬁne the optimal arrival rate policy as ^?() = argmax^W (; ^). The arrival rate
path f^?t ; t  1g starting with an initial arrival rate 0 is computed sequentially as
^?t = ^
?(^?t 1). The sequence f^?t g of the optimal decision is also the optimal state
path f?t ; t  1g in the sequence problem. The corresponding price path fp?t ; t  1g
can be computed through pt = v + t 1   w t in each period.
3.7.2 Myopic Policy
Similar to the previous section, we ﬁrst investigate the dynamic pricing decision in
the myopic policy, which is denoted by the superscript M . Therefore, the arrival
rate path and price path are denoted as fMt ; t  1g and fpMt ; t  1g respectively.
Similar to the previous section, we have the supermodularity of the proﬁt function in
each period and the increasing property of the optimal myopic arrival rate decision:
Lemma 3.5. The single period proﬁt is supermodular in (; ^), and the proﬁt max-
imizing arrival rate ~() = argmax^2^ (; ^) is increasing in . Correspondingly,
the single period proﬁt maximizing price ~p() = v +    w
 ~() is also increasing
in .
Therefore, a larger existing customer base will always lead to a higher price in
the myopic policy, and the corresponding eﬀective arrival rate is also increasing in
. We have the following sequence of arrival rate and corresponding price decision
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Since ~() is increasing and the arrival rate space is bounded, Mt is increasing
in Mt 1 and there exists a unique steady state M of the sequence fMt ; t  1g which
is the solution to the cubic function  =   
q
w
B+ . Correspondingly, the steady




Lemma 3.6. There exists a unique steady state arrival rate M in the myopic policy
in (0; ), i.e., M 2 (0; ), thus a unique steady state price pM .
Proof. Deﬁne F () = (   )2(B + )   w. There are three solutions, namely
(i); i = 1; 2; 3 to the equation F () = 0. We have F (0) = 2B   w > 0 based on
the assumption B > w, and F () =  w < 0. We also have 8  ; F () > 0
and 8   B ; F () < 0. Therefore the three solutions satisfy  B < (1) < 0 <
(2) <  < (3), indicating the unique steady state arrival rate in the myopic policy
is M = (2) 2 (0; ).
Starting with the initial market size M , the myopic policy will always set the
price at pM , which leads to the same arrival rate M in each period. We have the
following result in terms of the monotonicity of the arrival rate path and the price
path in the myopic policy:
Lemma 3.7. For any initial market size 0, the arrival rate path fMt g and the price
path fpMt g monotonically converge to M and pM respectively in the same direction
in the myopic policy.
Therefore, starting with a larger initial market size 0 > M , the monopolist
will charge a higher price and the arrival rate will be reduced gradually which will
converge to the unique steady state; due to the decreasing arrival rate path, the price
path is also decreasing. If the initial market size is small as 0 < M , the monopolist
will charge a lower price and the arrival rate paths will monotonically converge to
the steady state result increasingly; due to the increasing arrival rate path, the price
path is also increasing. The myopic policy is equivalent to setting the discount factor
 = 0, i.e., the manager ignores the impact of the current decision on the arrival rate
in the future due to the inﬂuence of social interactions. Therefore, compared with
the strategic policy, the myopic policy will select a smaller arrival rate by charging
a higher price in each period, as shown in the following result:
Proposition 3.5. The arrival rate decision in the myopic policy is smaller than that
in the strategic policy, i.e., ~()  ^?(), while the price satisﬁes ~p()  p^?(), where
~p() and p^?() are the corresponding price in the myopic policy and the strategic
3. Dynamic Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions 73
policy. Moreover, for any initial arrival rate 0, the arrival rate in the myopic policy
at any point in time is less than that in the strategic policy, i.e., Mt  ?t .
Proof. Since V () is increasing, we have ^?() = argmax
n
(; ^) + V (^)
o

argmax(; ^) = ~(). We also have ~p() = v+   w
 ~()  v+  
w
 ^?() =
p^?(). For any initial arrival rate 0, we have ?1 = ^?(0)  ~(0) = M1 and
pM1 = ~p(0)  p^?(0) = p?1. We use induction to prove the rest. Suppose ?t  Mt .
We have ?t+1 = ^?(?t )  ~(?t )  ~(Mt ) = Mt+1 based on the increasing property
of ~().
The above result indicates, given the same existing customer base , compared
with the strategic policy, the myopic policy will always charge a higher price, which
leads to a lower arrival rate. Thus, ignoring the inﬂuence of social interactions in the
future periods, the myopic policy always overprices the service, while the strategic
policy trades oﬀ the current period proﬁt by charging a lower price followed by a
larger arrival rate in the current period for a higher long term beneﬁt. However, we
can not determine the relation on the price paths in the two policies, p?t and pMt ,
starting at the same initial market size 0. It is possible that with the time period
increasing, the price charged by the strategic policy can be higher than that in the
myopic policy, when the existing customer base has been built up due to the inﬂuence
of social interactions. Given the ﬁxed capacity, the lower price in the strategic policy
explains why some companies intentionally under-price their products or service, i.e.,
a lower price can help attract more demand through social interactions, which will
bring more beneﬁt in the future.
3.7.3 Strategic Policy
Since there exists a unique steady state in the myopic policy both for arrival rate and
price, we investigate whether the steady state in the strategic policy exists or not.
Similar to the dynamic capacity management model, we ﬁrst have the monotonicity
of the optimal arrival rate in the strategic policy:
Lemma 3.8. The optimal arrival rate ^?() in the strategic policy is increasing in
. Moreover, the optimal arrival rate path ?t is monotonic.
Although the optimal arrival rate path is monotonic, the price path is not neces-
sarily monotonic. It is possible that the optimal price path may ﬂuctuate depending
on other parameters. Based on the monotonicity of the arrival rate path, in terms
of the existence and uniqueness of the steady state arrival rate, similar to the result
in the dynamic capacity management model, we have the following result:
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Proposition 3.6. There exists a unique steady state arrival rate ?? in the strategic
policy. All arrival rate paths converge to the steady state ?? monotonically.
The steady state arrival rate and the price decision in the strategic policy can
be solved from the following result:
Theorem 3.2. In the strategic policy, there exists a unique steady state ??, which is
the unique solution in (0; ) to the cubic function (B + (1 + )) ( )2 w = 0.
The steady state price is p?? = v+??  w ?? . The steady state ?? in the strategic
policy is increasing in  and  respectively. Moreover, ?? is larger than the steady
state in the myopic policy M .
The result is similar to that in the dynamic capacity management model. The
steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy in the dynamic pricing model can
be easily solved from a cubic function. The monotonicity of the steady state arrival
rate in terms of the social interaction intensity, and the discount factor is similar to
the dynamic service rate model with constant price. The strategic policy can always
lead to a larger steady state arrival rate than the myopic policy, i.e., a larger market
will be covered under the strategic policy. A larger social interaction intensity or a
larger discount factor will lead to a larger steady state arrival rate in both policies.
Similarly, the queue length, expected waiting time and the utilization under the
strategic policy are larger than those under the myopic policy respectively.
Fig.3.7.1-3.7.4 depict the value function, the arrival rate path and the price path,
as well as the arrival rate decision in the strategic policy and the myopic policy, with
the parameters v = 10;  = 7;  = 1; w = 1;  = 0:8;  = 0:9.
From the comparison on the arrival rate path and the arrival rate decision, we
can see the strategic policy always selects a higher arrival rate in order to utilize
the inﬂuence of social interactions. The price comparison indicates, the strategic
policy may ﬁrst charge a lower price to increase the customer base in the initial
periods. However, when the customer base has been built up, the strategic policy
will charge a higher price than the myopic policy. Many ﬁrms ﬁrst adopt penetration
pricing strategy with a lower price through promotions or other strategies to promote
the sales of their products or services in the introduction stage, and then charge
the normal or even a higher price after the market base has been built up. Our
result can explain this practice, since the customer base has been established, and
through WOM, OL, the potential demand will be sustained to be large enough even
if companies start to charge a higher price.
Similar to the previous section, the following result provides a suﬃcient condi-
tion for the comparison on the steady sate price level in the myopic policy and the
strategic policy:
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Fig. 3.7.1: Value function in the dynamic pricing strategy with respect to the initial arrival
rate.




















Fig. 3.7.2: Arrival rate paths in the dynamic pricing strategy under the myopic policy and
the strategic policy.
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Fig. 3.7.3: Price paths in the dynamic pricing strategy under the myopic policy and the
strategic policy.





























Fig. 3.7.4: Arrival rate dynamics in the dynamic pricing strategy under the myopic policy
and the strategic policy.
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Corollary 3.2. If   w
( M )2 , p
??  pM ; while if  > w
( ??)2 , p
?? > pM .
Therefore, the social interaction intensity impacts the steady state price level.
Speciﬁcally, if the social interaction intensity is small, the steady state price in the
strategic policy will be smaller than that in the myopic policy. Under a small social
interaction intensity, the steady state price is always decreasing in the arrival rate,
and the strategic policy sacriﬁces the proﬁt margin in order to maintain a larger
arrival rate. However, if the social interaction intensity is large, the steady state
price in the strategic policy can be larger than that in the myopic policy. The reason
is that, in the strategic policy, the steady state arrival rate is larger than that in the
myopic policy, which leads to a higher price level. In another words, the monopolist
can eventually get a higher proﬁt margin from the large customer base lead by low
prices during previous periods.
Although the comparison on the steady state prices may depend on the social
interaction intensity and other parameters, the proﬁt in the steady state is compara-
ble. We consider the optimal arrival rate under ﬁxed service rate in the static single
period model, where the price is v +    p   w  = 0 ) p = v +    w  with
the proﬁt function as
(; ) =

v +   w








which admits an optimal arrival rate denoted as ?, which is the unique solution to
the following cubic function
B + 2  w
(  )2 = 0) (B + 2)(  )
2   w = 0
Denote the optimal proﬁt in the static single period model as (?; ?) and the
steady state proﬁt levels in the myopic policy and the strategic policy as (M ; M )
and (??; ??) respectively. We have the following result:
Proposition 3.7. The steady state arrival rate in the strategic policy is bounded
in [M ; ?], i.e., M  ??  ?. Moreover, the proﬁt function is bounded in
(M ; M ); (?; ?)

, i.e., (M ; M )  (??; ??)  (?; ?).
Therefore, from the above result, we can see under the same service rate, com-
pared with the optimal arrival rate and proﬁt in the static single period model, the
steady state in the strategic policy is less. The reason is due to the time delay in
the social interaction eﬀect, which reduces the action space in the dynamic model.
The above result also provides an alternative way for the monopolist to estimate
the steady state arrival rate and the steady state price level in the strategic policy.
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Tab. 3.3: Comparison between strategic policy and myopic policy.
Steady state arrival rate Steady state price Steady state proﬁt
?? > M p?? >< pM ?? > M





























Fig. 3.7.5: Steady state arrival rate with respect to the social interaction intensity  2 [0; 1]
under three diﬀerent policies.
The monopolist can set the steady state price based on the myopic policy and the
static single period model, which may be an appropriate price decision, especially
when the discount factor is not certain, for example ps = v + s   w s , where
s = ? + (1  )M and  2 [0; 1] can measure the magnitude of the discount fac-
tor. If the monopolist cares more about the current proﬁt, a small  can be chosen;
otherwise, a large  should be preferred.
Table 3.3 summarizes the comparison between strategic policy and myopic policy
in terms of the steady state arrival rate, price and proﬁt.
Fig.3.7.5 shows the steady state arrival rate with respect to , with the param-
eters v = 10;  = 7;  = 1; w = 1;  = 0:8; Fig.3.7.6 shows the steady state arrival
rate with respect to , with the parameters v = 10;  = 7;  = 1; w = 1;  = 0:8,
where the other two steady state arrival rates are independent of .
3.8 Dynamic Capacity and Pricing Strategy
In this section, we consider the dynamic service rate and pricing strategy in a general
model, where the service rate and the price are simultaneously determined in each
period. Suppose the total potential arrival rate is  in each period. Based on the
arrival rate t 1, given the service rate t and price pt, the equilibrium arrival rate
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Fig. 3.7.6: Steady state arrival rate with respect to the discount factor  2 [0; 1] under three
diﬀerent policies.




v + t 1   pt ;

and the single period proﬁt is
(t; pt; t 1) = (pt   t)min

t   w
v + t 1   pt ;

(3.8.1)
The long-run discounted proﬁt with the initial arrival rate 0 and discount factor




t(t+1; pt+1; t) (3.8.2)
s:t: t = min

t   w
v + t 1   pt ;

; t  1
The objective of the monopolist is to decide the optimal service rate and price
policy to maximize the long-run discounted proﬁt as
V (0) = sup
t;pt
(0)
where the value function V () is the unique bounded solution to the following Bell-
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man equation:
V () = sup
;p





v +   p;

(3.8.3)
In the following section, we consider the myopic policy and the strategic policy
respectively and compare the dynamic behavior of the system under each policy. The
decisions and state variables in the myopic policy are denoted as fMt ; pMt ; Mt g, while
in the strategic policy as f?t ; p?t ; ?t g.
It can be shown that if the social interaction intensity is larger than or ap-
proaching the unit service rate cost    or  ! , the monopolist will cover the
whole market eventually even under the myopic policy. In the following section, to
investigate the inﬂuence of social interactions on the service rate and price decisions,
we focus on the case where the social interaction intensity is not large, i.e.,  < .
In order to simplify the analysis, we also assume the total potential arrival rate  is
large enough in each period, such that the equilibrium arrival rate in each period is
smaller than  under any feasible policy.
3.8.1 Myopic Policy




(t; pt; t 1) = (pt   t)

t   w
v + t 1   pt

(3.8.4)
where the proﬁt function (t; pt; t 1) is concave in t and pt respectively and
supermodular in (t; pt). To solve the optimal service rate and price, we ﬁrst solve












We ﬁrst solve the optimal service rate given the price pt as (pt), and then







Mt (t 1); pMt (t 1)

in terms of the existing arrival rate. Speciﬁ-
cally, we have
pMt (t 1) = v + t 1  
p





2(v + t 1   pt) jpMt = 
M
t (t 1)
and the corresponding equilibrium arrival rate in period t denoted as Mt (t 1) is
Mt (t 1) = t  
w
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which is increasing in t 1. Therefore, if the total potential arrival rate is small in
each period, such that v2  
q
w
  , the optimal strategy is to cover the whole
market in each period. Besides, if 2  1, i.e., the social interaction intensity is large
enough, the arrival rate will increase to  after several transient periods. Therefore,
after the transient stage, the optimal strategy is to cover the whole market and grab
all consumer surplus. In the following section, we assume v  2pw to guarantee
that the optimal arrival rate is always non-negative. The optimal service rate and
price under the full market coverage is given as the following result:
max
t;pt
(pt   t)t; s:t: v + t 1   w
t      pt = 0 (3.8.6)
where we can solve the optimal service rate and price as




; pMt = v + t 1     2
p
w
Therefore, we have the following result in terms of the myopic policy with a
larger social interaction eﬀect:
Proposition 3.8. Suppose the total potential market size in each period is . If the
social interaction intensity is large, such that   2, the market will be fully covered
after transient stages (if v2  
q
w
  , there is no transient stage at all) with the





t = v + (  )  2
p
w.
Remark 3.2. After the transient stage, the myopic policy is identical to the strategic
policy since the monopolist covers the whole market.
Therefore, in the following section, for the myopic policy, to reduce the com-
plexity of the analysis and exclude the full market coverage situation, we focus on
the case with  < 2 and the total potential arrival rate  is large enough for the
monopolist to cover in each period. We focus on the dynamics of the arrival rate
and the property of the optimal service rate and price decisions in the myopic policy.
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In terms of the existence of the steady state in the myopic policy, we have the
following result:
Lemma 3.9. (Steady state in the myopic policy) Given any initial arrival rate 0,
there exists a unique steady state M , where the arrival rate path converges to M
monotonically; the corresponding service rate path and the price path also monoton-
ically converge to M and pM respectively.
Proof. If 0 > M , the arrival rate dynamics in the myopic policy indicates M <
M1 < 0. The corresponding service rate and price in period 1 and period 2 satisfy
M1 (0)  M2 (M1 ) and pM1 (0)  pM2 (M1 ) respectively followed from the service
rate and the price dynamics. Then using induction, we can prove that the service
rate path, the price path and the arrival rate path converge to the corresponding
steady state respectively in a decreasing order. If 0 < M , the service rate path, the
price rate path and the arrival rate path will converge to the corresponding steady
state respectively in an increasing order.
From the steady state service rate and price in the myopic policy, we can see
the steady state decisions are both increasing in the social interaction intensity .









  pw, which is also increasing in . Therefore, in the myopic
policy, although the service rate and price may simultaneously increase gradually if
the initial market size is small, the proﬁt margin will always increase in the social
interaction intensity. The increased proﬁt margin and the market size lead to an
increased proﬁt. In practice, some ﬁrms provide a higher speed or higher quality
service and also charge a higher price with a higher proﬁt margin, compared with
their competitors. The inﬂuence of social interactions may provide an explanation
for this market segmentation, i.e., those ﬁrms with a higher price and a higher service
speed cover a larger market due to the higher inﬂuence of social interactions.
3.8.2 Strategic Policy
We compare the operational decisions and the steady state in the myopic policy
and the strategic policy. We ﬁrst investigate whether there exists a steady state in
the strategic policy. Since in each period, there are two decision variables and the
state transition function in terms of the equilibrium arrival rate is nonlinear, directly
investigating the optimal service rate and price policy as well as the steady state may
not be straightforward. In the following section, we ﬁrst consider a ﬁnite-horizon
problem with N  2 periods and study its structural property.
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We start with a two-period problem with the initial arrival rate 0. The mo-
nopolist decides the service rate and price in period 1 and 2. We use the backward
induction procedure to solve the optimal service rate and price decisions in the
two-period problem. Compared with the myopic policy, we have the following rela-


























































Therefore, the monopolist should increase the period 1 service rate in the strate-
gic policy to induce a higher equilibrium arrival rate which serves as the consumer
base in period 2. The service rate and arrival rate in period 2 under strategic policy
are larger than those in the myopic policy. Although the price in period 1 is the
same in the myopic policy, the price in period 2 is larger than that in the myopic
policy.
For the ﬁnite-horizon problem with N periods, the backward induction proce-
dure indicates in the last period, the monopolist always adopts the myopic policy.
In period 1, we can see the service rate in the strategic policy has an additional
constant term 4 , which leads to a higher arrival rate with the same additional term
in period 1. Then the price and the arrival rate will be larger in the following periods
compared with the myopic policy. Formally, we have the following result in terms of
the comparison on the service rate, price and the arrival rate in the strategic policy
and the myopic policy:
Theorem 3.3. For the ﬁnite-horizon problem of N  2 periods with the initial ar-
rival rate 0, the comparisons between the service rate path, price path and the arrival
rate path in the strategic policy and the myopic policy are given as the following:
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 )t
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2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 the price comparison is
p?1 = p
M
















1  ( 2 )t
1  2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For the ﬁnite-horizon problem, we have the following immediate conclusion: the
service rate and the price in the strategic policy are always larger than the correspond-
ing decisions in the myopic policy. The managerial implication for the above result
is that in order to optimize the long-run discounted proﬁt, the monopolist should
adopt a larger service rate, and a larger price in order to induce a larger arrival rate
base which will beneﬁt the monopolist in future periods due to the inﬂuence of social
interactions, since the arrival rate in the strategic policy is always larger than that
in the myopic policy.
We compare the single period proﬁt in the strategic policy and the myopic
policy for the ﬁnite-horizon problem with N periods. Clearly, in the last period N ,














N ), since the optimal proﬁt function is
increasing in the arrival rate base and we have ?N 1 > 
M
N 1. In the ﬁrst period,
we have ?1(?1; p?1; ?1) < M1 (M1 ; pM1 ; M1 ), since myopic policy always maximizes
the current period proﬁt. For the period t 2 f2;    ; N   1g, substituting the above
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t   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t ); while if t  tc, ?t (?t ; p?t ; ?t ) > Mt (Mt ; pMt ; Mt ).
In terms of the comparison on the proﬁt margin, the gap between the strategic
policy and the myopic policy is (   ) 4   4 ( 2 )t, where we have the following
immediate result:
Lemma 3.10. The comparison on the proﬁt margins in the strategic policy and the
myopic policy is given as follows:
 If   , the proﬁt margin in the strategic policy is always less than that in
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the myopic policy;
 If  <  < 2, there exists another critical period t2, where t2 > t1, such that
if t < t2, the proﬁt margin in the strategic policy is smaller; while if t  t2, the
proﬁt margin in the strategic policy is larger.
Therefore, we can see the proﬁt margin under social interactions in the strategic
policy is not necessarily larger than that in the myopic policy. Speciﬁcally, if the
social interaction intensity is smaller than the unit service rate cost, the proﬁt margin
in the strategic policy is always smaller than that in the myopic policy. However,
since the market size under the strategic policy becomes larger, the single period
proﬁt will be larger than that in the myopic policy if t  t1. Many companies adopt
small proﬁts but quick turnover strategy which may not be optimal in the short term,
but may be optimal in the long term under social interactions conﬁrmed by the above
result, since a smaller proﬁt margin will lead to a large market share. However, if
the social interaction intensity becomes larger, the monopolist only needs to scarify
the proﬁt margin temporarily while he eventually gets a larger proﬁt margin and a
larger market size as well as a larger single period proﬁt in the strategic policy.
The discount factor  is another critical factor that impacts the optimal price
and service rate decisions in the strategic policy. If the discount factor  is larger, the
service rate in the strategic policy will be larger than that in the myopic policy, and
the price in the strategic policy also becomes larger. The impact of  on the proﬁt
margin depends on  and . Speciﬁcally, if   , a larger  will drive the monopolist
to scarify more proﬁt margin in the strategic policy; while if  <  < 2, during the
initial periods t  t2, for a larger , the proﬁt margin will become smaller, while after
the initial periods, the proﬁt margin will be become larger in the strategic policy.
Therefore, in order to utilize the inﬂuence of social interactions, the monopolist
should scarify more proﬁt margin for a larger market size to increase the future
proﬁt.
Letting N !1, the steady state in the strategic policy in terms of the service
rate, price and the arrival rate, are given as the following result:
Corollary 3.3. There exists a unique steady state in the strategic policy, where the
steady state service rate, price and the arrival rate are given as
?? = M +

4   2; p
?? = pM +
2
4   2; 
?? = M +

4   2:



























2    +

4   2
The service rate path, price path and the arrival rate path monotonically converge to
the corresponding steady state in the strategic policy.
Since the steady state in the strategic policy is larger than that in the myopic
policy in terms of the arrival rate, we have the following three cases:
 If 0  M , the service rate path, price path and the arrival rate path in the
myopic policy and the strategic policy monotonically converge to M ; pM ; M
and ??; p??; ?? in an increasing order respectively;
 If M < 0 < ??, the service rate path, price path and the arrival rate path
in the myopic policy monotonically converge to M ; pM ; M in a decreasing
order; while in the strategic policy, they increasingly converge to ??; p??; ??;
 If 0  ??, the service rate path, price path and the arrival rate path in the
myopic policy and the strategic policy monotonically converge to M ; pM ; M
and ??; p??; ?? in a decreasing order respectively.
Therefore, compared with the myopic policy, the strategic policy always leads to a
higher service rate and a higher price while inducing a higher arrival rate in order
to take advantage of the social interaction eﬀect. The steady state proﬁt in the
strategic policy is always larger than that in the myopic policy, and the gap is




w + 2(v   2pw) + (  )
(4   2)2
(3.8.8)
Besides, in steady state, the expected waiting time in the strategic policy is
the same as that in the myopic policy. However, the average queue length in the
strategic policy is larger.
Table 3.4 summarizes the comparison between strategic policy and myopic policy
in terms of the steady state arrival rate, service rate, price, and proﬁt.
Fig.3.8.1-3.8.4 depict the steady state arrival rate, service rate, price and proﬁt
in the myopic policy and the strategic policy with respect to  with the parameters
v = 10;  = 1; w = 1;  = 0:8.
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Tab. 3.4: Comparison between strategic policy and myopic policy.
Steady state arrival rate Steady state service rate Steady state price Steady state proﬁt
?? > M ?? > M p?? > pM ?? > M
























Fig. 3.8.1: Steady state arrival rate with respect to the social interaction intensity  2 [0; 1]
under the myopic policy and the strategic policy.
























Fig. 3.8.2: Steady state service rate with respect to the social interaction intensity  2 [0; 1]
under the myopic policy and the strategic policy.
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Fig. 3.8.3: Steady state price with respect to the social interaction intensity  2 [0; 1] under
the myopic policy and the strategic policy.























Fig. 3.8.4: Steady state proﬁt with respect to the social interaction intensity  2 [0; 1] under
the myopic policy and the strategic policy.
3. Dynamic Capacity and Price Decisions Under Social Interactions 89
3.9 Conclusion
The signiﬁcant inﬂuence of social interactions helps ﬁrms attract more customers,
while it also leads to challenges in operations management, especially the capacity
and price decisions. If capacity is not properly managed, more demand attracted by
social interactions will increase congestion which may drive customers away, leading
to potential revenue loss, a typical congestion eﬀect. Therefore, under social inter-
actions, how to build capacities and charge prices to balance the tradeoﬀ between
social interaction eﬀect and congestion eﬀect is important.
Drawn on extensive economic and marketing literature, we consider the capacity
and price decisions of a monopolist when consumer purchase decisions are inﬂuenced
by social interactions. Based on several dynamic settings, depending on whether
managers consider social interactions in decision-making, both strategic and myopic
capacity and price policies as well as the system dynamics are investigated. In each
dynamic model, there exists a unique steady state arrival rate which is achieved
monotonically under both strategic and myopic policies. The steady state arrival
rate is always larger in the strategic policy than that in the myopic policy, i.e., the
monopolist will always cover a larger market when the impact of their operational
decisions is taken into consideration under social interactions. Strategic policies also
lead to longer queues in the steady state. In a market with more intense social
interactions, or the future proﬁts are of concern, the strategic operational decisions
should trade oﬀ more proﬁt in the short term for a larger proﬁt in the long term
from an increased market base.
In terms of operational decisions, managers should focus on how to increase the
consumer base in order to facilitate the inﬂuence of social interactions. Starting with
the same initial market, managers need to sacriﬁce the short term proﬁt by building
a larger capacity, or charging a lower price to build up the customer base. If prices
and capacities can be adjusted simultaneously, strategic policies require managers
to acquire a lower proﬁt margin to build up the customer base. Social interactions
through a larger customer base will beneﬁt ﬁrms in the long term, where a larger
proﬁt will be achieved in the steady state. However, the proﬁt margin in the strategic
policy may be always lower than that in the myopic policy, especially when social
interactions are not intense. Therefore, under social interactions, our results indicate
that managers who ignore long term implications of their operational decisions will
consistently serve a smaller market, thereby systematically lose revenue. By adopting
strategic policies, a larger customer base will help attract more potential demand,
which further strengthens the inﬂuence of social interactions, i.e., ﬁrms will achieve
cumulative advantages under social interactions.
The strategic policies driven by social interactions provide possible explanations
for those interesting phenomena raised in the introduction of this chapter. The inﬂu-
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ence of social interactions may drive ﬁrms to charge a lower price in the introduction
stage of their products or services. In practice, why some ﬁrms adopt seemingly
suboptimal operational decisions, such as a lower price, a larger service speed and
capacity, or keep a long queue may be due to the intention of building up a large
customer base to better utilize the inﬂuence of social interactions. These seemingly
suboptimal operational decisions may be desirable in the long term under social in-
teractions. Similarly, in order to utilize the inﬂuence of social interactions, ﬁrms
may not increase their prices or even charge a lower price facing excessive demand,
because long queues or waiting lines may signal the popularity of a product or ser-
vice, which will lead to more potential demand. This is shown in the results of the
strategic policies. The result in steady state also explains why some ﬁrms with pop-
ular products or services can charge a higher price or obtain a higher proﬁt margin
than their competitors even if similar or the same products or services are oﬀered:
companies with reputation may enjoy cumulative advantages from a larger customer
base.
The strategic policies indicate under social interactions, facing a small initial
market, appropriate operational decisions should induce a steadily expanding mar-
ket base, through smooth price adjustments or gradual capacity expansions. Drastic
change of operational decisions may lead to sudden sales explosion or contraction,
which may signiﬁcantly impact the future demand under social interactions. The
inﬂuence of social interactions may explain why some ﬁrms suﬀer from a signiﬁcant
demand drop after increasing their prices, which eventually leads to a contracted
market share, or even bankruptcy. The increased price will lower the current sales
volume, which will decrease the potential demand under social interactions whose
inﬂuence will be further reduced from even lower demand, i.e., cumulative disad-
vantages may lead to a contracted market. The inﬂuence of social interactions may
also explain why ﬁrms of the same industry adopt diﬀerent operational policies in
terms of price, capacity, or proﬁt margin. Probably, products or services of some
companies can stir up more customer involvement and interactions to help brand
dissemination, where ﬁrms can charge higher prices compared with their competi-
tors. Through operational decisions, social interactions may also drive some ﬁrms
to adopt the market strategy with a small proﬁt margin but a large market, while a
high proﬁt margin with a small market for other companies.
4. DYNAMIC SERVICE EFFORT DECISION UNDER SOCIAL
INTERACTIONS
4.1 Abstract
Consumer purchase decisions are highly inﬂuenced by others through social interac-
tions, where consumer satisfaction plays an important role. Satisfaction is primar-
ily determined by pre-purchase expectations and post-purchase experiences which
are both aﬀected by resource investment in service quality during product deliv-
eries and service encounters, termed as service eﬀort decision. Under social in-
teractions, consumer satisfaction signiﬁcantly inﬂuences purchase decisions of both
existing and potential consumers. How service eﬀort decisions will be impacted by
social interactions needs to be better understood. Appropriate service eﬀort deci-
sions help ﬁrms enhance consumer satisfaction and improve performance through
properly managed expectations and experiences in product deliveries and service
encounters. In this chapter, we propose a dynamic service eﬀort decision model for
a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm, which oﬀers frequently purchased product or service to
heterogeneous, backward-looking and adaptive consumers under social interactions,
particularly through word-of-mouth communication.
Through repeated interactions, both expectations aﬀected by past service en-
counters and experiences determined by service eﬀort, determine consumer satis-
faction in service delivery. Under optimal service eﬀort policies, consumer overall
experiences monotonically converge to a unique steady state level. Social interactions
always drive ﬁrms to exert a high level of service eﬀort which enhances consumer
satisfaction. Service expectations also impact service eﬀort decisions; if consumers
rely more on overall experiences from past service encounters in service expectations,
a higher level of eﬀort should be exerted to oﬀer a higher level of service quality. If
social interactions are satisfaction-dependent, a constant service eﬀort policy may
be optimal, especially when consumers have high initial service expectations. Be-
ing aware of social interactions and consumer adaptations in service expectations
as well as their interplay may contribute to better managed consumer expectations,
experiences and satisfaction in service delivery so as to increase proﬁtability.
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4.2 Introduction
Social interactions signiﬁcantly inﬂuence consumer purchase decisions. From a man-
agerial perspective, how service should be oﬀered in both product deliveries and
service encounters to properly manage expectations and experiences and thus en-
hance consumer satisfaction becomes critical in operations to expand market share
and increase proﬁtability under social interactions.
Nowadays, ﬁrms can take various marketing strategies and campaigns to stimu-
late demand and promote popularity of their products or services, through creation
of buzz and forums, providing online customer reviews, etc., to utilize the inﬂu-
ence of social interactions. As consumers become overloaded, they have become
increasingly skeptical about traditional company-driven advertising and marketing
and increasingly prefer to make purchase decisions largely independent of what com-
panies tell them (Bughin et al., 2010), in other words, they become more reliant on
consumer-generated information, such as recommendations, opinions and choices of
others. Social interactions, if properly utilized through operations, may help ﬁrms
easily establish brand reputations and recognitions. However, under social interac-
tions, ﬁrms may also suﬀer from negative publicity substantially due to inappropriate
operations, where some negligible unfavorable information may lead to sudden de-
mand drop, reputation damage, and even ruination of their fame and drag ﬁrms into
bankruptcy1.
The inﬂuence of social interactions, especially WOM communication, is closely
related to consumer satisfaction in service or product delivery. Under social in-
teractions, satisﬁed consumers from pleasant purchase experiences will help attract
potential consumers to make the same choice, termed as the positive social interac-
tion eﬀect ; while dissatisﬁed consumers due to disappointed purchase experiences
may discourage potential consumers purchasing from the same ﬁrm, termed as the
negative social interaction eﬀect. Consumer satisfaction and dis-satisfaction sub-
stantially impact ﬁrm performance. Under social interactions, satisﬁed consumers
may lead to more repurchase decisions and more recommendations that help draw
even more demand. Research has shown that for contact centers, satisﬁed consumers
will be more likely to make contact again by as much as 149%, and they are more
likely to recommend the company to others by as much as 180%2. Consumer dis-
satisfaction may lead to signiﬁcant revenue drop. Improving consumer satisfaction
to build brand reputation and sales is critical, even for big companies, such as Mc-
Donald’s3. It has been found that the spread of positive and negative messages from
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10% or reduce it by 20% over a two-year period (Bughin et al., 2010).
Consumer satisfaction is mainly determined by pre-purchase expectations and
post-purchase experiences, which are the two critical factors that impact consumer
repurchase decisions and social interaction activities. Lower expectations can be
met easily from past experiences leading consumers to be satisﬁed with their pur-
chase decisions4; while higher expectations may always be hard to satisfy which will
drive consumers to become dissatisﬁed with their purchase experiences5. Properly
managed expectations in operations can help improve consumer satisfaction signif-
icantly, especially through lowering consumer expectations. For example, letting
patients know that their messages may receive a delayed response when they start
sending messages to doctors, increases the patients’ satisfaction substantially6, since
expectations have been properly managed. Firms can adopt the “under-promise,
over-deliver” (UPOD) strategy to serve their customers, which may also help engen-
der consumer loyalties signiﬁcantly, due to reduced consumer expectations7.
Consumer purchase experiences are mainly aﬀected by operations, especially
how services are delivered during purchasing processes or service encounters, the
service eﬀort decision. As a broad term, service can refer to a speciﬁc service con-
sumed by customers and the service associated with product consumption. Service
eﬀort directly determines the service quality and service value during service en-
counters. As a broad term, service quality can be measured by the attribute of a
speciﬁc service oﬀered by a ﬁrm, such as the waiting time in call centers and fast food
restaurants, the connection speed of internet services, the signal strength and cover-
age of telecommunication services, the delivery speed of transportation services, the
accuracy and eﬀectiveness of diagnosis and expert services, and so on. For the ser-
vice associated with product consumption, service quality may be measured by the
eﬀort of sales representatives, shopping environment, supporting service after sales,
product availability (service level) of a retailer (Gaur and Park, 2007), the lead time
of an order from a make-to-order ﬁrm, or even the product quality itself, etc. Due to
service characteristics, such as intangibility, heterogeneity, and inseparability (Para-
suraman et al., 1985), service deliveries involve more consumer contacts, and service
quality may highly correlate with consumer expectations and experiences, which is
more consumer-dependent (Parasuraman et al., 1985; Harvey, 1998). Under social
interactions, as a determinant factor of service quality, service eﬀort decisions be-
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High quality service may signiﬁcantly enhance consumer service experiences,
thus satisfaction; while poor quality of service may substantially harm consumer
purchase experiences leading to dis-satisfaction. Although always desired, providing
a high level of service quality may require more eﬀort and resource investment, which
may increase operational cost and reduce proﬁt margins. Service eﬀort decisions also
impact consumer expectations, especially for frequently purchased products or ser-
vices due to repeated interactions between consumers and ﬁrms. Consumers may
have previous experiences from past service encounters, which will impact expec-
tations when making repurchase decisions due to reference eﬀect or adaptation in
expectations formation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Service eﬀort impacts both
experiences and expectations, and thus satisfaction of both existing customers and
potential customers under social interactions. Therefore, how service should be de-
livered with appropriate and acceptable quality to enhance experiences and meet
expectations and thus eﬀectively manage consumer satisfaction through service ef-
fort decisions becomes a critical challenge for managers to tackle to better leverage
the inﬂuence of social interactions in proﬁtability and market expansion.
In this chapter, based on the service quality gap model (Parasuraman et al.,
1985), we investigate service eﬀort decisions for a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm under so-
cial interactions. Our focus is to investigate how social interactions would impact
service eﬀort decisions to better manage expectations, experiences and consumer
satisfaction in proﬁt optimization. Speciﬁcally, (1) what is the impact of social in-
teractions on consumer expectations, experiences and satisfaction? (2) how would
consumer expectations impact service eﬀort decisions? (3) what is the impact of
social interactions on service eﬀort decisions? (4) should a constant level of eﬀort
be maintained to oﬀer a consistent quality of service or vary service eﬀort in proﬁt
optimization? Based on an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic service eﬀort decision model,
under several dynamic settings, optimal service eﬀort decisions and their structural
properties provide answers to the above questions.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 brieﬂy reviews several
related studies on the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer purchase decisions.
A dynamic service eﬀort management model under social interactions is built in Sec-
tion 4.4. Section 4.5 characterizes the optimal service eﬀort decision in the bench-
mark model where consumer expectations are independent of past experiences. We
investigate the optimal service eﬀort policy where consumers are adaptively in ex-
pectation formation in Section 4.6. The model is extended in Section 4.7, where
consumer purchase volumes are inﬂuenced by satisfaction. We generalize the model
to the situation where social interactions are dependent on consumer satisfaction
in Section 4.8. Discussion and conclusions as well as future research directions are
provided in Section 4.9.
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4.3 Literature Review
The primary research question in this study is to investigate how social interactions
would impact service eﬀort decisions in product and service deliveries to better man-
age consumer expectations, experiences, and satisfaction in proﬁt optimization. We
ﬁrst focus on studies on the inﬂuence of social interactions, especially the WOM
in consumer purchase behaviors and how ﬁrms utilize WOM to promote sales and
drive proﬁtability through operational decisions. Manski (2000) and Hartmann et
al. (2008) oﬀer brief reviews on the role of social interactions in consumer purchase
decisions. We then brieﬂy review several studies on operational decisions in terms
of service eﬀort decisions in service and product deliveries.
Consumer purchasing behaviors inﬂuenced by social interactions have been
widely studied both empirically and theoretically. As a typical form of social interac-
tion, the role of WOM communication has been extensively studied. Incorporating
WOM into the diﬀusion process, Bass (1969) developed one of the most important
marketing models, the Bass diﬀusion model to study the diﬀusion process of a new
product. Dodson and Muller (1978) build a new product diﬀusion model with in-
teractions between adopters and non-adopters as well as the impact of advertising.
Mahajan et al. (1984) discuss the new product introduction strategy and the optimal
advertising timing policy with positive and negative WOM using a diﬀusion model.
Similar study has been conducted by Kalish and Lilien (1986). Due to social inter-
actions, the value of the consumer to ﬁrms is beyond what he/she has bought. An
existing consumer may attract or discourage potential consumers to buy the same
product through social inﬂuences, which leads to the value of a consumer including
both her purchasing value and her inﬂuence value (Ho et al., 2012).
Several studies have focused on the measurement and the eﬀectiveness of WOM.
To measure WOM activity through the recommend intention metric, Aksoy et al.
(2011) provides a longitudinal study on the relationship between recommend inten-
tion and the adoption of a new-to-market service brand extension. The ﬁndings
indicate the recommending consumers are more recent adopters of the service and
are in more frequent contact with potential consumers. Narayan et al. (2011) inves-
tigate the eﬀects of peer inﬂuence in consumer product choices with multiattribute.
In the model, consumers who are uncertain about their attribute preferences update
their attribute preferences in a Bayesian mechanism incorporating peer inﬂuence.
Gu et al. (2011) distinguish the source of WOM, namely the internal WOM which
is provided by the retailers and the external WOM otherwise. Using the sales data
of high-involvement product like a camera from Amazon.com, the result indicates
external WOM sources have a signiﬁcant impact on sales. The empirical study by
Godes and Mayzlin (2009) indicates WOM created between less loyal consumers and
their acquaintances is more eﬀective to drive sales. The impact of WOM is even more
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eﬀective than social learning where individuals directly observe the choices of others.
A similar result is concluded by Celen et al. (2010) using a laboratory experiment,
where subjects appear to be more willing to follow the advice of their predecessor
than to copy their actions.
Interpersonal communications have long been recognized as an inﬂuential in-
formation source for consumers to make purchase decisions. Increasing popularity
of various online social media has substantially facilitated social interactions among
consumers. Iyengar et al. (2011) study the role of opinion leadership and social
contagion within social networks in new product adoption. The results indicate the
amount of contagion is moderated by both the recipient’s perception of their opin-
ion leadership and the volume of product usage. Sonnier et al. (2011) investigate
the eﬀect of online communications on ﬁrm sales, including the positive, negative
and neutral eﬀects. Consumer online discussions not only impact ﬁrm sales but
also impact stock market performance, such as the study by Tirunillai and Tellis
(2012), where user-generated-content (UGC) and its volume have a signiﬁcant pos-
itive eﬀect on abnormal returns and trading volumes of ﬁrm stock market shares.
There is a growing evidence that consumer perceptions are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
internet-based opinions before making purchase decisions, which signiﬁcantly impact
ﬁrm proﬁt and consumer surplus (Dellarocas, 2006). Community participation also
impacts consumer online buying and selling behaviors (Algesheimer et al., 2010).
Through online communications, informed consumers share price information to at-
tract uninformed consumers to form group buying through social interactions, where
quantity discounts can be enjoyed (Jing and Xie, 2011).
Envisioning the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer purchase behavior,
several studies have focused on ﬁrm strategies to increase sales and proﬁtability.
Mayzlin (2006) analyzes the equilibrium strategy for a ﬁrm to provide consumer re-
views, where consumers can get information about product quality from evaluations
of other consumers. Social interactions on consumer purchase behavior are corre-
lated with satisfaction which impacts consumer retention. Anderson and Sullivan
(1993) ﬁnd that satisfaction is best speciﬁed as a function of perceived quality and
“disconﬁrmation”-the extent to which perceived quality fails to match pre-purchase
expectations. There exists an asymmetric eﬀect on consumer satisfaction and re-
tention. Speciﬁcally, the perceived quality which falls short of expectations has a
greater impact on satisfaction and repurchase intentions than quality which exceeds
expectations. Ho et al. (2006) model consumer purchase rate as Poisson events with
the rates dependent on satisfaction of the most recent purchase encounters. Bolton
(1998) studies the role of consumer satisfaction on the retention in the long-run
supplier-consumer relationship. In the model, consumers update their subjective ex-
pected value of the relationship according to an anchoring and adjustment process,
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where the cumulative satisfaction serves as an anchor which is updated with new
service experiences. Bolton et al. (2006) investigate the eﬀect of service experiences
on ﬁrm renewal decisions with suppliers, and the result indicates, recent experiences
are weighted more than earlier experiences.
Since consumer expectations are crucial to satisfaction and retention, ﬁrms be-
gin to focus on the management of consumer expectations, especially how many
resources and how much eﬀort should be invested in service delivery. Always de-
lighting the consumer may raise consumer expectations, making them more diﬃcult
to be satisﬁed in the next purchase cycle, which hurts the ﬁrm in the long run (Rust
and Oliver, 2000). Ho and Zheng (2004) investigate how a ﬁrm chooses a delivery
time commitment to inﬂuence its consumer expectations and delivery quality in or-
der to maximize its market share. Kopalle and Lehmann (2006) investigate optimal
advertised quality, actual quality, and price for a ﬁrm to enter into a market. Based
on a two-period model, advertised quality inﬂuences expectations, and consumer sat-
isfaction are determined by the gap between actual quality and expectations. Rust
et al. (1999) model consumer expected service quality that they will experience as a
distribution based on their cumulative experiences. Aﬂaki and Popescu (2012) build
a dynamic model of the ﬁrm-client relationship to study the optimal service level pol-
icy. In their model, a representative consumer expectation is randomly distributed
and the retention function is a probability depending on consumer past experiences.
From the above studies, we can see there are few studies directly addressing
how social interactions would impact operational decisions in service delivery and
the dynamics of consumer expectations, experiences and satisfaction. The current
study aims to contribute to the literature by building a dynamic service eﬀort decision
model to investigate the impact of social interactions on operations and the related
dynamics in consumer purchase decisions.
4.4 A Service Eﬀort Decision Model Under Social Interactions
4.4.1 Model Settings
A proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm which oﬀers frequently purchased product/service in the
consumer market decides how many resources should be devoted to service delivery,
termed the service eﬀort decision, where consumer purchase decisions are inﬂuenced
by social interactions, typically WOM communication. We assume the service quality
or service value is primarily determined by the level of service eﬀort. For consumer-
intensive services, such as health care, legal and ﬁnancial consulting and personal care
services, the service quality is positively correlated with service durations (Anand et
al., 2011), i.e., the longer service time, the higher service quality.
In this chapter, the service quality may be associated with either a particular
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Tab. 4.1: Key variables and notations.
Variables Notations Variables Notations
Service eﬀort level q Service expectation distribution F (qE ; r)
Consumer service expectation QE Eﬀective demand d
Realized service expectation qE Positive social interaction intensity (q; r)
Consumer service experience qA Negative social interaction intensity (q; r)
Overall experience r Service price p
Expected service value UE Discount factor 
Realized expected service value uE Memory factor 
Experienced service value u Proﬁt function (q; r)
service or a product. For ease of exposition, we assume a frequently purchased
service is oﬀered by the ﬁrm. Service eﬀort impacts service quality and service
value perceived by consumers. High level of service quality may always be costly
from the ﬁrm perspective, since a high level of service eﬀort should be exerted.
Thus, we consider service eﬀort and service quality are positively correlated in this
chapter as an implicit assumption. A high level of service eﬀort will lead to a
high quality of service which will enhance consumer service experiences, which may
increase consumer satisfaction. However, the operational cost of service delivery may
increase substantially if the service eﬀort level becomes high enough. Therefore,
managers need to balance the tradeoﬀ between high quality of service and high
service eﬀort cost. Key notations used in this chapter are listed in Table 4.1:
At the beginning of each period t, before purchasing the service, potential con-
sumers form service expectations, where they have expected value from service con-
sumption8. Consumers are heterogeneous in expectations, i.e., their service expec-
tations may be diﬀerent from one another, which is captured by a random variable
UEt and uEt is the realization of the service value expectation for a representative
consumer. For frequently purchased service, due to repeated interactions, consumer
purchase decisions are inﬂuenced by expectations and experiences. Generally, there
are two types of consumers in terms of purchase decision making, namely forward-
looking and backward-looking. Forward-looking consumers make purchase decisions
based on expectations and reservations; while backward-looking ones make the con-
sumption choice from expectations and past experiences.
We focus on the backward-looking consumers in the repeated interaction set-
ting9. Particularly, at the end of period t, a consumer who has purchased the service
forms experienced service value ut. The experienced service value may also be dif-
ferent among consumers, due to their heterogeneity in perceptions, expectations, or
8 Consumer service expectations may also refer to service attributes, such as the expected waiting
time, lead time, etc.
9 The model can also be interpreted with forward-looking consumers with slightly changes, where
their experiences may impact their reservations.
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the service transactions. In this chapter, we assume service quality is the primary
factor that determines consumer experienced service value. Therefore, we mainly
consider the heterogeneity of consumers in terms of their expected service values,
while the experienced service values are kept the same among all consumers, which
is determined by service eﬀort. The model can be extended to situations where con-
sumers are heterogeneous in terms of their experienced service value only or both
the expected and experienced service value.
As discussed before, expectation before purchasing and experience after con-
sumption jointly determine consumer satisfaction, which impacts whether a con-
sumer is satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed from service experience due to the backward-looking
behavior. A satisﬁed consumer whose service experience is no less than the expecta-
tion will probably make repurchase decisions from the same ﬁrm; while a dissatisﬁed
one whose experience does not meet expectation may terminate the transaction im-
mediately or may not even come back for future consumption. Consumers are also
inﬂuenced by their backward-looking inclinations in expectation formation, where
they may adaptively change and update service expectations from overall experi-
ences through past service encounters.
In each period, a consumer who decides to purchase the service, is either as an
existing consumer who has purchased the service in the previous period, or a poten-
tial consumer (or new consumer) who does not have transaction experiences with
the ﬁrm before. Due to positive social interaction eﬀect, potential consumers will be
attracted to purchase the service through satisﬁed consumers directly or indirectly,
such as recommendations through WOM, on-line consumer reviews, or even obser-
vations from previous sales. While under negative social interaction eﬀect, potential
consumers may be discouraged from purchasing the service due to interactions with
dissatisﬁed consumers. Through social interactions, service expectations of poten-
tial consumers may be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by existing consumers, although they
have had no transaction experiences with the ﬁrm before. In this chapter, we as-
sume potential consumers have the same expectations as existing consumers in terms
of expected service value distributions.
Therefore, under social interactions, in each period, the total eﬀective demand
of the ﬁrm which will be served is composed of those existing consumers who are
satisﬁed and the attracted potential consumers. As discussed before, consumer ex-
pectations may be inﬂuenced by past experiences due to backward-looking behavior.
Thus, we consider consumers are reference dependent in expectation formation. Par-
ticularly, we assume the distribution of consumer expected service value depends on
previous service experiences with the ﬁrm, termed as the overall experience (or over-
all perception), which will be discussed in the following section in detail. Due to
repeated interactions and reference eﬀect (Popescu and Wu, 2007), the reference
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service value will be updated and adjusted frequently in time, especially due to
anchoring and adjustment inclination in consumer decision-making.
The objective of the ﬁrm is to make appropriate service eﬀort decisions to better
manage consumer expectations, experiences and satisfaction with the purpose of
maximizing the long-run expected proﬁt under social interactions. The model is
termed service eﬀort decision model or SED model for simplicity. We focus on the
structural properties of the optimal service eﬀort policy, such as the monotonicity of
the eﬀort level, the existence of the steady state service eﬀort levels, and the impact
of various behavioral factors on the service eﬀort decisions. The detailed model is
discussed in the following section.
4.4.2 Service Eﬀort Decision Under Social Interactions
4.4.2.1 Consumer Expectation, Experience and Satisfaction
In this section, we discuss the detailed formulation of the above SED model. As
discussed in the above section, service value and service quality are usually posi-
tively correlated; in the following section, we use service quality and service value
interchangeably without confusion. Consumer experienced service value is primar-
ily determined by service quality, where the latter is mainly impacted by service
eﬀort decision. Since the more service eﬀort, the higher service quality and larger
service value, we assume there exists a one-to-one correspondence between service
eﬀort and service value, formulated as u = (q). Similarly, consumer expected ser-
vice value and service expectation are also positively correlated as uE = '(qE);
consumer service experiences are primarily determined by experienced service value
as qA =  (u). For ease of analysis, in the following section, we assume the simple
relationships u = q; uE = qE ; qA = u, which implies qA = q, i.e., consumer service
experiences are determined by service eﬀort. The model can be easily generalized to
more complex functional forms as long as (q); '(qE);  (u) are increasing functions,
where all the key results remain unaﬀected.
As discussed before, consumer service expectations are formed based on overall
experiences rt during previous service encounters from the initial period until period
t  1. Since we only consider consumer heterogeneity in pre-purchase service expec-
tations, we assume overall experience in each period is the same for all consumers.
Consumers form initial service experience r0 which may be inﬂuenced by ﬁrm ad-
vertising campaigns, reputation, industry standards and other factors, such as the
experience of substitutable services from competing ﬁrms, etc. The heterogeneity
of consumers in terms of service expectations is modeled as follows. In each period
t, the distribution of the service expectation of a representative consumer or the
total population of all consumers is a random variable QEt 2 [q; q]; q  qL; q  qH
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whose distribution is anchored at the overall experience rt, with the cumulative dis-
tribution function F (qEt ; rt) = Pr(QEt  qEt jrt)10. Intuitively, due to the reference
eﬀect, the average service expectation will become larger if the overall experience is
higher, due to consumer adaptations. Therefore, we assume the distribution func-




EdF (qE ; r) as the mean of service expectation. The FSD property
indicates, if r0  r, then F (qE ; r0)  F (qE ; r), which indicates qE(r0)  qE(r).
Consumer satisfaction is determined by expectation and experience. Since con-
sumer service experience qAt is equal to ﬁrm service eﬀort qt, after consuming the
service in period t, the probability of an individual consumer who is satisﬁed with
the service experience is F (qt; rt) = Pr(QEt  qAt jrt), while dissatisﬁed with proba-
bility 1 F (qt; rt). Therefore, service eﬀort determines consumer satisfaction. From
the whole population perspective, F (qt; rt) is the proportion of satisﬁed consumers,
and 1 F (qt; rt) is the proportion of dissatisﬁed consumers. In the following section,
we refer to F (q; r) as the probability and proportion interchangeably without am-
biguity. Denote F1 and F2 as the ﬁrst order derivative of F (q; r) in terms of q and
r respectively. The corresponding second order derivatives and cross partial deriva-
tives are denoted as F11, F22 and F12. Besides the FSD property of the random
service expectation, we assume the distribution function F (q; r) has the following
additional properties:
 Diminishing reference eﬀect in consumer satisfaction: F (q; r) is decreasing
and convex in r, i.e., F2(q; r) =
@F (q;r)




assumption indicates the probability of a consumer whose service expectation is
no more than q is decreasing and convex in r, in the sense that, a higher overall
experience will induce more consumers to form a larger service expectation in
the stochastic sense. Therefore, given the actual service eﬀort, the proportion
of satisﬁed consumers will decrease if overall experience increases. However,
the impact of overall experience in consumer satisfaction is diminishing.
 Increasing service experience and service eﬀort eﬀect in consumer satisfaction:
F (q; r) is supermodular in (q; r), i.e., F12(q; r)  0. The supermodular prop-
erty of F (q; r) indicates if q2  q1 and r2  r1, we have F (q2; r2) F (q1; r2) 
F (q2; r1) F (q1; r1), i.e., given two service eﬀort levels, the diﬀerence betweem
the proportion of satisﬁed consumers increases in overall service reference.
 F (q; q) is increasing and concave in q, i.e., when service experience and overall
experience are identical, the proportion of satisﬁed consumers is increasing and
concave. We denote f(q) = @F (q;q)@q = F1(q; r)+F2(q; r)jr=q  0 with f 0(q)  0.
10 Due to the assumed one-to-one relationship, QEt and UEt have the same distribution. The
domain of QEt may depend on rt. For ease of analysis, we do not consider the dependance in this
chapter.
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We discuss how consumers update overall experiences from past service encounters.
Behavioral theories have demonstrated that consumers update and adjust their per-
ceptions gradually based on their experiences due to the anchoring and adjustment
inclination. The widely adopted Bayesian updating mechanism in consumer decision-
making also conﬁrms that consumers adaptively change and adjust their perceptions
gradually. Therefore, we assume consumers gradually update their overall experi-
ences from their past purchase decisions according to the widely used exponential
smoothing rule, as
rt+1 = rt + (1  )qAt = rt + (1  )qt (4.4.1)
where  2 [0; 1] denoted as the memory factor depicts how important the most recent
service experience is in the overall experience, i.e., consumers overall experience
rt+1 is a weighted sum of the previous overall experience rt and the recent service
experience determined by ﬁrm eﬀort qt. If  = 0, consumers are memoryless, i.e.,
they only remember their most recent service experiences rt+1 = qt; while if  = 1,
consumers are memorable and they always perceive the overall experiences based
on their initial perceptions, i.e., rt = r0 for t  1. We assume the initial overall
experience is in the range r0 2 [qL; qH ] and since qt 2 [qL; qH ], the overall experience
in each period is always bounded as rt 2 [qL; qH ] for all t  0.
4.4.2.2 Demand Dynamics Under Social Interactions
Through social interactions, consumer satisfaction from service experiences inﬂu-
ences repurchase decisions of existing consumers and service choices of potential
consumers. Therefore, the total potential number of consumers that demand a ser-
vice in period t+1 denoted as At+1 depends on the potential demand At, the eﬀective
demand served dt, the proportion of satisﬁed consumers F (qt; rt) as well as the pro-
portion of dissatisﬁed consumers 1   F (qt; rt). We assume the potential demand
dynamics under social interactions as the following general form
At+1 = G (At; dt; F (qt; rt)) (4.4.2)
which is increasing in At, dt and F (qt; rt), while decreasing in 1   F (qt; rt). In
the sense that, the larger potential demand and existing consumer base, the more
potential demand; the larger proportion of satisﬁed consumers, the more potential
demand; while the larger proportion of dissatisﬁed consumers, the less potential
demand. The implicit assumption in the above demand dynamics is that we consider
an open market and there is no constraint on the market size.
In each period t, the eﬀective demand depends on the potential demand and the
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ﬁxed service price. In the following section, the linear demand function is assumed
as an example
dt = At   p (4.4.3)
where  captures the price sensitivity. We assume dt  0 and dt  At for any t  0
in this chapter. For tractability, we assume a linear form of the potential demand
dynamics under social interactions as
At+1 = At + dt ((qt; rt)F (qt; rt)  (qt; rt)(1  F (qt; rt)))
= At + dt (((qt; rt) + (qt; rt))F (qt; rt)  (qt; rt)) (4.4.4)
where (qt; rt)  0 is deﬁned as the positive social interaction intensity and (qt; rt) 
0 is termed as the negative social interaction intensity. We denote S(qt; rt) =
((qt; rt) + (qt; rt))F (qt; rt)   (qt; rt). Social interaction intensities may depend
on overall service experience and service eﬀort. We will discuss the dependance in
the following section. For the base model, we assume social interaction intensities
are constant as  and  respectively.
If    , we have a stronger positive social interaction eﬀect, i.e., a satisﬁed
consumer can attract more potential demand than the loss from a dissatisﬁed one;
while if  <  , we have a stronger negative social interaction eﬀect, i.e., dissatisﬁed
consumers may discourage more potential consumers than those drawn by satisﬁed
ones. The strength of social interaction can be empirically measured from real data.
For example, the survey conducted by McKinsey Quarterly suggests that in the
mobile-phone market, the pass-on rates for key positive and negative messages can
increase a company’s market share by as much as 10 percent or reduce it by 20 percent
over a two-year period (Bughin et al., 2010). The empirical study by Anderson (1998)
suggests that WOM from dissatisﬁed consumers is greater than that from satisﬁed
ones.
Given the initial potential demand size A0 which may depend on the reputation
of the ﬁrm, the condition in consumer market, the service characteristics, etc., the
initial sales quantity is d0 = A0   p. In period t, the potential demand At and the
eﬀective demand dt can be formulated as
dt = At   p = At 1 + dt 1S(qt 1; rt 1)  p = dt 1 (1 + S(qt 1; rt 1))
= (1 + S(qt 1; rt 1)) (At 1   p) = dt 2 (1 + S(qt 1; rt 1)) (1 + S(qt 2; rt 2))
=    = d0
t 1Y
=0
(1 + S(q ; r ))
The above demand dynamics indicate, if the proportion of satisﬁed consumers
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is small, such that  1+  F (qt; rt)  + for all t  0, the ﬁrm will lose consumers
gradually and may have to exit the market eventually, since 0  1 + S(qt; rt)  1;
while if F (qt; rt)  + for all t  0, the ﬁrm will attract more and more potential
demand gradually in time and expand its market share to cover the whole market
eventually. Therefore, the proportion of satisﬁed consumers plays an important role
in demand dynamics. Although, the model is stylized and simple, it indeed captures
the real situation in practice to some extent. In the following section, we make the
following technical assumptions
(+ )F (qL; qH)   + 1  0; lim
t!1 
t ((+ )F (qH ; qL)   + 1)t = 0
where  is the discount factor. The ﬁrst condition indicates, for any q 2 [qL; qH ],
and r 2 [qL; qH ], we have 0  1 + S(q; r), even if the service eﬀort is the lowest
and overall consumer experience is the highest, where the proportion of satisﬁed
consumers is the lowest as F (qL; qH). The second condition is to guarantee the
long-run discounted proﬁt is bounded, since for any q 2 [qL; qH ], and r 2 [qL; qH ],
the sequence of demand (also the single period proﬁt) after discounting is ﬁnite and
convergent, so that the long-run discounted proﬁt will be bounded and convergent.
A suﬃcient condition for the second assumption to be satisﬁed is (+1)  , where
 2 (0; 1), which will be used in the analysis in the following section.
4.4.2.3 Service Eﬀort Decision Under Social Interactions
The time-line of the model is as the following: at the beginning of each period t, the
total number of served consumers is dt; consumer overall experience is updated as
rt; consumers form service expectations QEt ; the ﬁrm decides the service eﬀort qt;
consumer satisfaction is realized; the period changes to t+ 111.
The service eﬀort cost is assumed to be increasing and convex in the eﬀort
level, denoted as C(qt). The proﬁt in each period is denoted as (qt; rt; dt) =
k(qt; rt)(p  C(qt))dt, where k(qt; rt) denotes the purchase volume for an individual
consumer. For an initial reference quality r0 and potential demand size A0, the long-
run discounted proﬁt maximizing problem is formulated as the following dynamic
11 As discussed in the previous section, we realize that consumer evaluation of the service quality
may be biased due to their cognitive and aﬀective factors, such as their preconceptions. For example,
built on Categorization Theory and Perception Distortion Theory, Iglesias (2004) ﬁnds that there
exists strong eﬀect of preconceptions about the service category on the perceptions of quality during
the service encounter. In this chapter, we do not consider this eﬀect in our model.
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programming model:




t(qt; rt; dt) (4.4.5)
s:t: rt = rt 1 + (1  )qt 1; t  1
At = At 1 + dt 1 ((+ )F (qt 1; rt 1)  ) ; t  1
dt = At   p; t  0
Using the overall experience and the eﬀective demand as the state variables in
each period, the above proﬁt maximizing problem can be reformulated as a two-
dimensional inﬁnite-horizon dynamic programming problem
V (r; d) = max
q2[qL;qH ]
(q; r; d) + V (r + (1  )q; d ((+ )F (q; r)   + 1)) (4.4.6)
and V (r; d) is the unique bounded solution, since the single period proﬁt is ﬁnite
based on the assumptions on the demand dynamics. Since the single period proﬁt
function is separable in terms of the number of consumers, i.e., (q; r; d) = d(q; r),
where (q; r) = k(q; r)(p   C(q)) is denoted as the expected proﬁt from an indi-
vidual consumer, the eﬀective demand size does not impact the optimal decisions.
Therefore, the initial demand is normalized as d0 = 1, and the above model can be
reduced as
V (r) = max
q2[qL;qH ]
(q; r) +  ((+ )F (q; r)   + 1)V (r + (1  )q) (4.4.7)
Therefore, the model developed in this chapter can also be interpreted with a repre-
sentative consumer, where the value function V (r) captures the long-run discounted
life-time value of each consumer under social interactions.
Compared with previous studies, especially the model developed in Aﬂaki and
Popescu (2012), we can see our model is more general. Existing models lack consid-
eration of either the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer purchased decisions,
or the reference eﬀect in consumer expectations. By incorporating social interactions
and reference eﬀect in consumer purchase behaviors, our model captures the reality
in consumer market to a great extent.
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4.5 Service Eﬀort Decision with Myopic Consumers Under Social
Interactions
In this section, we consider the service eﬀort decision in the situation where the
single period proﬁt only depends on consumer service experiences, i.e., the service
eﬀort, and consumer service expectations at the beginning of each period are inde-
pendently and identically distributed without reference eﬀect. The model is termed
the benchmark model. Consumers are myopic, since their service expectations are
independent of their past overall experiences and only the most recent service ex-
perience impacts satisfaction. Consumers are still backward-looking and inﬂuenced
by social interactions in purchase decision-making. The benchmark model is also
applicable for those services which are not frequently purchased, where consumers
generally interact with ﬁrms for limited times, such as in non-contractual settings.
Therefore, at the beginning of each period, consumer service expectation QE
is a random variable with distribution F (qE) = Pr(QE  qE) in the domain [q; q].
Each customer will purchase a constant unit of service and we also assume the single
period proﬁt function (q) is strictly concave with a unique maximizer qm 2 [qL; qH ]
denoted as the optimal myopic service eﬀort level, where 0(qm) = 0, since it only
maximizes the current period proﬁt. Therefore, the long-run discounted proﬁt of the
ﬁrm with the service eﬀort decision path ~Q = (q0; q1;    ) is given as







((+ )F (ql)   + 1)
!
(qt): (4.5.1)
Given a constant service eﬀort policy qt = q; t  0, the long-run discounted
proﬁt is given as
W (q) =
(q)
1   ((+ )F (q)   + 1)
which is increasing in  and , while decreasing in  .
We investigate the optimal service eﬀort policy in the above stylized model. To
facilitate the analysis, we assume the distribution function F () satisﬁes the following





1   ((+ )F (q)   + 1)

 0
where F1() is the probability density function of F (q). A suﬃcient condition for the
above GDFR property to hold is F (q) with the property of decreasing failure rate
(DFR), such as Gamma and Weibull distributions. The GDFR property guarantees
that there exits a unique maximizer of W (q), denoted as qc as the optimal constant
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service eﬀort level, since the ﬁrst order derivative of W (q) is
W 0(q) =
(q)










(q) is decreasing in q due to concavity of (q) and the second term is de-
creasing in q based on GDFR property. Obviously, we have W 0(qm)  0. Therefore,
there exists a unique service eﬀort level qc, such that W 0(qc) = 0, and qc  qm. To
reduce the complexity of the analysis, we assume the unique maximizer is in the
interior as qc 2 [qL; qH ].
Based on the assumption of the demand dynamics, the optimal service eﬀort
policy exists in the above problem. We investigate whether a constant service eﬀort
policy or an oscillated service eﬀort policy is optimal in the above proﬁt maximizing
problem. It turns out that the constant service eﬀort policy is optimal. Formally,
we have the following result:
Proposition 4.1. If consumers are myopic, the optimal service eﬀort policy is a
constant policy qt = qc  qm; t  0, where qc is the unique maximizer of W (q).
The optimal service eﬀort level qc is increasing in  and  , as well as . Besides,
(qm)
1 ((+)F (qm) +1)  W (qc)  (q
m)
1 (+1) and W (q
c) is increasing in  and , while
decreasing in  .
The above result is straightforward and intuitive. The managerial implication is
that, the ﬁrm should adopt a constant service eﬀort policy in order to maximize the
long-run discounted proﬁt if consumers are myopic. A constant service eﬀort policy
smooths the demand in each period; an oscillated service eﬀort causes variability in
demand, which reduces the long-run discounted proﬁt. Formally, suppose the ﬁrm
adopts the following alternative service eﬀort policy (q0; q1; qc;    ), where q0  qc 
q1. It can be checked that the long-run discounted proﬁt from the alternative service
eﬀort policy is smaller than that from the constant policy with qt = qc.
Therefore, if consumers are backward-looking and their purchase decisions are
inﬂuenced by satisfaction from the most recent experiences, the ﬁrm should provide
a larger service eﬀort compared with the myopic policy. Due to social interactions
among consumers, the ﬁrm should provide a higher service eﬀort if the positive or
the negative social interaction eﬀect is strong. On the one hand, more consumers will
be satisﬁed with higher service experiences, where more demand will be attracted;
on the other hand, fewer consumers will be dissatisﬁed due to higher service experi-
ences, where less potential consumers will be lost. However, a larger negative social
interaction intensity always leads to a smaller proﬁt. The discount factor  measures
the levels of importance of the proﬁts in future periods in operational target. A
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higher  indicates the manager trades oﬀ more short-term proﬁt for the long-term
beneﬁt from a large proportion of satisﬁed consumers.
The market coverage under the above constant service eﬀort policy depends on
the level qc. If ( + )F (qc)    > 0, the ﬁrm will gradually acquire consumers
and eventually cover the whole market; if (+ )F (qc)   = 0, the ﬁrm maintains
the initial market size all the time; while if ( + )F (qc)    < 0, the ﬁrm will
systematically lose consumers and eventually exit the market.
4.6 Service Eﬀort Decision with Adaptive Consumers Under Social
Interactions
In this section, we focus on the service eﬀort policy with adaptive consumers, where
their purchase decisions are subject to satisfaction depending on past experiences and
adaptively formed expectations under the inﬂuence of social interactions. Similar
to the benchmark model, we also assume the single period proﬁt only depends on
the service eﬀort level as (q), which is strictly concave with a unique maximizer
qm 2 [qL; qH ], where 0(qm) = 0, as the myopic service eﬀort policy. Consumer
overall experience is updated based on the exponential smoothing rule. Therefore,
the long-run discounted proﬁt optimization problem with initial overall experience
r is given as
V (r) = max
q2[qL;qH ]
(q) +  ((+ )F (q; r)   + 1)V (r + (1  )q): (4.6.1)
Given the initial overall experience r, if the ﬁrm adopts a constant service eﬀort
policy qt = r; t  0, we have
U(r) =
(r)
1   ((+ )F (r; r)   + 1)
which is increasing in  and , while decreasing in  .
We have the following result in terms of the boundary of the value function:
Lemma 4.1. The value function V (r) is decreasing in r, increasing in  while
decreasing in  . Besides, U(r)  V (r)  (qm)1 (+1) .
Proof. The decreasing property of V (r) is due to the decreasing property of F (q; r)
in terms of r. Since ( + )F (q; r)    + 1 is increasing in  while decreasing
in  , the value function V (r) is increasing in  while decreasing in  . Similarly,
U(r) is the long-run discounted proﬁt with the constant service eﬀort policy qt = r
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for any t  0, and (qm)1 (+1) is the long-run discounted proﬁt where the single-
period proﬁt is maximized and all consumers are satisﬁed in each period. Therefore,
U(r)  V (r)  (qm)1 (+1) .
The result indicates that starting with a higher overall experience, the monopo-
list will get a lower long-run discounted proﬁt due to the reference eﬀect on consumer
expectations which impact their satisfaction. The reason is straightforward, since
given service experiences which are determined by service eﬀort decision, the pro-
portion of satisﬁed consumers will be small if the overall experience is high, since
consumer expectations are high. The result also indicates the long-run proﬁt is
increasing in the positive social interaction intensity, while decreasing in the nega-
tive social interaction intensity. Given the ﬁxed proportion of satisﬁed consumers, a
large positive social interaction intensity will attract more consumers to purchase the
service; while a large negative social interaction intensity will reduce the potential
demand.
Similar to the previous section, we denote the following term
(+ )f(q)
1   ((+ )F (q; q)   + 1)
as the generalized failure rate (GFR), where f(q) = @F (q;q)@q = F1(q; q) + F2(q; q).
We assume the above term is decreasing in q, as the DGFR property. Based on
the DGFR property, there exists a unique maximizer qc as the optimal constant
service eﬀort level of U(q), such that qc  qm and qc is decreasing in  and  , while
increasing in . We assume qc 2 [qL; qH ]. Therefore, qc satisﬁes
0(qc) =   (+ )f(q
c)(qc)
1   ((+ )F (qc; qc)  ) =  (+ )f(q
c)U(qc)  0
4.6.1 Steady State Service Eﬀort Level
We consider the optimal service eﬀort decision that maximizes the long-run dis-
counted proﬁt as the strategic policy. We investigate the optimal service eﬀort deci-
sion and its dynamics from the above model. Let q?(r) denote the optimal service
eﬀort level when the overall experience is r, and s?(r) = r + (1   )q?(r) as the
corresponding optimal overall experience. The optimal service eﬀort decision path
is q?t = q?(r?t ) and the overall experience dynamic is r?t+1 = s
?(r?t ), denoted as the
state path.
Since (+)F (q; r) +1 is increasing in q, while V (r+(1 )q) is decreasing
in q since the value function is always decreasing, direct comparisons between q?(r)
and qm are not straightforward. We ﬁrst investigate the characteristics of the steady
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state service eﬀort level denoted as q?? in the strategic policy. In the steady state, the
service eﬀort decision will be always q??, and the overall experience is also r = q??.
We have q?(q??) = q?? and s?(q??) = q?? in the steady state. In the following section,
we denote H(q; r) = (+ )F (q; r)   +1 for simplicity, with the partial derivative
in terms of q and r denoted as H1 = ( + )F1; H2 = ( + )F2 and H < 1. The
condition at qc is simpliﬁed as
0(q)
U(q)
+  (H1(q; q) +H2(q; q)) jq=qc = 0:
We have the following result in terms of the steady state service eﬀort level q??
(if exists):
Proposition 4.2. If a steady state service eﬀort level q?? exists, then it is larger
than the myopic service eﬀort level and the optimal constant service eﬀort level, i.e.,
q??  qc  qm.
The above result indicates if the long-run discounted proﬁt optimization problem
admits a steady state, the steady state service eﬀort level and the corresponding
overall experience will be larger than the optimal constant service eﬀort decision as
well as the myopic service eﬀort decision. In Aﬂaki and Popescu (2012), the steady
state service eﬀort level in their model is always less than the optimal constant service
eﬀort level. The result in our model is diﬀerent from theirs, due to the reference eﬀect
in consumer expectation formation, which impacts consumer satisfaction thus their
repurchase decisions.
Starting from overall experience r = qc, the optimal constant service eﬀort
policy qt = qc will yield U(qc) =
(qc)
1 ((+)F (qc;qc) +1) which is smaller than the
long-run discounted proﬁt V (qc) generated from the optimal service eﬀort policy,
since the constant service eﬀort policy is only one feasible policy. The above result
directly implies the following boundary of V (r) starting with r = q??:
Remark 4.1. U(q??)  V (q??)  U(qc)  V (qc), since qc is the optimal constant
service eﬀort policy, which indicates V (q??)  U(qc).
Intuitively, the steady state service eﬀort level will be higher if the positive social
interaction intensity  is larger, since the sales quantity will be larger due to a larger
positive social interaction eﬀect. However, due to the reference eﬀect on consumer
expectations, a higher service eﬀort will induce a higher service experience, which will
lead to a higher overall experience thus a higher service expectation (in the stochastic
sense), which will decrease the proportion of satisﬁed consumers. Therefore, the
impact of  on the steady state service eﬀort level depends on the two opposite
forces. Similarly, there are two countering forces driving the impact of the negative
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social interaction eﬀect on the steady state. The following section investigates the
impact of various factors on the steady state service eﬀort level. In terms of the
impact of social interaction intensities, discount factor and the memory factor on
the steady state eﬀort decision, we have the following result:
Corollary 4.1. The steady state service eﬀort level in the strategic policy q?? (if
exists) is increasing in ,  ,  and .
The above result indicates, due to the social interaction eﬀect (both positive
and negative), the steady state service eﬀort level will be larger if social interaction
intensities are larger. Therefore, although consumers adaptively form higher service
expectations (in the stochastic sense), due to the reference eﬀect, the steady state
service eﬀort level should increase if social interactions become more intense. There-
fore, both the reference eﬀect in consumer service expectations and the inﬂuence of
social interactions demand a higher service eﬀort decision in the consumer market.
The monotonicity of the steady state service eﬀort in terms of the discount factor
 indicates managers should balance the tradeoﬀ between the short term proﬁt and
the long term beneﬁt, since the single period proﬁt (q??) will decrease if  increases.
As discussed before, the overall experience is inﬂuenced by all the previous transac-
tions, while the service eﬀort in service delivery determines the most recent service
experience. The monotonicity of the steady state service eﬀort in terms of the mem-
ory factor  indicates the ﬁrm should exert a high level of service eﬀort if consumers
rely more on their previous experiences when updating their overall service experi-
ences. In the sense that, if consumers have a high memory in their past experiences,
the monopolist should exert a high level of service eﬀort in service delivery; while if
consumers become memoryless, where only the recent service experiences dominate
their overall experiences, a slightly lower level of service eﬀort can be exerted. The
reason is due to the impact of overall experience in consumer service expectations.
A small  indicates consumer expectations before purchasing the service are less
inﬂuenced by their previous experiences, while inﬂuenced more by their most recent
experience. Under the extreme situation where  ! 0, the ﬁrm can provide the ser-
vice eﬀort level as low as qc if consumer expectations are only determined by their
most recent experiences; while under  ! 1 where in each period, consumers form
their expectations only because of their initial experiences r0, the ﬁrm should exert
a higher level of service eﬀort in the steady state. The monotonicity of the steady
state service eﬀort level is contrary to the result in Aﬂaki and Popescu (2012), due
to the reason that consumer service expectations are reference-dependent.
In the following section, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of the
steady state service eﬀort level. We ﬁrst investigate the monotonicity of the overall
experience path r?t under the strategic policy. The following result indicates the
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overall experience path is monotonic:
Lemma 4.2. Starting with any initial overall experience r0 2 [qL; qH ], the optimal
overall experience path r?t ; t  0 monotonically converges to the unique steady state
level q??.
The above result indicates, starting with any initial overall experience r0, the
overall experience path will monotonically converge to the unique steady state.
Speciﬁcally, if the initial experience is large, such that r0  q??, the optimal state
path of overall experience r?t will decreasingly converge to q??; while if the initial
experience is small r0  q??, the optimal state path r?t will increasingly converge
to q??. Correspondingly, if the initial experience r0 is larger, the ﬁrm should lower
the service eﬀort level such that q?t  r?t to reduce consumer overall experience
systematically, thus increasing the proportion of satisﬁed consumers to maximize
the long-run discounted proﬁt; while if the initial experience r0 is smaller, the ﬁrm
should increase the service eﬀort level such that q?t  r?t to increase consumer overall
experience systematically. The optimal service eﬀort decision with overall experience
rt is q?t = q?(rt) =
r?(rt) rt
1  . However, the optimal service eﬀort path may not be
monotonic. The following result summarizes the above discussion:
Corollary 4.2. If the initial experience r0  q??, the optimal service eﬀort level
will be less than the overall experience, i.e., q?(rt)  rt, and (1   )(q?t+1   q?t ) 
(rt   rt+1); while if the initial experience r0 < q??, the optimal service eﬀort level
will be larger than the overall experience, i.e., q?(rt)  rt, and (1  )(q?t+1   q?t ) 
(rt   rt+1).
In the following numerical study, we assume the proportion of satisﬁed con-
sumers under the overall experience r and the service eﬀort q is 8q; r 2 [0; 1]; F (q; r) =
1  (1 + r2) exp( q   a) 2 (0; 1); a  1, which can be checked with all the required
properties of F (q; r), such as F1 > 0; F2 < 0; F22 > 0; F12  0; F1(q; q)+F2(q; q) 
0; f 0(q)  0. Besides, the GDFR property is also satisﬁed for the feasible  and
 . Fig.4.6.1 shows the steady state service eﬀort level with respect to  2 [0; 1] and
 2 [0; 1] for ﬁxed  = 0:5 and  = 0:4, and Fig.4.6.2 illustrates the steady state
service eﬀort level with respect to  2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 0:5] for ﬁxed  = 0:5 and
 = 1. The single period proﬁt function is assumed as (q) =  q2 + q + 1, and
F (q; r) = 1  (1 + r2) exp( q   2).
4.6.2 Market Coverage
The steady state service eﬀort level also impacts the ﬁrm market coverage in the
long run. Given the initial demand or market size d0, in period t, the total number






















Fig. 4.6.1: Steady state service eﬀort level with respect to the positive social interaction




















Fig. 4.6.2: Steady state service eﬀort level with respect to the memory factor  and the
discount factor .
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((+ )F (q ; r )   + 1)
Therefore, depending on the steady state service eﬀort level, we have the fol-
lowing three situations in terms of the market coverage:
 Market expansion, i.e., the ﬁrm will gradually cover the whole market if ( +
)F (q??; q??)   > 0.
 Market contraction, i.e., the ﬁrm will gradually reduce the market size if (+
)F (q??; q??)   < 0;
 Market preservation, i.e., the ﬁrm will keep the market share as large as its
initial market coverage in the long run if (+ )F (q??; q??)   = 0.
Therefore, we can see the steady state service eﬀort determines the market coverage
policy of the ﬁrm. Under the market expansion situation, in the long run with an
open market, the ﬁrm will get inﬁnite demand in the extreme case. In the market
with a ﬁxed size, the result should be interpreted as the situation where the ﬁrm
eventually covers the whole market as a monopolist. Indeed, in reality, we always
observe that one dominant supplier covers a large market in a certain product or
service category. The result from our model may provide an explanation. Similarly,
under the market contraction situation, the ﬁrm will gradually lose the market, and
eventually exit the market in the long run. The result can also be interpreted as
the situation where ﬁrms eventually declare bankruptcy and exit the market. In
reality, we always observe that some ﬁrms eventually disappear from the market due
to bankruptcy, mergers or acquisition by others. The market contraction may also
explain that it may be the optimal decision for some ﬁrms to restrict their market
size to focus on a particular market niche. Under the market preservation case, the
ﬁrm will keep its initial market in the long run. In reality, we can ﬁnd that some
ﬁrms only focus on a particular consumer market or conduct business with certain
consumer segmentation with similar characteristics. The market preservation may
provide an alternative mechanism from the social interaction perspective.
Since the steady state service eﬀort level is increasing in ,  ,  and , based
on our model, these factors impact the ﬁrm market coverage policy. Based on the
assumption that F (q; q) is monotonic in q 2 [q; q], given  and  , there exists a
unique threshold service eﬀort level qS = q(; ) for the market expansion case, such
that
(+ )F (qS ; qS)   = 0) F (qS ; qS) = 
+ 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where the RHS is decreasing in  while increasing in  . Therefore, based on the im-
plicit function theorem, we have qS is decreasing in  while increasing in  . Therefore,
compared with the monotonicity of the steady state service eﬀort level, we have the
following result in terms of the impact of ,  ,  and  on the market coverage policy:
Proposition 4.3. Given the other factors ﬁxed, if the positive social interaction in-
tensity , the memory factor , or the discount factor  is large enough, the ﬁrm will
eventually cover the whole market. While the impact of the negative social interaction
intensity  on the market coverage is undetermined.
Proof. The result is straightforward from the comparison between q?? and qS .
The above result indicates the ﬁrm will eventually cover the whole market under
the optimal service eﬀort policy if the positive social interaction intensity , the
memory factor , or the discount factor  is large enough, since the steady state
service eﬀort level will become larger than the threshold level. However, the impact
of the negative social interaction intensity  is inclusive. The reason is immediately
obvious from the role of  in the threshold service eﬀort level. The demand dynamic
is always decreasing in the negative social interaction eﬀect for any service eﬀort
level, which drives the threshold service eﬀort qS to be large. Although the steady
state service eﬀort level q?? is also increasing in  , it is possible that the threshold
can not be achieved for any possible   0, which implies the market contraction
case.
The region of market coverage in terms of  and  is depicted in Fig.4.6.3
with the single period proﬁt function (q) =  q2 + q + 1, and F (q; r) = 1   (1 +
r2) exp( q   2) under  = 0:5;  = 0:4.
From the ﬁgure, we can observe that the impact of positive and negative social
interaction intensities on the market coverage may not be monotonic, especially when
 and  are both large. On the one hand, both  and  will lead to a higher steady
state service eﬀort decision q??; on the other hand, a large  will lead to a smaller
qS , although qS is increasing in  . The two forces lead to a non-monotonic impact
of  and  on the market coverage, especially when both positive and negative social
interaction intensities are high.
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Market coverage under social interactions
Market contraction
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Fig. 4.6.3: Market coverage in terms of the positive social interaction intensity  and the
negative social interaction intensity  .
4.7 Service Eﬀort Decision with Expectation-dependent Proﬁt Under Social
Interactions
4.7.1 Expectation-dependent Proﬁt Function
In previous sections, we assume the single period proﬁt function only depends on
the service eﬀort level, where the overall experience only impacts consumer service
expectations before purchasing, which further impacts the proportion of satisﬁed
consumers after consuming the service. The assumption is reasonable for the service
that each consumer only demands a ﬁxed unit of the service. As discussed in the
previous section, service expectations also impact consumer purchase behavior, es-
pecially the consumption quantity/volume k(q; r), during service encounters. In this
section, we take the impact of consumer expectations on the single period proﬁt into
consideration, and investigate the structural property of the optimal service eﬀort
policy and its dynamics.
We brieﬂy discuss the impact of expectations on consumer purchase behaviors
during service encounters. For an individual consumer who decides to purchase the
service, the purchase quantity/volume may depend on service expectation qE and
service experience qA thus service eﬀort q. Speciﬁcally, if service eﬀort thus service
experience is smaller than service expectation, the consumer may not purchase the
service, or reduce the purchase volume since expectations are not satisﬁed. While
if service eﬀort thus service experience is larger than expectation, the consumer
may consume more service during service encounter. In other words, the service
expectation qE serves as a reference point for the consumer, and the gap between qE
and q determines the magnitude of reference eﬀect in terms of proﬁt (since the price
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is exogenous) as R(q   qE ; qE). Therefore, the proﬁt from an individual consumer
is (q; qE) = (q) + R(q   qE ; qE). Obviously, given q, (q; qE) is decreasing in qE
(or the gap qE   q), or R(q   qE ; qE) is decreasing in qE .
The mean of service expectation QE as qE(r) =
 q
q q
EdF (qE ; r) is increasing
in r by the assumption of the FSD property. From ﬁrm perspective, the expected




(q; qE)dF (qE ; r) = (q) +
 q
q
R(q   qE ; qE)dF (qE ; r)
= (q) + R(q   q^(r); q^(r)) (4.7.1)
where q^(r) is a function of r. Speciﬁcally, if R(qE   q; qE) is decreasing in qE
linearly, then q^(r) = qE(r); if R(qE   q; qE) is decreasing and convex in qE , then
q^(r)  qE(r) based on Jensen’s inequality; if R(q qE ; qE) is decreasing and concave
in qE , then q^(r)  qE(r). Generally, (q; r) is decreasing in r.
The above simple analysis investigates the impact of reference eﬀect of consumer
expectations on the proﬁt from an individual consumer perspective. In the follow-
ing section, to reduce the complexity of the analysis, we adopt a simple absolute
diﬀerence model in the single period proﬁt function to capture the reference eﬀect
as
(q; r) = (q) R(r   q)
We assume R(x) is increasing and convex in x, with R(0) = 0. The convexity
captures the increasing marginal eﬀect of service experience on the proﬁt function,
i.e., given q, if overall experience r is higher, the proﬁt loss will be more. Therefore,
we have the corresponding ﬁrst and second order derivatives as well as the partial
derivative of (q; r) in terms of q and r as 1 = 0(q)+R0(r q); 2 =  R0(r q)  0
and 12 = R00(r   q)  0, 11 = 00(q)   R00(r   q)  0, 22 =  R00(r   q)  0,
which indicate the following property of (q; r):
 (q; r) is decreasing and concave in r, i.e., for a ﬁxed service eﬀort level, a
larger overall experience will reduce the single period proﬁt more;
 (q; r) is supmodular in (q; r), i.e., the impact of overall experience on the
single period proﬁt will increase if overall experience is larger;
 (q; q) = (q), where (q) is deﬁned the same as that in previous sections, i.e.,
if overall experience and the service eﬀort level are equal, there is no reference
eﬀect in the proﬁt function.
Based on the supermodularity property of (q; r), we know the optimal single period
service eﬀort level qM (r) = argmaxq (q; r) is increasing in r, which is intuitive and
reasonable.
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The long-run discounted proﬁt optimization problem is given as
V (r) = max
q2[qL;qH ]
(q; r) +  ((+ )F (q; r)   + 1)V (r + (1  )q) (4.7.2)
which is decreasing in r, since (q; r) is decreasing in r, and (+ )F (q; r)   + 1
is decreasing in r.
In the following section, we still denote H(q; r) = ( + )F (q; r)    + 1 as in
the previous section to simplify the analysis. The long-run discounted proﬁt of the
constant service eﬀort policy qt = r; t  0 with the initial overall experience r is
U(r) =
(r; r)
1   ((+ )F (r; r)   + 1) =
(r)
1   ((+ )F (r; r)   + 1)
and based on previous DGFR property, there exists a unique r = qc, such that
U(qc) is the maximum proﬁt under the optimal constant service eﬀort policy. We
also assume qc 2 [qL; qH ], which satisﬁes 0 + U(H1 +H2)jq=qc = 0.
The ﬁrm can adopt a myopic policy in service eﬀort decision which only maxi-
mizes the current single-period proﬁt, denoted as qM (r) with the service eﬀort path
qMt . The steady state service eﬀort level of the myopic policy is denoted as qM?. At
steady state, we have r = qM?; qM (r) = qM?, which satisﬁes the following condition
0(qM?) +R0(0) = 0
indicating qM?  qm, since R0  0. Therefore, due to the impact of expectations in
consumer purchase volume, the steady state service eﬀort level in the myopic policy
is always larger than the myopic service eﬀort level if proﬁt is not inﬂuenced by
consumer expectations. The long-run discounted proﬁt under the myopic policy is
denoted as VM (r) with the initial overall experience r. The myopic service eﬀort
path monotonically converges to the steady state, which can be proved by induction,
as shown in the following result:
Lemma 4.3. The myopic service eﬀort path and the overall experience path con-
verge to the unique steady state service eﬀort level qM? monotonically, which satisﬁes
0(qM?) +R0(0) = 0.
Proof. Since 0(q) is decreasing if q  qm, the steady state (if exists) qM? is unique.
If qM0 = qM (r0)  r0, we have r1  r0 and qM1  qM0 . Suppose qMt  qMt 1 and
rt  rt 1. We have qMt+1 = qM (rt)  qMt = qM (rt 1) and rt+1 = rt + (1  )qMt 
rt 1 + (1   )qMt 1 = rt. Therefore, the service eﬀort level path and the overall
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experience path both increase. Since the decision space is bounded and compact,
there exists a unique steady state. Therefore, the service eﬀort level path and the
overall experience path will converge to the unique steady state. The other direction
can be similarly proved.
4.7.2 Steady State Service Eﬀort Level
The optimal service eﬀort policy which maximizes the long-run discounted proﬁt is
also denoted as the strategic policy. We investigate the structural property of the
strategic policy in the following section, especially the steady state service eﬀort level
and the dynamics of the strategic service eﬀort policy.
Since U(H1+H2) = (q)
(H1+H2)
1 H is decreasing in q  qm, we assume U(H1+
H2)jq=qc  R0(0). Therefore, qc  qM?. The steady state (if exists) of the strategic
policy is solved as the previous section, which is larger than the optimal constant
service eﬀort decision and the steady state of the myopic policy as shown in the
following result:
Proposition 4.4. If there exists a steady state in the strategic policy, then the steady
state service eﬀort level satisﬁes q??  qc  qM?.
Therefore, similar to the previous section without the impact of expectations
on the single period proﬁt function, the steady state in the strategic policy is larger
than the optimal constant service eﬀort level and the steady state in the myopic
policy.
Compared with the previous section, we have an additional term in the above
steady state condition, i.e.,   (1 H)R0(0)1 H due to the reference eﬀect in the proﬁt
function, which serves as additional force for the ﬁrm to increase the steady state,
i.e., the steady state service eﬀort level q?? is larger than that in the previous section.
The comparative static analysis in terms of the parameters is given in the following
section:
Corollary 4.3. The steady state service eﬀort level q?? is increasing in  and  ;
while the monotonicity in terms of  and  is indetermined.
Proof. It is easy to see that the RHS of steady state condition is decreasing in ,
indicates the steady state is increasing in . Since the ﬁrst term of the RHS is
decreasing in  as in the previous section, and the second term is also decreasing in
 with the derivative as (1 )R
0(0)
(1 H)2 (1   F )  0, this indicates the steady state q??
is increasing in  . The ﬁrst term of the RHS is decreasing in  as in the previous
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section. While the second term  (1 H)R
0(0)
1 H in the RHS is increasing in , since the
ﬁrst order derivative in terms of  is (1 )HR
0(0)
(1 H)2  0. Therefore, the monotonicity
in terms of  is indetermined. The monotonicity in terms of  is also indetermined,
since the ﬁrst term in the RHS is decreasing in , while the second term is increasing
in  with the derivative as (1 )R
0(0)
(1 H)2 F  0.
From the above result, we can see the steady state service eﬀort level is also
increasing in  indicating how consumers form their overall experiences thus how
consumer expectations are inﬂuenced by their experiences inﬂuences the steady state
service eﬀort level. The steady state increasing in  indicates a large steady state
service eﬀort level should be provided if the negative social interaction eﬀect from
dissatisﬁed consumers is large. However, the monotonicity of the steady state with
respect to the discount factor  and the positive social interaction intensity  is
indetermined. We provide the following reasons. The monotonicity of the steady
state q?? in terms of the discount factor  depends on two countering forces: the
discounting eﬀect and the reference eﬀect. The discounting eﬀect refers to the fact
that if the discount factor  becomes larger, i.e., the ﬁrm cares more about the
future proﬁt, the steady state service eﬀort level q?? should become larger. The
reference eﬀect refers to the fact that the proﬁt will decrease if the steady state is
larger (since q??  qm). The monotonicity in terms of  depends on the relative
strength of the satisfaction eﬀect and the reference eﬀect. The satisfaction eﬀect
refers to the fact that since the proportion of satisﬁed consumers will increase if
the steady state increases, the ﬁrm should provide a high steady state service eﬀort
level. The reference eﬀect refers to the fact that a high service eﬀort level will induce
consumers to form even higher overall experiences, thus making it more diﬃcult to
serve the consumers and make them satisﬁed. Therefore, the ﬁrm should trade oﬀ
these counter-forces when making service eﬀort decisions in service delivery.
The existence and the uniqueness of the steady state service eﬀort is guaranteed
in the following result:
Proposition 4.5. The steady state service eﬀort level in the strategic policy is unique
which is stated in the above proposition, and the overall experience path monotonically
converges to the steady state.
Proof. The single period proﬁt is supermodular, since ^12 =   (1 )211+ 11 12 
0. We also know that second term in the value function is supermodular. Therefore,
the supermodularity of the RHS guarantees that the optimal state rt+1 = r?(rt) is
increasing in rt. Therefore, the state path is monotonic by induction. The uniqueness
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of the steady state is guaranteed by the monotonicity of the steady state condition
in the compact decision space.
Although, the state path monotonically converges to the unique steady state,
and the optimal service eﬀort path will also converge to the steady state, similar
to the above section, the optimal service eﬀort path in the strategic policy may
not be monotonic. It is possible that the ﬁrm should vary the service eﬀort levels
in order to guarantee a monotonic overall experience path. Therefore, we can see
in this section, although consumer purchase quantity or volume is subject to the
reference eﬀect, under certain conditions, the structural properties of the dynamic
service eﬀort policy may keep the same as in the previous section. The impact of
the steady state service eﬀort in the market coverage can be similarly analyzed as in
the previous section, which is omitted here.
4.8 Service Eﬀort Decision Under Satisfaction-dependent Social Interactions
4.8.1 Satisfaction-dependent Social Interactions
In previous sections, we assume both the negative and positive social interaction
intensities are constant for all consumers, i.e., each satisﬁed consumer will attract 
potential consumers while each dissatisﬁed consumer will discourage  potential con-
sumers to purchase the service. It is assumed that consumer WOM communication
activity does not depend on their satisfaction levels. However, in reality, especially
in the networked and social economy, a much satisﬁed consumer may spread his/her
experience to others more actively; while a much disappointed consumer may even
create web sites or blogs to criticize the seller which deﬁnitely has even high inﬂu-
ences on other potential consumer purchase decisions. Both satisﬁed and dissatisﬁed
consumers may even create virtual communities to praise or criticize the sellers on-
line. Therefore, social interaction intensities may depend on consumer satisfaction
levels.
In this section, to capture the above phenomenon, we consider a dynamic ser-
vice eﬀort decision model under satisfaction-dependent social interactions. We ﬁrst
deﬁne the satisfaction level in this section which depends on the gap between the
actual service experience qA and consumer service expectation qE . For an individual
consumer, the satisfaction level is deﬁned as SL = max(qA   qE ; 0) and the dis-
satisfaction level is deﬁned as DL = max(0; qE   qA) =  SL. Therefore, if the gap
between service experience and expectation is high, the satisfaction level or the dis-
satisfaction level will be high. A much satisﬁed consumer will attract more potential
consumers to purchase the service; while a much dissatisﬁed consumer will discour-
age more potential consumers to purchase the service (Anderson, 1998). Therefore,
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we assume for an individual consumer with expectation qE , social interaction inten-
sities are deﬁned as I = (SL) = (qA  qE);  I = (DL) = (qE   qA), which are
increasing functions of the corresponding satisfaction or dis-satisfaction levels. Since
each individual consumer is either satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed, we deﬁne satisfaction-




(q   qE)dF (qE ; r); (q; r) =
 q
q
(qE   q)dF (qE ; r):
Therefore, given the demand size dt, service experience qt and overall experi-
ence rt in period t, incorporating the above satisfaction-dependent social interaction




(qt   qE)dF (qE ; rt) 
 q
qt
(qEt   qt)dF (qE ; rt) + 1

(4.8.1)
Given rt (thus service expectations distribution is ﬁxed), we can see the positive
social interaction eﬀect (qt; rt) =
 qt
q (qt   qE)dF (qE ; rt) will increase in qt, while
the negative social interaction eﬀect (qt; rt) =
 q
qt
(qEt   qt)dF (qE ; rt) will decrease
in qt. Both (qt; rt) and (qt; rt) are decreasing in rt. Therefore, a general dynamic
service eﬀort decision model with satisfaction-dependent social interaction intensities
is formulated as the following dynamic programming model:
V (r) = max
q2[qL;qH ]
(q) +  (((q; r) + (q; r))F (q; r)  (q; r) + 1)V (r + (1  )q)
(4.8.2)
which is decreasing in r, since the average social interaction intensity ((q; r) +
(q; r))F (q; r)   (q; r) + 1 is increasing in q and decreasing in r. The existence of
steady state service eﬀort level and the related structural property can be analyzed
similarly to the above sections. We have the following result:
Proposition 4.6. Suppose ((q; r)+ (q; r))F (q; r)  (q; r)+ 1 is supermodular in
(q; r), concave in q, then there exists a unique steady state service eﬀort level and all
overall experience paths monotonically converge to the steady state.
Proof. Deﬁne (((q; r) + (q; r))F (q; r)  (q; r)) = H(q; r) and reformulate the
long-run discounted proﬁt optimization problem as
V (rt) = ^(rt; rt+1) + H^(rt; rt+1)V (rt+1)
where ^(rt; rt+1) = (
rt+1 rt
1  ) and H^(rt; rt+1) = H(
rt+1 rt
1  ; rt). ^(rt; rt+1) is
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supermodular in (rt; rt+1) since (q) is concave. The term H^(rt; rt+1)V (rt+1) is












V 0  0
since H11  0; H12  0; H1 > 0 and H2 < 0 as well as V 0  0. Therefore, the overall
experience paths monotonically converge to the unique steady state level.
Therefore, the service eﬀort policy under satisfaction-dependent social interac-
tions may follow the same structure and the optimal service eﬀort policy will lead to
a monotonic overall experience path, which will converge to the unique steady state
level.
4.8.2 Service Eﬀort Decision Under Satisfaction-dependent Social Interactions
Since satisfaction-dependent social interaction intensities are a general function in
terms of the overall experience and the service eﬀort, in the following section, we
assume the following special social interaction intensity function as
K = (q; r) =
8<:l; q < rh; q  r ; K = (q; r) =
8<:h; q < rl; q  r
where h  l and h  l since (q; r) is increasing in q, and (q; r) is decreas-
ing in q. In other words, social interaction intensities depend on the magnitude of
overall experience and service experience, i.e., service eﬀort. Compared with overall
experience, a higher service experience induces a higher positive social interaction
eﬀect and a lower negative social interaction eﬀect; while a lower service experi-
ence induces a higher negative social interaction eﬀect and a lower positive social
interaction eﬀect.
Therefore, the long-run discounted proﬁt optimization problem is formulated as
V K(r) = max
q2[qL;qH ]
(q) + HK(q; r)V K(r + (1  )q) (4.8.3)
where the social interaction eﬀect on demand dynamics is
HK(q; r) =
8<:(l + h)F (q; r)  h + 1; q < r(h + l)F (q; r)  l + 1; q  r
with Hh(q; r) = (h + l)F (q; r)  l +1  (l + h)F (q; r)  h +1 = H l(q; r). The
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above model is denoted as the dynamic service eﬀort decision model with satisfaction-
dependent social interaction eﬀect.
We deﬁne the long-run discounted proﬁt with the constant policy qt = r; t  0
as Uh(r) = (r)1 ((h+l)F (r;r) l+1) and the optimal long-run discounted proﬁts with
(h; l) and (l; h) as V h(r) and V l(r) respectively. Since Hh(q; r)  H l(q; r), we
always have V h(r)  V l(r). Therefore, the value function V K(r) is bounded as
Lemma 4.4. The value function is bounded as V l(r)  V K(r)  V h(r).
Proof. Since Hh(q; r)  HK(q; r)  H l(q; r), the result follows.
The corresponding steady states service eﬀort level under (h; l) and (l; h)
are denoted as q??h and q
??
l respectively. Since q
?? is increasing in  and  based on
the previous result in the above section, we have two separate situations: q??l  q??h
and q??l < q
??
h . Based on the steady state condition in the previous section, we have
the following result in terms of the comparison of the steady state service eﬀort level
in the above model:
Lemma 4.5. If h + l  l + h, the steady state service eﬀort level satisﬁes
q??h  q??l ; while if h+ l < l+ h, the comparison of the steady state service eﬀort
level is inconclusive.
Proof. The result is straightforward from the steady state condition. Speciﬁcally, if
h + l  l + h, at (q; q), we have
(h + l)(F1 + F2)
1   ((h + l)F   l)  
(h + l)F2
1   ((h + l)F   l)
 (l + h)(F1 + F2)
1   ((l + h)F   h)  
(l + h)F2
1   ((l + h)F   h)
which indicates q??h  q??l . However, if h + l  l + h, the above comparison is
inconclusive.
Therefore, the steady state service eﬀort level will be large when the total social
interaction intensities are large enough, in the sense that if social interactions become
more intense among consumers, the steady state service eﬀort level in the strategic
policy will become larger. The initial overall experience r0 and the steady state
service eﬀort level q??h or q
??
l imply the following result:
Proposition 4.7. If the initial overall experience is small enough, such that r0 
min(q??l ; q
??
h ) or q
??
l  r0  q??h , the optimal overall experience path will converge to
q??h monotonically, and V
K(r0) = V
h(r0).
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Proof. If r0  min(q??l ; q??h ), the optimal state paths are both increasing in V l(r0)
and V h(r0). Therefore, V K(r0) will take the optimal path of V h(r0) and achieves
the same value, i.e., V K(r0) = V h(r0). The same result holds for the situation if
q??l  r0  q??h .
The above result indicates if the initial overall experience is small, the ﬁrm can
always achieve the same result as the intense social interaction case by providing a
higher service eﬀort than the overall experience in each period.
However, if the initial overall experience is large, such that r0  max(q??l ; q??h ) or
q??h  r0  q??l , the optimal value function V K(r0) may not achieve V h(r0), and the
optimal service eﬀort policy is not obvious. It is possible that a constant service eﬀort
policy is optimal under certain conditions. We ﬁrst deﬁne the following constraint
long-run discounted proﬁt optimization problem with the constraint qt  rt; t  0
as:
W h(r) = max
qr
(q) + Hh(q; r)W h(r + (1  )q)
Since the optimal state path is monotonic, we make the following assumption:
If the optimal state path is decreasing in the original problem without the con-
straint, i.e., r > q??, we assume the constant service eﬀort policy is the optimal
policy in the above constraint problem, i.e., W h(r) = Uh(r).
Based on the above assumption, we have the following result in terms of the
service eﬀort policy under satisfaction-dependent social interactions:
Proposition 4.8. If max(q??l ; q
??
h )  r or q??h  r  q??l , the following provides a
suﬃcient condition for the optimality of a constant service eﬀort policy for V K(r):
 if max(q??l ; q??h )  r, for any q  r,
Uh(r)  (q) +  ((l + h)F (q; r)  h)V h(r + (1  )q);
 if q??h  r  q??l , for any q  r,
Uh(r)  (q) +  ((h + l)F (q; r)  l)V l(r + (1  )q):
From the above result, we conclude that, if the social interaction eﬀect is in-
ﬂuenced by consumer satisfaction levels, speciﬁcally, the gap between service eﬀort
decision and consumer overall service experience, the ﬁrm should adopt a constant
service eﬀort policy under certain conditions, especially when consumer initial over-
all experience is high which leads to high service expectations. The underlying forces
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for the constant service eﬀort policy to be optimal are discussed here. Suppose the
ﬁrm decides to provide a high service eﬀort to deliver high quality of service to the
consumer market. Consumers will adaptively form high service expectations. Al-
though in the short term, the high service eﬀort and high quality of service may
attract more consumers due to social interactions, in the long run the ﬁrm has to
maintain the high service eﬀort level with a high cost thus a low proﬁt margin since
consumer expectations have been raised; otherwise, a low service eﬀort decision will
lower the service quality which will decrease the demand substantially due to the
large negative social interaction eﬀect. It may be optimal for the ﬁrm to keep the
service eﬀort at the constant level all the time and keep consumer expectation at a
consistent level. Therefore, the managerial implication from the above result is that,
if the social interaction eﬀect depends on the adaptive consumer satisfaction level
which is determined by their experiences and the expectations, the ﬁrm should keep
the service eﬀort at a stable level to oﬀer a consistent quality of service. Varying
service eﬀort may always be suboptimal from a long-run perspective.
4.9 Discussion and Conclusion
For those frequently purchased products or services, expectations and experiences in-
ﬂuence consumer satisfaction in service delivery, which substantially aﬀects consumer
purchase decisions under social interactions. As both expectations and experiences
depend on how services are delivered during service counters through operations, bet-
ter understanding of the impact of social interactions in consumer purchase decisions
is critical for ﬁrms to properly manage expectations and experiences through service
eﬀort decisions to enhance consumer satisfaction and improve ﬁrm performance.
Drawn on extensive economic and marketing literature as well as consumer be-
havioral theories, we investigate service eﬀort decisions under social interactions,
which are captured as the WOM communication among existing and potential con-
sumers. Speciﬁcally, existing consumer repurchase decisions are aﬀected by satis-
faction which is determined by pre-purchase expectations and post-purchase expe-
riences. Potential consumers are inﬂuenced by existing consumers in service expec-
tations and purchase decisions through social interactions. Consumers are adaptive
in their service expectations which are inﬂuenced by past experiences from frequent
interactions with the ﬁrm. We investigate under such context, what would be the
impact of social interactions on service eﬀort decisions to achieve proﬁt optimization.
In the benchmark model, where consumer expectations are independent of pre-
vious experiences, the optimal service eﬀort policy is a constant policy, where the
service eﬀort level is kept constant to maximize the total discounted proﬁt. The
constant service eﬀort level is always higher than the short term proﬁt maximizing
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myopic level. If consumers are adaptive in expectations formation or their pur-
chase volumes are aﬀected by satisfaction, the optimal service eﬀort policy induces
a monotonic overall experience path which converges to a unique steady state. Due
to consumer adaptations in service expectations formation, the steady state service
eﬀort level is higher than either the myopic level or the optimal constant level.
Steady state service eﬀort levels are always increasing if social interactions be-
come more intense, especially for the negative social interaction eﬀect. If consumer
expectations are more inﬂuenced by overall experiences from previous interactions,
a higher level of service eﬀort should be exerted. Consumer satisfaction may also
aﬀect social interactions, where highly satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed consumers may be-
come more active in spreading service experiences. Under certain conditions, the
optimal service eﬀort policy follows the same pattern as previous models, such as
a monotonic overall experience path and a unique service eﬀort level. It is possible
that due to satisfaction-dependent social interactions, it may be optimal for ﬁrms to
adopt a constant service eﬀort policy.
Our results show that managers who ignore social interactions in consumer
purchase decisions, tend to invest less or exert insuﬃcient eﬀort in service delivery,
thereby systematically lose revenue due to lower consumer satisfaction from lower
level of service quality. Through sacriﬁcing the current proﬁt to oﬀer a high level of
service quality by exerting more eﬀort, a large proportion of existing consumers will
be satisﬁed which will lead to a larger demand through social interactions. However,
the optimal service eﬀort policy indicates always exceeding consumer expectations
through higher service eﬀort may not be optimal if consumers are adaptive in service
expectations, that is in order to maximize the long-run proﬁt, ﬁrms may need to
systematically lower (increase) consumer expectations if their initial expectations
are too high (too low). As discussed in the introduction, managers have already
adopted such strategies to manage consumer expectations. As stated in Rust and
Oliver (2000), “delighting the consumer ’raises the bar’ of consumer expectations,
making it more diﬃcult to satisfy the consumer in the next purchasing cycle and
hurting the ﬁrm in the long run”. The result in our model conﬁrms this argument.
Our result also indicates if social interactions depend on consumer satisfaction,
a constant service eﬀort policy may be optimal in the long-run, especially when con-
sumer initial expectations are high. Under such situations, exerting a lower service
eﬀort to lower consumer expectations or providing a high level of service quality to
meet consumer expectations are always suboptimal from proﬁt optimization perspec-
tive. On the one hand, since consumer expectations are already too high, oﬀering an
even higher level of service quality through more eﬀort to satisfy consumer expec-
tations increases operational cost, although a larger positive social interaction eﬀect
may be expected. On the other hand, providing a lower service eﬀort to lower con-
4. Dynamic Service Eﬀort Decision Under Social Interactions 128
sumer expectations may reduce satisfaction which will aﬀect future demand through
social interactions due to increased proportion of dissatisﬁed consumers. Therefore,
to strike the balance between service quality and quality of experience under social
interactions, a constant service eﬀort policy may be desired to oﬀer a consistent
quality of service to consumers.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Social interactions become increasingly inﬂuential in consumer purchase decisions.
Better understanding of the impact of social interactions in operations management
will help carry out the decision-making process more eﬀectively to improve prof-
itability and enhance consumer satisfaction.
Focusing on the three core operational decisions of capacity, price, and quality,
we investigate how social interactions would impact operational decisions and ﬁrm
performance in terms of proﬁt, market share, and consumer satisfaction. Based on
three research topics, key results and managerial insights are summarized below:
1. In terms of the impact of social interactions on the capacity and price decisions
in a competitive market
 Social interactions can always beneﬁt a monopolist ﬁrm, where a large
market can be covered with a smaller capacity and a higher price.
 Whether social interactions can beneﬁt ﬁrms in competition depends on
both social interaction intensity and competition intensity captured by
market size.
 Ignoring social interactions will lead to potential market and revenue loss
due to suboptimal price and capacity decisions in a monopoly market;
while in the competitive market, managers need to be aware of social
interactions and their interplay with competition in operational decision-
making.
2. In terms of the impact of social interactions on the capacity and price decisions
for frequently purchased products or services
 Both strategic and myopic policies in terms of price and capacity lead to
monotonic customer base dynamics which converge to a unique steady
state under social interactions.
 More intense social interactions drive ﬁrms to charge lower prices, build
higher capacities or obtain lower proﬁt margins which lead to larger steady
state customer bases.
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 Understanding the inﬂuence of social interactions, operational decisions
and performance can be better improved; under social interactions, op-
erational decisions should be adapted to balance the tradeoﬀ between
short-term proﬁt and long-term beneﬁt to achieve proﬁtability and mar-
ket expansion.
3. In terms of the impact of social interactions on service eﬀort decisions
 Service eﬀort decisions should be adapted to systematically increase (de-
crease) consumer overall experiences to properly manage expectations and
satisfaction, if initial overall experience is low (high).
 More intense social interactions lead to more resource investment in op-
erations to deliver high quality service to enhance consumer satisfaction;
satisfaction-dependent social interactions may drive ﬁrms to oﬀer a con-
sistent level of service quality through a constant level of service eﬀort
decisions.
 Being aware of social interactions and consumer adaptations in service
expectations as well as their interplay will help better allocate resources
to manage consumer expectations, experiences and satisfaction in service
delivery to increase proﬁtability.
To sum up, in viewing radical changes of consumer behaviors and consump-
tion habits due to the profound impact of information technology, through the three
research topics, this dissertation has studied the impact of social interactions on
operational decisions and performance in terms of capacity, price and quality in a
systematical and synthesized manner. This dissertation has contributed to both
management practices and academic research. For practical signiﬁcance, this disser-
tation has oﬀered fresh insight about the impact of social interactions in operational
decisions and ﬁrm performance. Based on analytical results, better understanding
of the role of social interactions has been derived, which will help managers improve
operational decision-making to achieve proﬁtability and market expansion in the new
economy. For academic signiﬁcance, this dissertation has contributed to the disci-
pline of operations management. In addition to the contributions that have already
been highlighted in each topic, this dissertation brings out important perspectives
for future operations management research. The three topics highlight the impera-
tive of incorporating consumer behaviors into operational decision-making. Eﬀective
operational decisions require hearing the voice of consumers, so that product and
service delivery can be carried out eﬃciently. It is crucial to take the changes and
the trends of consumer behaviors into operational decision-making before trying to
improve service systems. This dissertation also has contributed to the study of social
interactions from an operational perspective. The three topics have considered both
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positive and negative externalities from social interactions. We not only investigate
the impact of social interactions on the dynamics of a service system as existing stud-
ies, but also address how decision-making can be better improved to utilize social
interactions in operations management.
Limitations of this dissertation are obvious. First, like most theoretical studies,
we rely on analytical models to investigate the impact of social interactions on oper-
ational decisions and ﬁrm performance. Although these models are developed based
on empirical and experimental evidence, this dissertation suﬀers from the drawbacks
of typical modeling work, such as the assumptions made in the model construction.
Second, as a widely observed phenomenon in consumer markets, social interactions
have been directly incorporated into consumer purchase decisions, and we do not
focus on the underlying factors that drive the inﬂuence of social interactions. Third,
for analytical tractability, we adopt some simple functional forms to model social
interactions in consumer purchase decisions, and consumers are homogeneous in
preferences and utilities.
Several promising directions are foreseeable for future research. One possible
direction is to empirically examine the inﬂuence of social interactions in consumer
purchase decisions, where the result can be incorporated into the analytical models
to better improve operational decisions. Another possible direction is to extend the
models in several ways. We can consider service competition among asymmetric
ﬁrms with diﬀerent capacity costs, social interaction intensities or service values.
Intuitively, more eﬃcient ﬁrms with a lower capacity cost, or ﬁrms with higher social
interaction intensities will cover a larger market. Service competition under social
interactions can also be extended to dynamic settings. Extensions on the model of
social interactions are also promising. More sophisticated functional forms such as a
nonlinear relationship between customer base and consumer utility can be employed
in the analysis. For example, a concave-convex function with an inﬂection point
(threshold) can be adopted. Analytical models can also be extended to heterogeneous
consumers in terms of utilities and preferences. For example, consumers may be
heterogeneous in terms of price and service speed sensitivities. It is possible that
under social interactions, ﬁrms may adopt diﬀerent operational strategies to serve
diﬀerent types of consumers. For example, some ﬁrms may focus on service speed to
be more eﬃcient while charging higher prices; while others may focus on lower prices
with less eﬃcient service speed. Consumer satisfaction may be impacted by price,
service speed and other factors, which also can be extended for future research to
investigate the impact of social interactions. Hopefully, this dissertation will open up
new avenues for operations management research in the digital age. We expect more
investigations incorporating social interactions and other new trends of consumer
behaviors in the operations management area.
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6. APPENDIX
6.1 Appendix I: Proofs in Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Obviously, the optimal price and service rate decision will reduce consumer
expected surplus to be the same as the reservation value 0; otherwise, the ﬁrm can
increase its proﬁt by charging a higher price or providing a lower service rate while
keeping the arrival rate unchanged. Therefore, the monopoly proﬁt optimization
problem is reduced as
max
2[0;];<
(v +   CW (; )  ) (6.1.1)
where for ﬁxed  2 [0;], the proﬁt function is concave in , and the optimal service
rate is () = +
q
w









Therefore, if   , the proﬁt function is convex and the optimal arrival rate is





2(   ) ;

:
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. If i >  and i  w(i )2 , the expected surplus from ﬁrm i is always
increasing in i 2 [0;], which indicates for any possible intersection i 2 (0;),
S(i; i; pi) = S(   i; j ; pj)  S(; i; pi). Therefore, if v +    wi    pi 
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max(S(; j ; pj); 0), the market is fully covered by ﬁrm i; if S(; j ; pj)  max(v +
  wi    pi; 0), the market is fully covered by ﬁrm j.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 To prove Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3,
given the other ﬁrm’s service rate decision 2, the proﬁt optimization problem of the
ﬁrm is given as
max
12[ wv p ; p ]
(p  1)1 (6.1.3)
s:t: v + 1   p  CW (1; 1)  0
v + 1   p  CW (1; 1) = v + 2   p  CW (2; 2)
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]; i < i
and the Lagrangian function is deﬁned as
L(1; 1; 2) = (p  1)1 + 1











+ 3(1 + 2   )
where 1  0, 2 and 3 are the Lagrangian multipliers. The necessary condition for
the optimal solution is characterized by the following KKT conditions
 1 + (1 + 2) w
(1   1)2 = 0
p  1 + (1 + 2)  (1 + 2) w
(1   1)2 + 3 = 0
 2 + 2 w
(2   2)2 + 3 = 0
1





1 + 2    = 0







(2   2)2   
 1





which is denoted as 1 = G(; 1; 2; 1; 2).
We consider the following two cases 1 = 0 and 1 > 0 separately. If 1 > 0,
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then v + 1   p  w1 1 = 0. The proﬁt optimization problem is reduced as
max
12[ wv p ; p ]
(p  1)1 (6.1.4)
s:t: v + 1   p  w
1   1 = 0
1   w
1   1 = 2  
w
2   2
1 = G(; 1; 2; 1; 2) > 0
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]; i < i
which is further reduced as
max






v   p+ 1

1 (6.1.5)
s:t: 1   w
1   1 = 2  
w
2   2
1 = G(; 1; 2; 1; 2) > 0
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]i < i
If 1 = 0, then v + 1   p   w1 1  0, i.e., consumer expected surplus is
non-negative. The proﬁt optimization problem is reduced as
max
12[ wv p ; p ]
(p  1)1 (6.1.6)
s:t: v + 1   p  w
1   1  0
1   w
1   1 = 2  
w
2   2
1 = G(; 1; 2; 1; 2) = 0
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]; i < i
Without the constraints, based on the monopoly result, the optimal arrival
rate is given as m = min(?;) and the optimal service rate is given as m =
m + wv p+m . The other ﬁrm’s proﬁt optimization problem is the same due to
symmetry. Suppose the symmetric equilibrium exists. Since each ﬁrm adopts the
same service rate e and covers 2 , we have Proposition 2.2 if 1 > 0 and Proposition
2.3 if 1 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.2





e; e) > 0 in the symmetric equilibrium. We focus on the uniqueness
of the symmetric equilibrium. Denote  = wv p+
2
. Suppose 2 = e, and 1 =
e + , where   0. In equilibrium, 1 = 2 + () and 2 = 2   (), where
()  0. From 1   w1 1 = 2   w2 2 , () can be solved from the equation
F (; ) = 2( + )( +    )   2w + w = 0, where if  = 0, then  = 0.
Based on the implicit function theorem, we have the ﬁrst order derivative of ()
with respect to  as
0() =  F
F
=   2( + ) + w
2( + )( +    ) + 2( +    )  2( + )  2w







)2 w] > 0. The second order derivative
is denoted as 00(). In the symmetric equilibrium, given the other ﬁrm chooses
2 = 
e, the proﬁt with the service rate decision 1 = e +  is (e + ; e) =
(p  e   )(2 + ()) and we have
() = (e + ; e)  (e; e) = (p  e)()  
2
   ()
where the ﬁrst and second order derivatives with respect to  are
0() = (p  e   )0()  
2
  ()
00() = (p  e   )00()  20()
Therefore, if0(0)  0 and00()  0, the proﬁt function is concave in  2 [0; p e],
indicating e is the optimal service rate given the other ﬁrm chooses 2 = e.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. The symmetric equilibrium service rate is solved from 1 = 0, where 1 =
2 =

2 . We focus on the uniqueness of the equilibrium service rate. Given the other
ﬁrm chooses 2 = e, if one chooses 1 = e + , the eﬀective arrival rate will be












e   2 + 
where we have F (; ) = 2
 
e +    2   
  
e   2 + 
   2w + w = 0 and if
 = 0, then  = 0. Based on the implicit function theorem, we have the ﬁrst order
derivative of  with respect to  as
0() =   2
 





e   2 + 
  
e +    2   

+ 2 (   2)  2w
and 0( = 0) =   w
2(e 2 )(e 2 ) 2w
. The second order derivative is denoted as
00(). In the symmetric equilibrium, given the other ﬁrm chooses 2 = e, the proﬁt
with the service rate decision 1 = e +  is (e + ; e) = (p   e   )(2 + )
and we have
() = (e + ; e)  (e; e) = (p  e)  
2
   
where the ﬁrst and second order derivatives with respect to  are
0() = (p  e   )0()  
2
  
00() = (p  e   )00()  20()
It is clear that 0(0) = 0 which indicates 1 = e is a necessary condition for the
equilibrium. Therefore, if 00()  0, the proﬁt function is concave in  2 [0; p  e],
indicating e is the optimal service rate given the other ﬁrm chooses 2 = e.
Proof of Proposition 2.4 and 2.5 To prove Proposition 2.4 and 2.5, given the other
ﬁrm’s price decision p2, the proﬁt optimization problem of the ﬁrm is given as
max
p1
(p1   )1 (6.1.7)
s:t: v + 1   p1   CW (1; )  0
v + 1   p1   CW (1; ) = v + 2   p2   CW (2; )
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]
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and the Lagrangian function is deﬁned as
L(p1; 1; 2) = (p1   )1 + 1






1   p1   w




+ 3(1 + 2   )
where 1  0, 2 and 3 are Lagrangian multipliers. The necessary condition for the
optimal solution is characterized by the following KKT condition
1   (1 + 2) = 0
p1   + (1 + 2)  (1 + 2) w
(  1)2 + 3 = 0
 2 + 2 w
(  2)2 + 3 = 0
1





1 + 2    = 0
from which we can solve the multiplier as
1 = 1  

w
(  2)2   
 1




which is denoted as 1 = G(; 1; 2; p1). We consider two cases 1 > 0 and 1 = 0
separately.
If 1 > 0, then v+1  p1  w 1 = 0, consumer expected surplus is the same
as the reservation value. The proﬁt optimization problem is reduced as
max
p1
(p1   )1 (6.1.8)
s:t: v + 1   p1   w
  1 = 0
1   p1   w
  1 = 2   p2  
w
  2
1 = G(; 1; 2; p1) > 0
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]; i < i
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v + 1   w
  1   

1 (6.1.9)
s:t: 1   p1   w
  1 = 2   p2  
w
  2
1 = G(; 1; 2; p1) > 0
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]; i < 
where without the constraint, the objective function is concave and the optimal
arrival rate satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
v + 21     w
(  1)2 = 0
Since the proﬁt optimization problems of the two ﬁrms are identical, in the
symmetric equilibrium, each ﬁrm covers 2 . Therefore, the necessary condition for
the optimality of 1 = 2 is that
v +     w
(  2 )2





; p) > 0
where the ﬁrst condition holds since  < c, and from the condition 1(; 2 ;

2 ; p) >
0, we have Proposition 2.4.
If 1 = 0, then v + 1   p1   w 1  0, i.e., consumer expected surplus is
non-negative. The proﬁt optimization problem is reduced as
max
p1
(p1   )1 (6.1.10)
s:t: v + 1   p1   w
  1  0
1   p1   w
  1 = 2   p2  
w
  2
1 = G(; 1; 2; p1) = 0
1 + 2 = ; i 2 [0;]; i < 
where from the equality constraint 1 = 0, in the symmetric equilibrium 1 = 2 =

2 , we have the symmetric equilibrium price p
e =  + 4w
(2 )2   . Therefore, if










the above symmetric equilibrium price pe holds, which leads to Proposition 2.5.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. Suppose pe = v + 2   w 
2
is a symmetric equilibrium. Then from the
condition 1(; 2 ;




























0. Therefore, if c1 <  < c, the above condition always holds. We focus on the
uniqueness of the equilibrium price pe. Given the other ﬁrm chooses p2 = pe, if the
ﬁrm chooses p1 = pe   , the eﬀective arrival rate will be  = 2 + . From the




+ )  (pe   )  w




  )  pe   w
  2 + 
where we have F (; ) = (2 + )
 
(  2 )2   2
   2w = 0 and if  = 0, then
 = 0. Based on the implicit function theorem, we have the ﬁrst order derivative of









(  2 )2   2
  2(2+ )  2w






)2 2w > 0. The second order derivative is denoted as 
00().
In the symmetric equilibrium, given the other ﬁrm chooses p2 = pe, the proﬁt with
the price p1 = pe    is (pe   ; pe) = (pe      )(2 + ) and we have
() = (pe   ; pe)  (pe; pe) = (pe      )  (
2
+ )
where the ﬁrst and second order derivatives with respect to  are
0() =  2+ (pe   2   )0()  
2
00() = (pe     2)00()  40()
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  2  0, and if 00()  0, the proﬁt
function is concave in  2 [0; pe   ], which indicates pe is the optimal price given
the other ﬁrm chooses p2 = pe, and pe is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. The symmetric equilibrium price pe is solved from the condition 1 = 0
under 1 = 2 = 2 . We focus on the uniqueness of the equilibrium price p
e.
Given the other ﬁrm chooses p2 = pe, if one chooses p1 = pe   , the eﬀective
arrival rate will be  = 2 + . From the equality constraint 1 + 2 =  and




+ )  (pe   )  w




  )  pe   w
  2 + 
where we have F (; ) = (2 + )
 
(  2 )2   2
   2w = 0 and if  = 0, then
 = 0. Based on the implicit function theorem, we have the ﬁrst order derivative of









(  2 )2   2
  2(2+ )  2w






)2 2w > 0. The second order derivative is denoted as 
00().
In the symmetric equilibrium, given the other ﬁrm chooses p2 = pe, the proﬁt with
the price p1 = pe    is (pe   ; pe) = (pe      )(2 + ) and we have
() = (pe   ; pe)  (pe; pe) = (pe      )  (
2
+ )
where the ﬁrst and second order derivatives with respect to  are
0() =  2+ (pe   2   )0()  
2
00() = (pe     2)00()  40()
where if pe = + 4w
(2 )2   , then 0( = 0) = 0. Therefore, if 00()  0, the
proﬁt function is concave in  2 [0; pe   ], which indicates pe is the optimal price
given the other ﬁrm chooses p2 = pe, and pe is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 2.7
Proof. If   , given the arrival rate  2 [0;], the monopolist can set the ser-
vice rate at  =  +
q
w
 to maximize consumer surplus, which is always positive.
Therefore, in order to cover the whole market, consumer expected surplus should be
non-negative, as
S(; ) = v +   w
        0
Since S(; ) is concave in , we can solve the optimal service rate in the range
m 2 [v + (+ )  
p
(v + (  ) )2   4w
2
;
v + (+ ) +p(v + (  ) )2   4w
2
]
If  < , SM () is decreasing in . Therefore, if v+( ) 2pw   0,
the monopolist can still set the corresponding service rate to maximize consumer
surplus which is non-negative if the whole market is covered. Therefore, the optimal
service rate is still in the above range. While if v + (   )   2pw    < 0,
consumer maximum surplus is negative if the whole market is covered. Therefore,
the maximum market can be covered is m = v 2
p
w 
  <  and the optimal service




Proof of Lemma 2.8
Proof. Since   , each ﬁrm can cover the whole market. Therefore, the market








consumer expected surplus S(; +
q
w
 ) = v +    w+qw












 , consumer expected surplus S(; ) is smaller than S(;+
q
w
 ) for any
 2 [0;], since S(; )  S(; )  S(;+
q
w
 ) where the ﬁrst inequality follows








 ; while if  < +
q
w








 ), where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the increasing property of
S(; ) in terms of  for ﬁxed  2 [0;], and the second inequality follows from the
increasing property of S(; +
q
w
 ) for  2 [0;]. Therefore, all the consumers will
join the queue with  =  +
q
w
 to maximize their expected surplus. Therefore,
given the other ﬁrm chooses e =  +
q
w
 , the best response for the ﬁrm is to
set e =  +
q
w








 and covers the whole market.
Therefore, e = +
q
w
 is the unique equilibrium service rate.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. For any service rate , the maximum consumer surplus is given as S(  p
w
 ; ) = v+( ) 2
p
w  which is decreasing in . The curve S( ; )
depicts consumer surplus from the service provider with service rate  when the
competitor covers . Given e = 2 +
q
w
 , consumer surplus is maximized at






























































































 ). Since S(   ; 2 +
q
w
 ) is increasing while S(;  +
q
w














 ) is the unique intersection based on the assumption
that S(0; 2 +
q
w





 ). Therefore, if each
service provider sets e = 2 +
q
w
 , each service provider will cover one half of the
market and consumers will not deviate with strictly positive surplus.
We next prove the service rate  = 2 +
q
w
 is the best response if the other
ﬁrm sets e = 2 +
q
w
 . Given the other service provider sets 




one sets 0 < 2 +
q
w
 , we have 
0  pw < 2 +qw  pw < 2 ;    0 +pw >





















































 ) < S(






 ). Therefore, there exists at least one arrival rate 
e 2 (0  pw ; 2 ),
such that S(e; 0) = S(   e; 2 +
q
w
 ). In the range  2 [2 ;], we always have
S(; 0) < S(; +
q
w
 ) < S( ; 2 +
q
w
 ), i.e., S(; 
0) is under the curve S(),
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while S() is under the curve S( ; 2 +
q
w
 ). Therefore, there is no intersection
between the curve S(; 0) and S(; 2 +
q
w




is not a best response, since a small service service rate will cover a small market.
Given the other sets  = 2 +
q
w
 , if one sets 
00 > 2 +
q
w
 , we have 8 2
[2 ;]; S(; 
00)  S(; +
q
w
 ) < S(  ; 2 +
q
w
 ), where the second inequality
follows from the assumption that S( ; 2 +
q
w




S() in  2 [2 ;]. Therefore, there is no intersection between the curve S(; 00)
and S(; 2 +
q
w
 ) if  2 [2 ;]. There may or may not exist intersections in the
interval  2 [0; 2 ]. Therefore, 00 > 2 +
q
w
 is not a best response, since a large
service rate will cover a small market.
The model with price-dependent social interactions We consider the impact of
price-dependent social interactions on the optimal price and service rate decisions
for the monopolist. The social interaction intensity is denoted as (p), which is
assumed to be decreasing in p, i.e., the higher price of the service, the lower social
interaction intensity. Consumer expected surpus is
S(; p; ) = v + (p)  CW (; )  p
and the proﬁt maximization problem of the monopolist is given as
max
;p
(; p) = max
;p
(p  ) (6.1.11)
s:t: v + (p)  p  CW (; )  0
 2 [0;]; 0   < 
Since in equilibrium, consumer expected surplus is always reduced to the reser-
vation level, the problem is reduced as
max
;p
(; p) = max
;p
(v + (p)  CW (; )  ) (6.1.12)
s:t:  2 [0;]; 0   < 
for any given  2 [0;], the optimal service rate will be  = +
q
w
 , and the above
problem is reduced as
max
2[0;];p




Since given  2 [0;], and  = +
q
w
 , the optimal price satisﬁes v+ (p) 
p pw = 0, denoted as p(), which is unique and increasing in . Therefore, the
problem is reduced as
max
2[0;]
(v + (p())    2
p
w)
We deﬁne F () = (p()) for simplicity, with n th order derivative with respect
to  as F (n). It is straigthforward that F (1)  0. We assume F (n)  0; n  2. The
ﬁrst and the second order conditions of the above proﬁt maximizing problem are
(1)() = v   2
p
w + 2F  2+ F (1)2; (2)() = 2F   2 + 4F (1)+ F (2)2
and the third order derivative is (3) = 6F (1) + 6F (2) + F (3)2  0. Therefore, if
(2)()  0, the proﬁt function is convex in  2 [0;], i.e., the optimal arrival rate
is m = ; while if (2)() < 0, the optimal arrival rate will be
m = min(?;)
where ? satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition (1)(?) = 0. Correspondingly, the optimal





6.2 Appendix II: Proofs in Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. We have three situations: the steady state arrival rate under either policy is
smaller than the initial arrival rate; the steady state arrival rate under either policy
is larger than the initial arrival rate; the initial arrival rate in the middle of the two
steady state arrival rates.
If 0  c(; p), the sequence 1; 2;    ; is increasing, we have














since the arrival rate is increasing. We have c(II ; p(II))  c(I ; p(I)) 
1(
I ; p(I)), since the proﬁt function is increasing in 0 and 0  c(; p). There-
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fore, if 0  min, under either policy, the arrival rate path and the proﬁt path are
both increasing, indicating c(II ; p(II)) is the largest single period proﬁt. There-
fore, we have W (0)  
c(II ;p(II))
1  .
While if 0 > c(; p), the sequence 1; 2;    ; is decreasing, we have






v   p+ t

(6.2.2)





since the arrival rate and the proﬁt path are both decreasing. We have c(II ; p(II)) 
c(I ; p(I)) and 1(I ; p(I))  1(II ; p(II)). Therefore, the two proﬁt se-
quences fIt ; t = 1; 2;    ;1g and fIIt ; t = 1; 2;    ;1g intersect exact once. If 0 
max, under either policy, the arrival rate path is decreasing, indicating 1(I ; p(I))
is the largest single period proﬁt. Therefore, we have the resultW (0)  1(
I ;p(I))
1  .
If 0 is in the middle as min < 0 < max, the proﬁt sequence fIt ; t =
1; 2;    ;1g must be decreasing while the proﬁt sequence fIIt ; t = 1; 2;    ;1g





1  ). Therefore, the above results in the proposition hold.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. The proof is based on Topkis’ theorem (Topkis, 1998). We can also calculate




















which is increasing in . The single period proﬁt maximizing service
rate is









which is decreasing in .
Proof of Lemma 3.4
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Proof. The single period proﬁt function (; ^) is supermodular. For ﬁxed price
p, the constraint set of ^ is bounded in the set () = [0; p   wA+ ] which is
ascending in , i.e., for any  > 0 and x 2 (); x0 2 (0), it follows that
min(x; x0) 2 (0) and max(x; x0) 2 (). Therefore, by Theorem 2.8.2 in Topkis
(1998), ^?() = argmax^f(; ^) + V (^)g is increasing in . The monotonicity





1 > 0. Suppose ?t > ?t 1. We have ?t+1 = ?(?t ) >
?(?t 1) = ?t indicating ?t is increasing. While if ?1 = ?(0) < 0, we will have
a decreasing sequence f?t ; t  1g. Therefore, the arrival rate path in the strategic
policy is monotonic.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the solution of the steady state ?? based on Euler equation.
The partial derivatives of (; ^) with respect to  and ^ are deﬁned as 1 and 2
respectively. If the steady state exists, we have 0 =

2(















Therefore, the steady state arrival rate ?? is the solution to the following cubic











since the arrival rate is bounded. Therefore, the transvasality condition is satisﬁed,
indicating the solution to the above cubic function is a suﬃcient and necessary
condition for the steady state (Stokey et al. 1989, Theorem 4.15).
We next prove the uniqueness of the solution in the interval (0; p ). Deﬁne
F () = (p   2)(A + )2   w(A + ) + w. There exit three solutions,
namely (i), i = 1; 2; 3, to the equation F () = 0. We have F (0) = pA2   wA >
0 based on the assumption, and F ( p ) =  p(A + p )2   w(A + p ) + wp =
 p(A + p )2   wA   (1   )wp < 0. Since we also have F ( A ) =  wA < 0,
8 p ; F () < 0, and 8  A ; F () > 0, the three solutions satisfy (1) <  A <
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(2) < 0 < (3) < p . We have the unique solution 
?? = (3) 2 (0; p ). Besides, the
derivative of F () at ?? is negative.
Suppose 1 < 2. Deﬁne F (; i) = (p 2)(A+)2 w(A+)+iw,
and ??(i) = arg (F (; i) = 0) 2 (0; p ), i = 1; 2. We have F (??(1); 2) = (p  
2??(1))(A+
??(1))
2 w(A+??(1))+2w??(1) > F (??(1); 1) = 0.
Therefore, we have 0 < ??(1) < ??(2) <  based on the fact that F (??(2); 2) =
0 and 8 2 (0; ??(2)); F (; 2) > 0. Therefore, ??() is increasing in . The
monotonicity of ??() in terms of  can be proved similarly.
We compare the value of ?? in the strategic policy and M in the myopic
policy. From the previous result, we know M 2 (0; p ) is the unique solution to
the following equation  = p2   w2(A+) , which can be reformulated as G() =
(p   2)(A + )2   w(A + ) = 0, i.e., G(M ) = 0. We have F (M ) =
G(M ) + wM > 0. Therefore, we have 0 < M < ?? <  based on F (??) = 0
and 8 2 (0; ??(2)); F (; 2) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. In the steady state (strategic policy or myopic policy), the proﬁt function is









;  = M or ??
The derivative at M is larger than that at ?? since
@(??; ??)
@




indicating M  ??  ? and (M ; M )  (??; ??)  (?; ?).
Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. The cross derivative of (; ^) is ^ =  > 0 indicating the supermodularity.




= B +   w






which is increasing . The price will be set as
~p() = v +   w








increasing in  2 (0; ), indicating the derivative is bounded in (   2
q
w





(B+)). Based on the assumption B > w, we have   2
q
w
B > 0. Therefore,
8 2 (0; ); @~p()@ > 0, in the myopic policy, the price is also increasing in .
Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof. Mt is increasing in Mt 1. Since ~(M ) = M , if Mt 1 > M , we have Mt >
M . We also have







  Mt 1 < 0
based on the assumption, indicating M < Mt < Mt 1. Correspondingly, pM =
~p(M ). We have pMt = ~p(Mt 1)  ~p(Mt ) = pMt+1. The rest is by induction, which is
omitted here. The case for Mt 1 < M can be similarly proved.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. The proof is based on Euler equation. The partial derivatives of (; ^) with














where ^ = ?? is the solution to the cubic function (B+(1+))( )2 w = 0.




??; ??)?? = lim
t!1 
t(??)2 = 0
since ^ is bounded. Therefore, the solution to the above cubic function is a suﬃcient
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and necessary condition for the steady state.
We next prove the uniqueness of the solution in (0; ). Deﬁne F () = (B +
(1 + ))(  )2  w. We have F (0) = B2  w > 0 based on the assumption,
and F () =  w < 0. Since it is a cubic function, there are three solutions, namely
(i); i = 1; 2; 3 to the equation F () = 0. We also have 8  ; F () > 0; 8 
0; F () < 0. Therefore, these three solutions satisfy (1) < 0 < (2) <  < (3).
Therefore there exists a unique solution ?? = (2) in the interval (0; ). Besides,
the derivative of F () at ?? is negative.
Suppose 1 < 2. Deﬁne F (; i) = (B + (1 + i))(   )2   w, and
??(i) = arg (F (; i) = 0) 2 (0; ), i = 1; 2. We have F (??(1); 2) = (B +
(1+ 2)
??(1))( ??(1))2 w > (B+(1+ 1)??(1))( ??(1))2 w =
F (??(1); 1) = 0. Therefore, we have 0 < ??(1) < ??(2) <  based on the fact
that F (??(2); 2) = 0 and 8 2 (0; ??(2)); F (; 2) > 0. Therefore, ??() is
increasing in . The monotonicity of ??() in terms of  can be proved similarly.
We compare the value of ?? in the strategic policy and M in the myopic
policy. From the previous result, we know M 2 (0; ) is the unique solution to
the following cubic function G() = (B + )(   )2   w. We have F (M ) =
(B+(1+)M )( M )2 w > G(M ) = 0, since 0 <  < 1. Therefore, we have
0 < M < ?? <  based on F (??) = 0 and 8 2 (0; ??(2)); F (; 2) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. For three-period problem, using backward-induction, after simpliﬁcation, we












































































































Therefore, we conjecture that the service rate path, price path and the arrival
rate path follow the above relationship. Clearly, the above relationship is valid
for the problem with period 2 and 3. Suppose the above relationship is valid for
the ﬁnite-horizon problem with n periods. We can use induction to prove the above
relationship is also valid for the ﬁnite-horizon problem with n+1 periods. Therefore,
in the problem with n + 1 periods, at stage t = n   1, we have the arrival rate










. In period n + 1, the service provider
adopts the myopic policy given n, where we can solve the optimal service rate,





function is (n) which is linear in n. Then in period n, given the arrival rate ?n 1,
we solve the two-period proﬁt optimization problem with the optimal service rate,
price and arrival rate in period n as ?n(?n 1); p?n(?n 1); ?n(?n 1). Respectively,
we can solve the service rate, price and the arrival rate in the myopic policy in











we can conclude that ?n(?n 1); p?n(?n 1); ?n(?n 1) in period n follow the above
relationship. Substituting ?n into ?n+1(n); p?n+1(n); ?n+1(n), we can see the
above relationship is also valid. Therefore, we conclude the above relationships are
valid for all N  2.
6.3 Appendix III: Proofs in Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. Suppose Wt(q?) as the optimal long-run discounted proﬁt from period t on-
wards with the service eﬀort decision q? in period t. Given the service eﬀort decisions
q0; q1;    ; qt from the initial period to period t, the cumulative proﬁt from the period
t+1 onwards only depends on the service eﬀort decision from period t+1 onwards.
Therefore, if q? is the optimal decision in period t for the total proﬁt from period
t onwards, then q? will be also the optimal decision in period t + 1 for the total
proﬁt from period t+ 1 onwards. Therefore, we have Wt(q?) = maxq2[qL;qH ] (x) +
 ((+ )F (x)   + 1)Wt+1(q?), where the optimal decision must satisfy x = q?.
Therefore, we have 0(q?)+(+)F1(q?)W (q?) = 0, which indicates q?  qm, since
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0(q?) < 0. We also have W (q?) = (q?) +  ((+ )F (q?)   + 1)W (q?), which
indicates W (q?) = (q
?)
1 ((+)F (q?) +1) . Therefore, the optimal service eﬀort policy
is a constant policy in each period. Since qc maximizes W (q), the optimal service
eﬀort policy will be a constant policy with qt = qc in each period. At q? = qc, we
have 0(qc) =   (+)F1(qc)(qc)1 ((+)F (qc) +1) , where the RHS is decreasing in . Therefore, qc
is increasing in . The RHS is also decreasing in  , since the derivative in terms of 
is  F1(q
c)(qc)(1 )
[1 ((+)F (qc) +1)]2  0 based on the assumption that 1 > (+1). Therefore, qc
is increasing in  and  . Clearly, (q
m)
1 ((+)F (qm) +1) is the myopic policy, where the
service eﬀort decision is only to maximize each single period proﬁt, and (q
m)
1 (+1) is
the maximum long-run proﬁt if the all served consumers are satisﬁed and the single-
period proﬁt is the largest. We have (q
m)
1 ((+)F (qm) +1) W (qc)  (q
m)
1 (+1) .
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. Given the overall experience r0 = r + (1   )q, we reformulate the single
period proﬁt as v(r; r0) = ( r
0 r
1  ) since q =
r0 r
1  . Therefore, the problem is
reformulated as a sequence problem in terms of overall experience
V (rt) = max
rt+12Rt+1
v(rt; rt+1) + H

rt+1   rt
1   ; rt

V (rt+1) (6.3.1)
where the ﬁrm determines the optimal overall experience rt+1 2 Rt+1 = [rt + (1 
)qL; rt + (1   )qH ] through service eﬀort decision qt 2 [qL; qH ]. If the problem
admits a steady state service eﬀort level q??, based on the Euler equation, we have
the ﬁrst order derivative of the RHS at rt+1 as
v(rt; rt+1) + H

rt+1   rt
1   ; rt
 
v(rt+1; rt+2) + H

rt+2   rt+1




where at the steady state, rt = rt+1 = rt+2 = q??, and the above ﬁrst order derivative






2H ( H1 + (1  )H2)
1  H = 0 (6.3.2)
where H = H(q??; q??); H1 = H1(q??; q??); H2 = H2(q??; q??); 0 = 0(q??); U =
U(q??). The above equation is denoted as the steady state condition.
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Since H < 1, H2 < 0 and H1 + H2  0, H1 + 2H ( H1 + (1  )H2) 
H1 +  (H1   H1 + (1  )H2  H1) = (1  )(H1 +H2)  0. Therefore, we have
0 < 0, which indicates q??  qm.
Recall that at qc, we have 
0(q)
U(q)+ (H1(q; q) +H2(q; q)) jq=qc = 0. At qc, the ﬁrst





jq=qc = 00UU2 jq=qc  0, indicating 
0
U is decreasing
at qc. From the steady state condition, the second term can be simpliﬁed as








U jq=q??  
0(qc)
U(qc) . Therefore, we have q
??  qc.
Proof of Corollary 4.1
Proof. Clearly, the second term in the LHS of the steady state condition is increasing
in , which indicates 
0
U will decrease if  increases. Therefore, q
?? is increasing in .





is increasing in , indicating q?? is increasing in .





1  H = 0 (6.3.3)
where the term (H1+H2)1 H is increasing in , and   H2(1 H) is also increasing in .
Therefore, 0 is decreasing in , indicating the steady state q?? is increasing in ,
since 0 is decreasing at q??  qm.
We have the ﬁrst order derivative of (H1+H2)1 H in terms of  as

(F1 + F2)(1  H) + (H1 +H2)(F   1)
(1  H)2 = 
(F1 + F2)(1  )
(1  H)2  0
and the ﬁrst order derivative of H2(1 H) in terms of  is

F2(1  H) +H2(F   1)
(1  H)2 = 
F2(1  )
(1  H)2  0
which indicates 0 is decreasing in  , indicating the steady state q?? is also increasing
in  .
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Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. Since (q) is concave, the reformulated single period proﬁt function v(r; r0)
is supermodular, since the cross derivative v12(r; r0) =   (1 )200( r
0 r
1  )  0. The









V (r0) can be checked to be
positive, based on the assumption that F (q; r) is supermodular. Therefore, the
derivative of the RHS of the reformulated sequence problem in terms of rt+1 is
supermodular, which indicates the optimal state path in period t + 1, termed as
r?t+1 = s
?(rt) is increasing in rt based on the supermodularity property (Topkis,
1998). Suppose the optimal state path is not monotonic with any three sequential
states as r?t < r?t+1 > r?t+2. Since r?t+2 = s?(r?t+1)  s?(r?t ) = r?t+1, which indicates
a contradiction. Other cases can be similarly proved by contradiction. Therefore,
the optimal state path r?t must monotonically converges to a steady state. Since the
state path is monotonic and the domain Rt+1 = [rt+ (1  )qL; rt+ (1  )qH ] is
ascending in rt and compact, there exists a unique steady state of overall experience
path. The steady state condition also guarantees the uniqueness of the steady state,
since 0 is decreasing, and (H1+H2)1 H is decreasing in q by the DGFR assumption,
and the third term is also decreasing in q since H2 is increasing in q due to the
convexity of F (q; r) on r. Therefore, the steady state is unique which is q?? in the
previous result.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. The single period proﬁt is reformulated as ^(R; r) = (R r1  ; r) where R 2
[r+(1 )qL; r+(1 )qH ]. The long-run discounted proﬁt optimization problem
is reformulated as
V (rt) = max
rt+12[rt;1]




1   ; rt)  

V (rt+1) (6.3.4)
Suppose the steady state service eﬀort level exists as q??. In the steady state, we
have q?(q??) = q??. Applying Euler’s equation, we have the steady state condition
(1  H)1 + (1  )H2 + U [(1  H)H1 + (1  )HH2] = 0 (6.3.5)
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Substitute 1 and 2 into the above equation, we have
0(q) =










1  H  0 (6.3.6)
which is denoted as the steady state condition. Since H1 +
(1 )H
1 H H2  H1 +
H2; R
0(0)  0. Therefore, the steady state (if exists) satisﬁes q??  qc  qM?.
Proof of Proposition 4.8
Proof. In the ﬁrst case max(q??l ; q
??
h )  r, the condition says if the ﬁrm ﬁrst decides a
lower enough service eﬀort q, such that r+(1 )q  q?h, then the total discounted
proﬁt is less than the total discounted proﬁt under the constant service eﬀort policy,
since if max(q??l ; q
??
h )  r, for any q  r,
Uh(r)  (q) +  ((l + h)F (q; r)  h)V h(r + (1  )q)
 max
q
(q) +  ((l + h)F (q; r)  h)V l(r + (1  )q)
= V l(r) (6.3.7)
based on the previous result that the optimal state path of V l(r) is monotonically
decreasing.
In the second case q??h  r  q??l , the condition says if the ﬁrm ﬁrst decides a
higher enough service eﬀort q, such that r+(1 )q  q?l , then the total discounted
proﬁt is less than the total discounted proﬁt under the constant service eﬀort policy,
since if q??h  r  q??l , for any q  r,
Uh(r)  (q) +  ((h + l)F (q; r)  l)V l(r + (1  )q)
 max
q
(q) +  ((h + r)F (q; r)  r)V l(r + (1  )q)
 V l(r) (6.3.8)
